WWCP_OCPI

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Communication between the World Wide Charging Protocol (WWCP) and the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI v2.1.1, v2.2.1, v2.3.0, v3.0).

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WWCP OCPI
=========

This software will allow the communication between World Wide Charging Protocol (WWCP) entities and entities implementing the [Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI)](https://github.com/ocpi/ocpi) which is defined and used by the [EVRoaming Foundation](https://evroaming.org). The focus of this protocol is a scalable, automated EV roaming setup between Charge Point Operators (EVSE Operators) and e-Mobility Service Providers. The focus of this protocol is communication within a **peer-to-peer** topology of CPOs, EMPs and other actors, but since v2.2 also roaming hubs are defined.

## Implementation Details and Differences

The following desribes differences of this implementation to the official protocol specification.
Most changes are intended to simplify the daily operations business or to support additional concepts/methods like the *European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)*, the *German Calibration Law (Eichrecht)*, the *Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR)* or the *Public Charge Point Regulations 2023* within the United Kingdom.

- The [OCPI v2.1.x ](WWCP_OCPIv2.1.1/README.md) focuses on simple *"one peer connected to one other peer"*-topologies, but besides its simplicity the specification has unfortunatelly some design flaws. This implementation provides extensions and work-arounds for most of these issues to simplify the daily operations business, high availability or to support additional concepts/methods like *European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)* and the *German Calibration Law (Eichrecht)*.

- The [OCPI v2.2.x ](WWCP_OCPIv2.2.1/README.md) extends its focus on *"many CPOs/EMPs on one peer"*-topologies and introduces a *"hub*"-concept like OICP. This specification is unfortunatelly more a hack, has many design flaws and security issues. This implementation provides extensions and work-arounds for most of these issues to simplify the daily operations business, high availability or to support additional concepts/methods like *European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)* and the *German Calibration Law (Eichrecht)*.

- The [OCPI v2.3.0](WWCP_OCPIv2.3.0/README.md) is a simple data structures extension to v2.2.1. So the same problems exist and are still unsolved. This implementation provides extensions and work-arounds for most of these issues to simplify the daily operations business, high availability or to support additional concepts/methods like *European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)*, the *German Calibration Law (Eichrecht)*, *EU Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR)* and the *UK's Public Charge Point Regulations 2023*.

- The [OCPI v3.0](WWCP_OCPIv2.0/README.md) is very different to the v2.x versions of the protocol specification, closer to WWCP, but still has many (new) design flaws and security issues. This implementation provides extensions and work-arounds for most of these issues to simplify the daily operations business, high availability or to support additional concepts/methods like *European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)*, the *German Calibration Law (Eichrecht)*, *EU Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR)* and the *UK's Public Charge Point Regulations 2023*.    
**Note:** OCPI v3.0 has not been officially released yet. The latest draft, *"OCPI v3.0-2 review2, 2024-02-22"*, still contains numerous issues. As a result, this implementation should be considered a technology preview rather than a production-ready solution.

## 2nd-Secret Authentication via Time-based One-Time Passwords (TOTPs)

The OCPI authentication security model is fundamentally fragile. In practice it boils down to a single long-lived static access token plus the infamous *CREDENTIALS* module, a combination that has been known to be *broken-by-design* since the release of OCPI v2.2.

This implementation hardens OCPI by introducing a **second, independent secret** derived from a **Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP)**. Instead of authenticating requests solely with the static OCPI access token, each OCPI request carries an additional HTTP header containing a short-lived TOTP value based on a shared secret and rotating in fixed time slots (e.g. every 30 or 60 seconds). The existing OCPI access token effectively becomes a **stable identifier** comparable to a *login* or *username*, while the TOTP value serves as an **ephemeral time-bound authentication token**.

For deployments where TLS 1.3 is available, this scheme can be further strengthened by binding the TOTP generation to a specific TLS connection **(TLS Channel Binding)** using the *TLS v1.3 Exporter Material* feature. In this mode, the TOTP becomes a ***ephemeral session- and time-bound authentication token***, providing strong replay protection even in the presence of token leakage, stolen or logged tokens, reverse proxies, or partial TLS termination, as this token can no longer be replayed on a different TLS connection, even during the correct time window.

*Note:* As the TOTP value is not based on a different factor class *(“something you know”, “something you have”, “something you are”)*, this is a *Two/Three-Secret Scheme*, not a real *2nd, Two-Factor (2FA) or Multi-Factor Authentication Scheme (MFA)*. Time-based One-Time Passwords deliver a pragmatic, interoperable hardening of OCPI that directly mitigates the most critical weaknesses of the existing OCPI access token-only model without waiting for an unlikely consensus on mutual TLS (mTLS) adoption or the strange mutual certificate signing concepts of OCPI v3.

### Alignment with EU CRA and EU NIS2

This TOTP extension directly supports several technical obligations under the upcoming *EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)* and the *NIS2 Directive*, especially for manufacturers and operators of EV charging infrastructure:

- **CRA Article 10: “Security by Design”**
The native OCPI token model provides no replay protection and no mitigation against token theft. Adding per-request TOTP implements time-bound authentication, a recognized ***state-of-the-art security-by-design*** measure. Long-lived single static tokens are explicitly called out in *ENISA* and *BSI guidance* as not meeting state-of-the-art criteria.

- **CRA Article 15: “Vulnerability Handling & Mitigation”**
Static tokens are single points of failure. With TOTPs, a stolen token is insufficient to access the system, reducing the severity of credential-leak vulnerabilities and improving post-incident containment.

- **CRA Annex I, Essential Requirement 1 & 2**
These require protection against unauthorized access and prevention of common attack vectors. Short-lived TOTPs reduce the attack surface dramatically without requiring changes to OCPI message schemas.

- **NIS2: Risk-based Security Controls for Essential/Important Entities**
CPO/EMSP systems increasingly fall under NIS2 supervision (energy sector). Deploying short-lived, replay-resistant request authentication is aligned with required security hardening and incident-minimization strategies.

- **NIS2 Article 21(2)(d): Strong Authentication**
Article 21 mandates risk-based cybersecurity measures including “access control policies based on state-of-the-art authentication mechanisms” and “protection against stolen or compromised credentials”.
This TOTP authentication is a compliant step towards stronger authentication mechanisms by removing static credentials from the threat landscape.    
National NIS2 implementations (Germany: KRITIS-DA, Netherlands: NEN-7510 extensions, France: ANSSI référentiel) explicitly cite TOTP, short-lived tokens, or hardware-based second factors as acceptable measures.

- **CRA/NIS2: Operational Monitoring and Auditability**
Every couple of seconds all requests contain a fresh TOTP. This simplifies anomaly detection (invalid TOTPs, repeated attempts, replay patterns) and aligns with CRA/NIS2 expectations for continuous monitoring of security-relevant events.

## HTTPS/TLS Client Certificates

Advanced operators can enhance their security even further by using mutual authentication via HTTPS/TLS client certificates and client certficate chains. As this kind of security is below the HTTP layer, it can easily be mixed with the traditional Token-based authentication and TOTP-based 2nd-secret authentication.

The current security model assumes that a single OCPI client uses **exactly one HTTPS/TLS client certificate** for all **OCPI module endpoints** belonging to the same party-to-party relationship. In practice this is a reasonable and operationally simple constraint: a single certificate (or certificate chain) cleanly represents the authenticated identity of the client system, and module-level certificate fragmentation would significantly complicate key-management, revocation logic, and interoperability testing. If you operate environments where **per-module client certificates** are technically or organizationally required — for example, strict separation of accounting vs. operational telemetry, delegated subcontractor modules, or multi-tenant backend architectures where only specific modules are exposed through isolated gateways — please open an ***Issue*** and describe the concrete motivation, trust boundaries, and required certificate-handling rules. This will allow us to evaluate whether module-granular certificate configuration is justified and how it could be standardised without degrading the simplicity of the current model.

Nevertheless you can still implement stricter *"separation of concerns"* by deploying **dedicated OCPI clients** for specific responsibilities. For example, a backend may operate a standalone client instance for submitting *Charge Detail Records (CDRs)*, authenticated with its own **HTTPS/TLS CDR-SENDER client certificate**. The primary OCPI client would then use a different certificate that is *not* authorised to push CDRs. This pattern allows:

* **Granular privilege separation** at the TLS layer, enforced before any OCPI logic runs.
* **Independent revocation** of the CDR-SENDER certificate without impacting other modules.
* **Clear audit trails**, as each functional role maps to a distinct cryptographic identity.
* **Tight firewalling**, where only the CDR-SENDER client is permitted to access `CDRs module` endpoints.
* **Delegation to third parties**, e.g., outsourced billing providers with their own certificate while operational modules remain in-house.

In other words, while we do not define module-level certificate selection, you can achieve effective separation of duties by simply running multiple OCPI clients — each bound to its own TLS client certificate and authorised TLS trust profile — without modifying protocol semantics.

## HTTPS/TLS Client Certificate Public Key Infrastructre (PKI)

This implementation is agnostic to the origin of the HTTPS/TLS client certificates. As long as the server-side certificate validation logic can verify the presented chain, any trust model is technically acceptable: public Internet Root CAs, privately operated enterprise Root CAs, or even peer-to-peer self-signed certificates as commonly used in OCPI v3.0 *preview* and EEBus environments.

However, for production-grade interoperability and lifecycle management, the preferred architecture is a shared PKI hierarchy with a dedicated RootCA and clearly separated ServerCA and ClientCA intermediates. This enables deterministic trust domain boundaries and structured certificate workflows. On top of that, certificates can embed operational metadata:

- CPO/EMSP identifiers encoded as certificate attributes.
- Module- or role-specific authorisations (RBAC) expressed as *Extended Key Usages*, when per certificate or expressed as certificate attributes, when specific for CPO/EMSP identifiers.
- Environment namespaces (test, staging, production) for clean segregation.

Such a structured PKI avoids the ambiguities and operational fragility of ad-hoc certificate setups. It provides predictable revocation behaviour, consistent issuance policies, and machine-verifiable authorisation logic — all of which are essential when mapping OCPI authentication to **EU CRA/NIS2-ready** security requirements.

## Open Data by Default

This OCPI implementation includes an optional feature to enable anonymous, unauthenticated access to the VERSIONS, LOCATIONS, and TARIFFS endpoints via a simple WebAPI. By activating this feature, you can ensure compliance with regulatory requirements such as the *EU Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR)* and the *UK's Public Charge Point Regulations 2023*.

This capability facilitates the provision of open and transparent access to essential data about charging station availability, locations, and pricing, aligning with the mandates for publicly accessible information to promote interoperability and user convenience. Additionally, this feature simplifies integration with third-party platforms and services that rely on open access to charging infrastructure data, supporting a seamless user experience while adhering to legal standards.

### Your participation

This software is free and Open Source under [GNU Affero General Public License (AGPL)](LICENSE).
We appreciate your participation in this ongoing project, and your help to
improve it and the e-mobility ICT in general. If you find bugs, want to request
a feature or send us a pull request, feel free to use the normal GitHub
features to do so. For this please read the Contributor License Agreement
carefully and send us a signed copy or use a similar free and open license.

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